NOTES

OF

A SPEECH

CONCERNING A WAR WITH SPAIN.

THAT ye conceive there will be little difference in opinion, but that all will advise the king not to entertain further a treaty, wherein he hath been so manifestly and so long deluded.

That the difficulty therefore will be in the consequences thereof; for to the breach of treaty, doth necessarily succeed a despair of recovering the Palatinate by treaty, and so the business falleth upon a war. And to that you will apply your speech, as being the point of importance, and besides, most agreeable to your profession and place.

To a war, such as may promise success, there are three things required: a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent and politic choice of the designs and actions whereby the war shall be managed.

For the quarrel, there cannot be a more just quarrel by the laws both of nature and nations, than for the recovery of the ancient patrimony of the king's children, gotten from them by an usurping sword, and an insidious treaty.

But further, that the war well considered is not for the Palatinate only, but for England and Scotland; for if we stay till the Low Countrymen be ruined, and the party of the papists within the realm be grown too strong, England, Scotland, and Ireland, are at the stake.

Neither doth it concern the state only, but our Church other kings, papists, content themselves to maintain their religion in their own dominions; but

the kings of Spain run a course to make themselves protectors of the popish religion, even amongst the subjects of other kings: almost like the Ottomans, that profess to plant the law of Mahomet by the sword; and so the Spaniards do of the pope's law. And therefore if either the king's blood, or our own blood, or Christ's blood be dear unto us, the quarrel is just, and to be embraced.

For the point of sufficient forces, the balancing of the forces of these kingdoms and their allies, with Spain and their allies, you know to be a matter of great and weighty consideration; but yet to weigh them in a common understanding, for your part, you are of opinion that Spain is no such giant; or if he be a giant, it will be but like Goliah and David, for God will be on our side.

But to leave these spiritual considerations: you do not see in true discourse of peace and war, that we ought to doubt to be overmatched. To this opinion you are led by two things which lead all men; by experience, and by reason.

For experience; you do not find that for this age, take it for 100 years, there was ever any encounter between Spanish and English of importance, either by sea or land, but the English came off with the honour; witness the Lammas-day, the retreat of Gaunt, the battle of Newport, and some others: but there have been some actions, both by sea and land, so memorable as scarce suffer the less to be spoken of. By sea, that of eighty-eight, when the Spaniards, putting themselves most upon their stirrups, sent forth that invincible Armada which should have swallowed up England quick; the success whereof was, that although that fleet swam like mountains upon our seas, yet they did not so much as take a cock-boat of ours at sea, nor fire a cottage at land, but came through our channel, and were driven, as Sir Walter Raleigh says, by squibs, fire-boats he means, from Calais, and were soundly beaten by our ships in fight, and many of them sunk, and fmally durst not return the way they came, but made a scattered perambulation, full of shipwrecks,

by the Irish and Scotish seas to get home again ; just according to the curse of the Scripture, that they came out against us one way, and fled before us seven ways, By land, who can forget the two voyages made upon the continent itself of Spain, that of Lisbon, and that of Cales, when in the former we knocked at the gates of the greatest city either of Spain or Portugal, and came off without seeing an enemy to look us in the face? And though we failed in our foundation, for that Antonio, whom we thought to replace in his kingdom, found no party at all, yet it was a true trial of the gentleness of Spain, which suffered us to go and come without any dispute. And for the latter, of Cales, it ended in victory; we ravished a principal city of wealth and strength in the high countries, sacked it, fired the Indian fleet that was in the port, and came home in triumph; and yet to this day were never put in suit for it, nor demanded reasons for our doings. You ought not to forget the battle of Kinsale in Ireland, what time the Spanish forces were joined with the Irish, good soldiers as themselves, or better, and exceeded us far in number, and yet they were soon defeated, and their general D'Avila taken prisoner, and that war by that battle quenched and ended.

