ject in view than the ostensible one of the public good.

His favorite reading was the history of Rome; and the example of that illustrious commonwealth, as well as his own experience, had shown him the entire incapacity of deliberative assemblies for the conduct of military affairs. The real objection to the plan of a state dictator was not, in fact, the danger resulting from the existence of such an office to the public liberty, but its utter inefficiency for the defence of the Union. The expediency of something of the kind, for state purposes, was felt in Virginia, in 1781; and, although the plan of creating a dictator was rejected, resolutions were passed, conferring on the Governor and Council extraordinary powers, amounting to an unlimited control over the purse and sword of the state, and requesting Congress to intrust authority of a similar description to the commanderin-chief of the forces of the Union, which was, in fact, done. The concern, if any, which Henry may have had in the project of constituting a dictator need not, therefore, diminish our confidence in his patriotism, although it might, perhaps, impair, in some degree, our respect for his judgment. Even in this particular, as the tendency of his mind was always for the boldest and most energetic course of action, the plan would not

have been very much at variance with the predominant traits of his character.

During the second year of Henry's administration as Governor occurred the intrigue against the influence of Washington, which has sometimes been called the Conway Cabal. The origin, character, extent, and precise objects, of this conspiracy are not very exactly known. It appears to have included a good many members of Congress, and some distinguished officers of the army. The success of General Gates, in the capture of the British troops under Burgoyne, seems to have given to Gates himself, and perhaps to others, the impression that he was superior, in efficiency as a commander, to Washington. Those who held this opinion may have thought it politic and patriotic to endeavor to substitute Gates for Washington in the chief command. Other influences, of a less honorable kind, no doubt, had their effect in determining the movement. The existence of the intrigue was made known to Washington through the indiscretion of General Conway, and the odium of the affair has finally rested upon him more directly than upon any other person, though it is difficult to view him in any other light than as an instrument of Gates. The intention seems to have been to act through the medium of

Congress, where the cabal had supporters; to disgust Washington by repeated slights, until he should be induced to resign, and then to appoint Gates in his place.

The appointment of Conway to the place of Inspector-General of the army, against the express advice of Washington, and after his hostility to the commander-in-chief was known, was the strongest demonstration made by the conspirators towards carrying their views into effect. The discovery of the plot by Washington, and his cool and discreet, but at the same time firm, conduct on the occasion, apparently disconcerted the leaders, and checked their operations for the time; while the total failure of Gates, in his southern campaign, removed every honest and plausible pretext for a change. Conway's characteristic indiscretion afterwards involved him in a controversy with Congress, which led to his compulsory resignation, and in a duel which nearly cost him his life. While suffering from the effect of his wounds, and in expectation of immediate dissolution, he wrote a penitential letter to Washington, in which he avows, with expressions of deep regret, his share in the plot, and declares Washington to be, in his eyes, the "great and good man." This voluntary confession of the principal agent in the plot, while it does but little to atone for his guilt, is

valuable as a complete bar to the suspicion, which might otherwise have arisen in some minds, that there was a real foundation for imputations of some sort upon the character or capacity of Washington. An attempt was made to implicate Henry in this cabal. An anonymous letter was sent to him, on this subject, dated at Yorktown, January 12th, 1778.

A passage in that letter, which is given as an extract from a letter of General Conway to a friend, coincides exactly in substance, and very nearly in the language, with one in a letter from Conway to Gates, which accidentally became known to Washington, and first revealed to him the existence of the plot. It is worthy of remark, that the substantial genuineness of the latter passage is here avowed by one of the conspirators, although the defence afterwards set up by Gates, when the affair was brought home to him by Washington, was, that the supposed extract was not in the letter, and was a "wicked forgery." The true state of the case might easily have been shown by producing the letter, which the conspirators never ventured to do. The reality of the passage in question is admitted by the strongest implication, in the first letters, written by Conway and Gates to Washington on the subject, as was remarked by Washington at the time, in his pointed and manly reply to

the latter. It is here directly avowed by one of the conspirators. The pretence of forgery was evidently an after-thought. This overture was treated by Henry in the way which might have been expected from his known character. He transmitted the communication to Washington, enclosed in the following letter;

66

Dear

Williamsburg, February 20th, 1778. Sir; You will, no doubt, be surprised at seeing the enclosed letter, in which the encomiums bestowed on me are as undeserved, as the censures aimed at you are unjust. I am sorry there should be one man who counts himself

who is not yours.

my friend,

"Perhaps I give you needless trouble in handing you this paper. The writer of it may be too insignificant to deserve any notice. If I knew this to be the case, I should not have intruded on your time, which is so precious. But there may possibly be some scheme or party forming to your prejudice. The enclosed leads to such a suspicion. Believe me, Sir, I have too high a sense of the obligations America has to you, to abet or countenance so unworthy a proceeding. The most exalted merit hath ever been found to attract envy. But I please myself with the hope, that the same fortitude and greatness of mind, which have hitherto braved all the difficulties and dangers inseparable from your sta