letter; but that which you put out, you put out at ence: so we have now to deal with the tables of mens hearts, wherein it is in vain to think you can enter the willing acceptance of our laws and customs, except you first put forth all notes either of hostility or foreign condition: and these are to be put out simul et semel, at once without gradations; whereas the other points are to be imprinted and engraven distinctly and by degrees.

Thirdly, Whereas it is conceived by some, that the communication of our benefits and privileges is a good hold that we have over them to draw them to submit themselves to our laws, it is an argument of some probability, but yet to be answered many ways. For first, the intent is mistaken, which is not, as I conceive it, to draw them wholly to a subjection to our laws, but to draw both nations to one uniformity of law. Again, to think that there should be a kind of articulate and indented contract, that they should receive our laws to obtain our privileges, it is a matter in reason of estate not to be expected, being that which scarcely a private man will acknowledge, if it come to that whereof Seneca speaketh, Beneficium accipere est libertatem vendere. No, but courses of estate do describe and delineate another way, which is, to win them either by benefit or by custom: for we see in all creatures that men do feed them first, and reclaim them after. And so in the first institution of kingdoms, kings did first win people by many benefits and protections, before they pressed any yoke. And for custom, which the poet calls imponere morem; who doubts but that the seat of the kingdom, and the example of the king resting here with us, our manners will quickly be there, to make all things ready for our laws? And lastly, the naturalization, which is now propounded, is qualified with such restrictions as there will be enough kept back to be used at all times for an adamant of drawing them farther on to our desires. And therefore to conclude, I hold this motion of union of laws very worthy, and arising from very good minds; but yet not proper for this time.

To come therefore to that, which is now in ques tion, it is no more but whether there should be a difference made, in this privilege of naturalization, between the ante-nati and the post-nati, not in point of law, for that will otherwise be decided, but only in point of convenience; as if a law were now to be made de novo. In which question I will at this time only answer two objections, and use two arguments, and so leave it to your judgment.

The first objection hath been, that if a difference should be, it ought to be in favour of the ante-nati, because they are persons of merit, service, and proof; whereas the post-nati are infants, that, as the Scripture saith, know not the right hand from the left.

This were good reason, Mr. Speaker, if the question were of naturalizing some particular persons by a private bill; but it hath no proportion with the general case; for now we are not to look to respects that are proper to some, but to those which are common to all. Now then how can it be imagined, but that those, which took their first breath since this happy union, inherent in his majesty's person, must be more assured and affectionate to this kingdom, than those generally can be presumed to be, which were sometimes strangers? for Nemo subito fingitur: the conversions of minds are not so swift as the conversions of times. Nay in effects of grace, which exceed far the effects of nature, we see St. Paul makes a difference between those he calls Neophytes, that is, newly grafted into Christianity, and those that are brought up in the faith. And so we see by the laws of the Church that the children of Christians shall be baptized in regard of the faith of their parents: but the child of an ethnic may not receive baptism till he be able to make an understanding profession of his faith.

Another objection hath been made, that we ought to be more provident and reserved to restrain the postnati than the ante-nati; because during his majesty's time, being a prince of so approved wisdom and judgment, we need no better caution than the confidence

1

we may repose in him; but in the future reigns of succeeding ages, our caution must be in re and not in persona.

But, Mr. Speaker, to this I answer, that as we cannot expect a prince hereafter less like to err in respect of his judgment; so again, we cannot expect a prince so like to exceed, if I may so term it, in this point of beneficence to that nation, in respect of the occasion. For whereas all princes and all men are won either by merit or conversation, there is no appearance, that any of his majesty's descendants can have either of these causes of bounty towards that nation in so ample degree as his majesty hath. And these be the two objections, which seemed to me most material, why the post-nati should be left free, and not be concluded in the same restrictions with the ante-nati; whereunto you have heard the answers.

The two reasons, which I will use on the other side, are briefly these: the one being a reason of common sense; the other, a reason of estate.

We see, Mr. Speaker, the time of the nativity is in most cases principally regarded. In nature, the time of planting and setting is chiefly observed; and we see the astrologers pretend to judge of the fortune of the party by the time of the nativity. In laws, we may not unfitly apply the case of legitimation to the case of naturalization; for it is true that the common canon law doth put the ante-natus and the post-natus in one degree. But when it was moved to the parliament of England, Barones una voce responderunt, Nolumus leges Anglia mutare. And though it must be confessed that the ante-nati and post-nati are in the same degree in dignities; yet were they never so in abilities for no man doubts, but the son of an earl or baron, before his creation or call, shall inherit the dignity, as well as the son born after. But the son of an attainted person, born before the attainder, shall not inherit, as the after-born shall, notwithstanding charter of pardon.

The reason of estate is, that any restriction of the

ante-nati is temporary, and expireth with this generation; but if you make it in the post-nati also, you do but in substance pen a perpetuity of separation.

Mr. Speaker, in this point I have been short, because I little expected this doubt, as to point of convenience; and therefore will not much labour, where I suppose there is no greater opposition.

CERTAIN

CONSIDERATIONS

TOUCHING THE

PLANTATION IN IRELAND.

PRESENTED TO HIS MAJESTY, 1606.

TO THE KING.

It seemeth God hath reserved to your majesty's times two works, which amongst the works of kings have the supreme pre-eminence; the union, and the plantation of kingdoms. For although it be a great fortune for a king to deliver or recover his kingdom from long continued calamities: yet in the judgment of those that have distinguished of the degrees of sovereign honour, to be a founder of estates or kingdoms, excelleth all the rest. For, as in arts and sciences, to be the first inventor is more than to illustrate or amplify: and as in the works of God, the creation is greater than the preservation; and as in the works of nature, the birth and nativity is more than the continuance: so in kingdoms, the first foundation or plantation is of more noble dignity and merit than all that followeth. Of which foundations there being but two kinds; the first, that maketh one of more; and the second, that maketh one of none: the latter resembling the creation of the world, which was de nihilo ad quid; and the former, the edification of the Church, which was de multiplici ad simplex, vel ad unum: it hath pleased the divine providence, in singular favour to your majesty, to put both these kinds of foundations or regenerations into your hand: the one, in the union of the island of Britain; the other, in the plantation of great and noble parts of the island of Ireland. Which enterprises being once happily accomplished, then that which was uttered by one of the best orators, in one of the worst