And it is worthy to be noted how much our power in those days was inferior to our present state. Then, a lady old, and owner only of England, intangled with the revolt of Ireland, and her confederates of Holland much weaker, and in no conjuncture. Now, a famous king, and strengthened with a prince of singular expectation, and in the prime of his years, owner of the entire isle of Britain, enjoying Ireland populate and quiet, and infinitely more supported by confederates of the Low Countries, Denmark, divers of the princes of Germany, and others. As for the comparison of Spain as it was then, and as it is now, you will for good respects forbear to speak; only you will say this, that Spain was then reputed to have the wisest council of Europe, and not a council that will come at the whistle of a favourite.

Another point of experience you would not speak of,

if it were not that there is a wonderful erroneous observation, which walketh about, contrary to all the true account of time; and it is, that the Spaniard where he once gets in, will seldom or never be got out again; and they give it an ill-favoured simile which you will not name, but nothing is less true: they got footing at Brest, and some other parts in Britain, and quitted it: they had Calais, Ardes, Amiens, and were part beaten out, and part they rendred: they had Vercelles in Savoy, and fairly left it: they had the other day the Valtoline, and now have put it in deposit. What they will do at Ormus we shall see. So that, to speak truly of latter times, they have rather poached and offered at a number of enterprises, than maintained any constantly. And for Germany, in more ancient time, their great emperor Charles, after he had Germany almost in his fist, was forced in the end to go from Isburgh, as it were in a mask by torch-light, and to quit every foot of his new acquests in Germany, which you hope likewise will be the hereditary issue of this late purchase of the Palatinate. And thus much for experience.

For reason it hath many branches; you will but extract a few first. It is a nation thin sown of men, partly by reason of the sterility of their soil; and partly because their natives are exhaust by so many employments in such vast territories as they possess, so that it hath been counted a kind of miracle to see together ten or twelve thousand native Spaniards in an army. And although they have at this time great numbers of miscellany soldiers in their armies and garrisons, yet, if there should be the misfortune of a battle, they are ever long about it to draw on supplies.

They tell a tale of a Spanish ambassador that was brought to see their treasury of St. Mark at Venice, and still he looked down to the ground; and being asked the reason, said, "he was looking to see whe"ther the treasure had any root, so that, if that were spent, it would grow again; as his master's had." But, howsoever it be of their treasure, certainly their forces have scarcely any root, or at least such a root

C

as putteth forth very poorly and slowly; whereas there is not in the world again such a spring and seminary of military people as is England, Scotland, and Ireland; nor of seamen as is this island and the Low Countries: so as if the wars should mow them down, yet they suddenly may be supplied and come up again.

A second reason is, and it is the principal, that if we truly consider the greatness of Spain, it consisteth chiefly in their treasure, and their treasure in their Indies, and their Indies, both of them, is but an accession to such as are masters by sea; so as this axletree, whereupon their greatness turns, is soon cut atwo by any that shall be stronger than they at sea. So then you report yourself to their opinions, and the opinions of all men, enemies or whosoever; whether that the maritime forces of Britain and the Low Countries are not able to beat them at sea. For if that be, you see the chain is broken from shipping to Indies, from Indies to treasure, and from treasure to greatness.

The third reason, which hath some affinity with this second, is a point comfortable to hear in the state that we now are; wars are generally causes of poverty and consumption. The nature of this war, you are persuaded, will be matter of restorative and enriching; so that, if we go roundly on with supplies and provisions at the first, the war in continuance will find itself. That you do but point at this, and will not enlarge it.

Lastly, That it is not a little to be considered, that the greatness of Spain is not only distracted extremely, and therefore of less force; but built upon no very sound foundations, and therefore they can have the less strength by any assured and confident confederacy. With France they are in competition for Navarre, Milan, Naples, and the Franche County of Burgundy; with the see of Rome, for Naples also; for Portugal, with the right heirs of that line; for that they have in their Low Countries, with the United Provinces; for Ormus, now, with Persia; for Valencia, with the Moors expulsed and their confederates; for the East and West Indies, with all the world. So that if

every