336

THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Division of Science into Theology and Philosophy. Division of Philosophy into three doctrines; concerning the Deity, concerning Nature, and concerning Man. Constitution of Primary Philosophy, as the common mother of all.

ALL History, excellent King, walks upon the earth, and performs the office rather of a guide than of a light; whereas Poesy is as a dream of learning; a thing sweet and varied, and that would be thought to have in it something divine; a character which dreams likewise affect. But now it is time for me to awake, and rising above the earth, to wing my way through the clear air of Philosophy and the Sciences.

Some waters

The knowledge of man is as the waters. descend from above, and some spring from beneath; and in like manner the primary division of sciences is to be drawn from their sources; of which some are above in the heavens, and some here below. For all knowledge admits of two kinds of information; the one inspired by divine revelation, the other arising from the senses. For as to that knowledge which man receives by teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as it is likewise in waters, which beside their own springheads, are fed with other springs and streams. I will therefore divide knowledge into Divinity and Philosophy; meaning by Divinity Sacred or Inspired, not Natural Divinity; of which I will speak hereafter. But this (namely, Inspired Divinity) I will reserve to the end, that with it I may conclude my discourse; being as it is the haven and sabbath of all human contemplations.

The object of philosophy is threefold - God, Nature, and Man; as there are likewise three kinds of ray-direct, refracted, and reflected. For nature strikes the understanding with a ray direct; God, by reason of the unequal medium (viz. his creatures), with a ray refracted; man, as shown and exhibited to himself, with a ray reflected. Philosophy may therefore be conveniently divided into three branches of knowledge: knowledge of God, knowledge of Nature, and knowledge of Man, or Humanity. But since the divisions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle; but are rather like branches of a tree that meet in one stem (which stem grows for some distance entire and continuous, before it divide itself into arms and boughs); therefore it is necessary before we enter into the branches of the former division, to erect and constitute one universal science, to be as the mother of the rest, and to be regarded in the progress of knowledge as portion of the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves. This science I distinguish by the name of Philosophia Prima, primitive or summary philosophy; or Sapience, which was formerly defined as the knowledge of things divine and human. To this no other is opposed; for it differs from the rest rather in the limits within which it than in the subject matter; treating only of the highest stages of things. Which science whether I should report as deficient or not, I stand doubtful, though I rather incline to do so. For I find a certain rhapsody and incongruous mass of Natural Theology, of Logic, and of some parts of Natural Philosophy (as those concerning First Principles and the Soul), all mixed up and confused, and in the lofty language of men who take delight in admiring themselves advanced as it were to the pinnacle of the sciences. But setting all high conceits aside, my meaning is simply this: that a science be constituted, which may be a receptacle for all such axioms as are not peculiar to any of the particular sciences, but belong to several of them in common. Now that there are very many axioms of that kind need not be doubted. For example, "if equals be added to unequals the wholes will be unequal," is a rule of mathematics. The same holds in ethics, as regards distributive justice; for in commutative justice the rule of equity requires that equals be given to unequals; whereas in distributive, if unequals be not given

ranges

to unequals there is the greatest injustice.' Again
Again" things
that are equal to the same are equal to one another," is like-
wise a rule of mathematics; but it is at the same time so potent
in logic as to be the basis of the syllogism." The nature of
everything is best seen in its smallest portions," is a rule in Phy-
sics of such force that it produced the atoms of Democritus;
and yet Aristotle made good use of it in his Politics, where he
commences his inquiry of the nature of a commonwealth with
a family. "All things are changed and nothing is lost," is
in like manner a rule in Physics, exhibited thus," The
Quantum of nature is neither diminished nor increased."
The same holds in Natural Theology, with this variation, " It
is the work of omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, and to
make nothing somewhat;" which likewise the Scripture testi-
fies; "I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever;
nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it."3"Things
are preserved from destruction by bringing them back to their
first principles," is a rule in Physics; the same holds good in
Politics (as Macchiavelli rightly observed), for there is scarcely
anything which preserves states from destruction more than the
reformation and reduction of them to their ancient manners.
"Putrefaction is more contagious before than after maturity,"
is a rule in Physics; the same is eminently true in Morals,
for the men who are most wicked and profligate produce less
corruption in the public manners than those who appear to
have some soundness and virtue in them, and are only partly
evil. "Whatever is preservative of a greater Form is more
powerful in action," is a rule in Physics; for that the connexion
of things should not be severed, nor a vacuum (as they call it)
admitted, tends to preserve the fabric of the universe; whereas
the collection of heavy bodies towards the mass of the earth
tends to preserve only the region of dense bodies; and there-
fore the first motion overcomes the last. The same holds in
Politics; for whatsoever contributes to preserve the whole
state in its own nature, has greater power than that which only
benefits the particular members of that state. It holds likewise
in Theology; for of the theological virtues, charity, which is
the virtue most communicative of good, excels all the rest.
"The force of an agent is increased by the reaction of a con-
trary," is a rule in Physics. The same has wonderful efficacy

