fill but Matter: To other parts be adds Senfe, or fpontaneous Motion, and thofe other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted but the Power of God may go; but if we venture to go one Step further, and Jay, God may give to Matter Thought, Reafon, and Volition, as well as Senfe and fpontaneous Motion, there are Men ready to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; because it deftroys the Effence, or changes the ef Jential Properties of Matter, &c. Well! and a very good Reafon it would certainly be; for Omnipotence itself cannot produce Impoffibilities, cannot effect Contradictions, cannot make the fame Thing to be, and not to be, at the fame time; cannot make a Subftance, which, as folidly extended, muft refift all Change of State, become (while it continues unactive and dead) Life, Senfe, and fpontaneous Motion; for that is directly affirming, that the fame Portion of Matter, which is unactive, dull, and dead, may be at the fame time living, fenfible, and fpontaneously moving. To fay the truth, his Zeal to fupport his Argument, and confound his Adverfary, has thrown him into fuch Inconfiftencies of Thought and Expreffion, as could never have proceeded from cool and fober Reason. For Inftance, where he fays above, To fome parts of Matter, God fuperadds Motion, but it has ftill the Effence of Matter. What does he mean by faying, It has ftill the Effence of Matter? Does he mean, that Motion has the Effence of Matter, or is effential to it, or a Mode of of it: Neither of these could be his Meaning; he could only mean, that that Portion of Matter to which Motion is fuperadded, has still the Effence of Matter. Who doubts it? And therefore is intirely diftinct from the Motion fu-. peradded, which is really and truly nothing less than an Emanation or Impreffion from the Original and Eternal Fountain of Life and Power; and, confequently, intirely diftinct from Matter. If Solidity, Inactivity, and Refiftance, be the effential Properties of Matter, it will unavoidably follow, that all thofe Effects commonly afcribed to certain natural Powers refiding in Matter, are immediately produced by the Power of an immaterial Being, who first created this dead Substance Matter, originally impreffed, and still continues to imprefs Motion upon it. Now whatsoever begins Motion where it was not, and ftops it where it was, that effects a Change from Reft to Motion, and from Motion to Reft, and that arbitrarily, can never be Matter, whofe effential Property it is neceffarily to refift all change of its State, either of Reft or Motion. I therefore conclude, that whatever Principle or Being can arbitrarily effect a Change of the prefent State of Reft or Motion, in that Portion of Matter which compofes the Body of any Animal, cannot be the Matter of the Body itself, which neceffarily refifts or opposes all change of its prefent State, and therefore must be concluded to be an active, immaterial, and fpiritual Substance, which, without any violence to Philofophy, we may venture to call a Soul. Pardon D 2 me, me, Madam, for leading you into this intricate dry Speculation; my Subject led me into it, and requir'd fome little Examination in this place. Some further Confiderations upon this Subject, and the Reverend Father's devilish Contrivance to account for all animal Functions and Opera→ tions, without allowing them to have Souls, we fhall defer to a more proper Place, and proceed to the next Head of Inquiry. II. Of the Neceffity of a Language between By Language we are not only to understand a Sequel of articulate Sounds, by which Men have agreed to exprefs their Ideas and Sentiments to each other, but any fort or kind of inarticu late Sounds, Geftures, or Motions, by which, in the feveral Tribes and Families of the Brute-Creation, the Individuals communicate their Sentiments, their Wants, their Defires to each other and these are, no doubt, as different as the Species themselves, and as expreffive and fignificant to them as our moft articulate Sounds can be to us. Of thi there can be no manner of doubt, efpecially among thofe that, live in fo ciety, as particularly Pigeons, Rooks, Swallows, and Storks among Birds; Bees and Ants among Infects; and particularly the Beavers among Beafts; and no doubt but there muft be the fame among Fishes, thofe especially which at certain Seafons remove in Shoals to different parts of their Element. All, and each of these, fpeak, fpeak, undoubtedly, a Language proper and peculiar to their Species, which are as expreffive and intelligible to them, as our Language is to us; and may, not improperly, be called the different Dialects of the Language of Nature. Our Author, in the midst of this Inquiry, has dropp'd an Expreffion which I cannot underftand, as having no apparent relation to his Subject, or any Connection with what goes before, or follows after. Page 27, He fays, Angels fpeak to each other, yet have no Voice. How bold, how crude, how unphilofophical is this Expreffion? Have Angels a Voice to speak to us, and none to speak to one another? Did he never read of the Conversation of Angels with the Patriarchs and Holy Men of the Old Teftament? Of the Angel Gabriel delivering a Meffage from God to Zacharias, concerning the Birth of John the Baptift, Luke i, and another to the Bleffed Virgin, concerning the Incarnation of our Lord Jefus Chrift? Did he never read of the Voice of the Archangel, 1 Theff. iv. 16? If he only means, that they have not a Voice like us, articudated by the Organs of the Human Body, and different Modulations of the Air; who difputes it? But is this fufficient to justify him in faying they have no Voice? Does he allow a Voice, or fomething equivalent to it, to the lowest Orders of Brutes and Infects, and will he allow none to the highest Orders of intellectual Beings? How furprizing, how unaccountable is this? Surely he had as mean an Opinion of the good Senfe of " the the fine Lady to whom he was writing, as he had a good one of his own. But to return: He obferves, very juftly, that we have a thoufand ways of expreffing our Paffions, our Sentiments, our Hopes and Fears, our Defires and Wants, our Joys, or Sufferings, without the Mediation of Words. When we are pleafed (fays he, pag. 23.) every thing in us speaks: Do we not continually speak by certain Looks, by a Motion of the Head, a Gesture, nay the leaft Sign in the World? Ay! and when we are difpleafed or angry, we can as eafily make ourselves underftood by Looks and Gestures, as by the plaineft and moft expreffive Language. How often have I feen those lovely Eyes of yours rebuking, with unutterable Eloquence, the affuming Coxcomb, and the malicious Prude, into Silence and good Manners? How many melting Addreffes have you received from the Eyes of your languishing Admirers, who had neither Courage nor Merit enough to address themselves in any other Language? In fhort, languishing modeft Lovers refemble a Nation or Society of dumb People, who are never at a lofs for a Set of fignificant Looks, Motions, and Geftures, to fupply the want of Words, and Defect of other Expreffions; and which form a Language as exprefsive and intelligible to them, as the most articulate Language in the World can be to other People. Now can any one reasonably doubt, whether the BruteAnimals have the Power and Means of doing the fame? It is, I think, undeniable, that they have all a knowing Faculty; but to what pur pofe |