2. If a point be indistinctly stated, so that a doubt rests on the mind as to the meaning, or if it be intelligibly stated, but appears to be at variance with the common notions of right, or with the analogy of the law; read the cases referred to, until the doubt be removed. The proper time to dissolve such doubts is when they are excited. The student, in these researches, will find that there is a legal reason in contradistinction to natural reason; that many points which appear at variance with the latter, are in strict conformity with the former; and that points which prima facie seem not to be justified by analogy and principle, are upon examination ascertained to be fully correspondent to both.

3. The ancient reports should be read principally by way of reference, for, with the exception of Lord Coke's reports, there are none which are worthy a continuous perusal. The ancient reports, likewise, should be more frequently referred to than the modern, as it is a principle that the science should be studied chronologically. From this mode of investigation, uniting the aid of juridical, and even general history, the student will find much advantage. This mode is also preferable for other reasons: generally, the ancient reports are less methodical, in style more rugged and dry, and altogether less interesting in their matter and manner, than the modern. If the student then (at a time when he is zealously devoted to the study of ancient doctrines, and when his mind is deeply imbued with their principles,) should neglect to search into these repositories of the ancient law, he certainly will not resort to them after he has indulged in the more lucid, harmonious, and pleasing pages of such reporters as Sir James Burrows, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Cowper, and Messrs. Dunsford and East, of England; and Mr. Johnson, Mr. Binney, and Messrs. Hening and Munford, of this country. We would remark besides, that the ancient reports generally contain the cases in which points of law were first either established or agitated; and the modern cases are, very often, little else than different illustrations of these ancient points or principles, by applications of them to different statements of facts. They are frequently repetitions of precisely the same law, or with some little modification; or are, (upon full consideration of all the ancient cases on the particular points,) full denials of them. In these ancient cases, therefore, as they first agitated or settled the various doctrines, we may expect to find the reasons or motives which induced these decisions. The modern reports, moreover, are in such constant and daily use, that a knowledge of their contents is necessarily, and almost imperceptibly acquired; and if the ancient cases have been duly attended to, many of the modern cannot but be familiar to the student, whilst they present to him

a constant opportunity of exercising his mind in a similar way with the judge who has decided them, viz. by examining the bearings and analogies of cases, applying principles to facts, and modifying or reversing these decisions, as the change in times and circumstances sometimes imperiously requires. This selfinvestment of the office of a judge, in this particular, will be found a highly profitable exercise, which every student will insensibly glide into, if he has been in the practice of tracing legal points from their infancy, to their full establishment or final decay.

4. In order that the student may not consume too much time, or be so frequently interrupted by his references as to lose sight of the object and method of the subject under perusal, we suggest three modes. First, to read the case referred to immediately, in all cases where the present doubt or difficulty interferes with the due comprehension of the subsequent matter. Secondly, to note down the names, book, and pages of such cases as are deemed important and necessary to be read, but which are nevertheless improper to be referred to immediately, either because they are on insolated points, not interfering with the full comprehension of the main subject, or because, upon looking into the report, they are found to be too long for present perusal. Such cases, thus noted down, should be read as soon as the student has finished the volume or chapter in which he was engaged. Thirdly, to read such cases only as are intended to remove existing doubts, or such as are known to be what are denominated. leading cases. An indiscriminate reference would require too much time, and, in numerous instances, prove an absolute waste of it, because upon examination of these cases, they will be frequently found to contain the precise words of the work by which they are cited. In order, then, to profit by reference, we know of no better mode than to limit this reference, as stated, to such cases as are examined to satisfy doubts and difficulties, and secondly to those which, on account of their peculiar learning, or other cause, are denominated leading cases. We shall close this note with a few observations on the great utility of according an especial attention to leading cases.

Those cases are considered leading, in which a point of law was first in an especial manner judicially noticed, or an important and pervading principle, after a series of contrariant decisions, finally settled; or in which a long received doctrine was reversed; or a dubious one established or modified, after an elaborate and thorough examination of the point in all its plenitude of analogies and bearings. Such cases are unquestionably entitled to more than ordinary attention from the student, who, by trea

suring them in his mind, lays the foundation of an extended and durable superstructure of legal knowledge.

Chronology and geography have, with great propriety, been denominated the eyes of history. They enable the historian to take a comprehensive view of a long and infinitely varied series of events, which, like the differently formed links of an extended chain, are obviously designated from each other, yet connected by ties equally manifest. They likewise impart a fixity and locality to our ideas, which impress them indelibly on the mind; sa that disconnected events are, by the aid of chronology, united and fixed in the memory; whilst geography is no less instrumental, by giving to such events, all those interests and sympathies which belong to place.

So is it in the science of Law. Leading decisions establish resting places for the mind, they form so many epochas in juridical history; and, if attended to, render a service to the legal inquirer, similar to that which is afforded to the historian by chronology and geography.

The undivided infinity of time, in common with the boundless and trackless regions of space, bewilders and wearies the mind; and for steady and useful contemplation it is essential, that there should be fixed periods and determined places whence to compute time and measure space so in the interminable regions of jurisprudence, the mind would soon be confused and exhausted, were it not for those great and learned cases on which it occasionally is allowed to repose, and from which the various relations and dependencies of this august science may be contemplated.