1 Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. v. 3, 4, 5.
Ecclesiastes, iii. 14.

2 Ovid. Metam. xv. 165.

4 Macch. Discorsi, § 1.

4

in Politics, since every faction is violently irritated by the encroachment of a contrary faction. "A discord ending immediately in a concord sets off the harmony," is a rule in Music. The same holds in Ethics and in the affections. The trope of Music, to glide gently from the close or cadence (as they call it) when you seem to be on the point of it, resembles the trope of Rhetoric, of deceiving expectation. The quavering upon a stop in music gives the same pleasure to the ear as the playing of light on water or a diamond gives to the eye;

splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.'

"The organs of the senses resemble the organs of reflexions," is a rule in Perspective; for the eye is like to a glass, or to water; and it is the same in Acoustics, for the instrument of hearing is like an obstruction in a cavern. These few cases are enough by way of examples. But indeed the chief business of the Persian magic (so much celebrated) was to note the correspondences between the architectures and fabrics of things natural and things civil. Neither are all these which I have mentioned, and others of this kind, only similitudes (as men of narrow observation may perhaps conceive them to be), but plainly the same footsteps of nature treading or printing upon different subjects and matters. And it is a thing which has not as yet been carefully handled. You may perhaps find in the writings of the profounder sort of wits such axioms here and there sparingly inserted for the use of the argument they have in hand; but for any body of such axioms, which should tend primitively and summarily to the advancement of the sciences, no one has as yet collected one; though it is a thing of excellent use for displaying the unity of nature; which is supposed to be the true office of Primitive Philosophy.

There is also another part of this philosophy, which, if you look to the terms, is ancient, if to the thing which I mean, is new. It is an inquiry with regard to the Adventitious Conditions of Essences (which we may call Transcendentals), as Much, Little; Like, Unlike; Possible, Impossible; likewise Being and Not-Being, and the like. For since these do not properly come under Physic, and the logical discussion concerning them belongs rather to the laws of reasoning than to the existence of things, it is very proper that the consideration

1 Virg. Æn. vii, 9. : — Beneath the trembling light glitters the sea.

of them (wherein there is no little dignity and profit) should not be altogether neglected, but should find at least some place in the divisions of the sciences. Nevertheless I mean that it should be handled in a way very different from the common. For example; no one who has treated of Much and Little has endeavoured to assign a reason why some things in nature are and can be so numerous and plentiful, others so few and scanty; for it certainly cannot be that in the nature of things there should be as much gold as iron; that roses should be as abundant as grass; and that there should be as great variety of the specific as of the non-specific. In like manner no one in handling Similitude and Diversity has sufficiently explained why betwixt different species there almost always lie certain individuals which partake of the nature of both; as moss between corruption and a plant; fishes that stick to rocks and cannot move away, between a plant and an animal; rats and mice, and some other things, between animals generated of putrefaction and of seed; bats, between birds and beasts; flyingfish (which are now well known), between birds and fishes; seals, between fishes and quadrupeds; and the like. Nor has any one inquired the reason why, seeing that likes delight in likes, iron does not attract iron, which the magnet does; nor why gold does not attract gold, though it does attract quicksilver. With regard to these and similar things in the discussion of Transcendentals there is a deep silence; for men have aimed rather at height of speech than at the subtleties of things. Wherefore I wish the real and solid inquiry, according to the laws of nature and not of language, concerning these Transcendentals or Adventitious Conditions of Essences, to have a place in Primitive or Summary Philosophy. And so much for Philosophia Prima (or Sapience), which I have with reason set down as deficient.

CHAP. II.

Of Natural Theology; and the Doctrine concerning Angels and Spirits, which is an Appendix of the same.

THIS science being therefore first placed as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, who had so much heavenly issue,