It is scarcely necessary to attempt an illustration of the practical utility of a knowledge of these leading cases, by whom best reported, and even the pages where they are to be found, which is a matter of much less difficulty than may at first be imagined. The memory is a very improvable and docile faculty, and after principles are impressed, such minutie as the names of cases, their reporters, and even the pages, should not be neglected, as they afford much facility in the course of an extensive practice. A knowledge of one or more leading cases on most of the great doctrines of this science, is of infinite utility, as by reference to them, the inquirer is at once furnished by the marginal or other citations with a comprehensive view of the law on the particular subject. As for example; On the various species of bailments, and the respective duties of bailees, the great case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond, 909, may be referred to. If the point of inquiry be the conclusiveness of a sentence in a foreign court of admiralty, the case of Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. 232. As to the authority of domestick judgments, Moses v. McFarlane, 2 Burr. 1005. On the necessity of pleading with a

profert, Reed v. Brookman, 3 Dun. and Ea. 151. The distinction between case and trespass vi et armis, Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black. 892. As to the right of a feme covert to sue or be sued, Marshall v. Rutton, 8 Dun. and Ea. 545. The legality of agrements in restraint of trade, Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 Peer. Wms. 181. On the effect of a demurrer to evidence, Gibson v. Hunter, 2 Hen. Black. 187. Whether money paid under a mistake be subject to repetition, Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469. As to legacies in terrorem, Scott v. Tyler, 2 Dick. Rep. 712. The dependence and independence of covenants, Kingston v. Preston, Doug. 684; or Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. 520. The validity or nullity of the deeds of infants, Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794. As to fraud in the sale of personal property, Twine's case. 3 Co. 80. The personal responsibily of agents to the persons contracted with, Macbeth v. Haldiman, 1 Dun. and Ea. 172, or Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345. As to variance between the allegata and probata Bristow v. Wright, Doug. 664. As to the validity of a deed by feme on the eve of marriage, defeating the marital rights of her future husband, Carleton v. Earl of Dorset, 2 Vernon 17; King v. Cotton, 2 P. Wms. 674; or Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Brow. Ch. Rep. 345. As to the extent of the consideration of marriage to validate deeds against the claims of subsequent purchasers, under statute 27 Eliz. White v. Stringer, 2 Lev. 105. Jenkins v. Keymis, 1 Lev. 150. That an agent must perform the authorised act in the name of his principal, Combe's case, 9 Co. 76. Wilks v. Back, 2 East. 142. Appleton v. Binks, 5 East 148. Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. T. Rep. 14.

In this way should the student treasure in his mind a governing case on every interesting doctrine of the law. As his mind matures, he will find no difficulty in retaining the names of most of the important cases which lead him directly into the channel in which the law of a subject may be found at large. The subject of note books we have treated much in detail, Vid. post. It may, however, be well in this place, to advise the student to preserve, in a book for the purpose, a list of all such cases as in the course of his reading he may ascertain to be distinguished and leading; which should be placed under the heads to which they belong. The titles should be alphabetically arranged, and the cases only of great learning or importance should be inserted, without a comment, except where best reported. This kind of note book consumes but little of the student's time, will prove of great utility in the prosecution of his future inquiries, and will be found eminently serviceable, when the pressing and multifarious duties of a counsellor will so occupy his time, as to render highly impor tant every means, which is calculated to abridge his labours.' Vol. VI. No. 1.

10

These observations of Mr. Hoffman are perfectly practical and for the most part accurate and just. In respect to the praise bestowed on Mr. Viner's Abridgment we are constrained to differ from the learned gentleman. We are far from thinking it the safest abridgment for reference-it is a very irregular fabrick, built up on the basis of Rolle's Abridgment with an incorporation of the principal matter of Fitzherbert and Brook, and other old abridgers. It abounds with inaccuracies and repetitions; and it is quite obvious that the author more frequently consulted the works of other abridgers, than the original reports to abbreviate and digest for himself. We agree, however, with Mr. Hargrave (Co. Litt. 9. a. note 3.) that notwithstanding all its defects and inaccuracies it must be allowed to be a necessary part of every lawyer's library. It is indeed a most useful compilation, and would have been infinitely more so, if the author had been less singular and more nice in his arrangement of method and more studious in avoiding repetitions.'-Bacon's (or more properly Gilbert's) Abridgment is more full in the developement of principles and the statement of cases; and, in every respect but copiousness, is a superiour production. It is incomplete; but this was the hard fate of all the writings of the most learned author, which were sent into the literary world with all their original imperfections on their head. For ourselves we confess that, in our opinion every other abridgment suffers greatly in comparison with the Digest of Lord Chief Baron Comyns. For succinctness and brevity, for exact method and arrangement, for perspicuity and accuracy, for copiousness in principles and illustrations, and for comprehensive analysis, it stands unrivalled in the annals of the law. On one occasion Lord Kenyon (Pasley v. Freeman. 3 T. R. 51, 64.) said, I find it laid down by the Lord C. B. Comyns, &c. He has not indeed cited any authority for his opinion, but his opinion alone is of great authority, since he was considered by his cotemporaries as the most able lawyer in Westminster Hall.' In some other more recent cases the court of kings bench have proceeded to adjudicate some very important questions upon the sole authority of his Digest, an honour which we believe

*We take this opportunity to enter our protest against that book making spirit, which has disfigured all the modern editions of this incomparable work. The original edition in folio (1762) is far superiour to all the later editions. These have the addition of the modern cases, it is true;