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volumen:-it be in the brain, it may

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in the toe, if the Creator had so pleased: it is where he has placed it, nor does it make any difference to the argument before us, where it is. All the bodily motions, which are denominated voluntary, and which comprehend the whole active history of man, originate from the mind; as all bodily motions throughout the wide extent of the universe have their commencement in mind, and can have no other commencement-a position which I mean to illustrate, if not fully establish in my second argument. If the seat be in the brain, the action of every volition of the mind may be immediately upon the brain, and mediately by a succession of impulses on the different members of the body. But this is wholly hypothetical, and involved in no inconsiderable difficulties; while it may be, that the body and every part of it is permeable by the soul, as some bodies are permeable by light, without any injury to their structure. This is as probable as the other hypothesis, and better

better accounts for the singular phænomenon of the will's giving motion to any member of the body at its pleasure. There is another illustration, which at least confers more dignity on the subject, than any tale of vibrations and vibratiunculæ can do. The universal mind wills the motion of the orbs of ten thousand thousand solar systems, and the endless succession of motions, which are constantly taking place in the vast extent of the universe; he wills, and the motions are. The human body is the theatre of the operations of the human soul; it wills, and the body instantaneously obeys. These are facts evinced in both; but how, is as unknown to us in the little world of man, as in the vast world of God. The soul is acknowledged to be in the body, and the empire of the soul over the body is acknowledged; but where and how is of no moment to the sent question. These speculations decide nothing as to its materiality or immateriality, and the preceding argument remains in undiminished force, That where two subjects E 2 have

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have each their respective properties, and not one property which is common to both, we have, so far as our knowledge extends, the fullest reason to conclude, that they are essentially different in kind. It would be the abandonment of all human reasoning, in every similar instance, to infer a different conclusion, without one decent authority for deviating from the established rule.

It may still be contended by the advocates for materialism, that if a common principle be necessary to assign to matter and mind a common nature, motion is an attribute common to both, to the intellectual and bodily part of man. But motion is a principle or power inherent solely in the mind, and not at all in the body. The whole man moves indeed, but the motion and the capacity of the motion issue solely from the will. The body neither wills to move, nor ever could move, but as the passive subject of the mind. It might as well be asserted, that, if a rational faculty be evinced in man by the composition of any rational essay or treatise,

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the pen also, which is the instrument of conveying this intelligence to fellow-man, is possessed of a rational faculty. But admitting that the body has a locomotive faculty or power, as well as the mind, which would be a monstrous supposition-would. this, by any conceivable connexion between the attributes, lead at all to the conclusion, that because the body has shape, colour, bulk, weight, &c., the mind must therefore of consequence have the same attributes also? In fine, I know of no common attribute, but existence. If both did not exist, and were not proved to exist by facts, separate but of equal force, we should be discoursing of nonentities. A curious discourse to be sure, but such as theorising men have sometimes amused themselves with. I see not, therefore, one argument, from which, agreeably to that reasoning, by which alone we infer a common nature in any two subjects, we can conclude that the mind is matter, or any modification of matter whatever. We may assume the position, and then rack our ingenuity

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ingenuity to reconcile the phænomena of man with the supposition. This, I believe, will be found universally to be the mode of proceeding with every advocate for materialism. And thus Descartes philosophized on the system of our world. Without one single fact reported by Nature to suggest the idea, he arbitrarily supposed an infinity of minute indivisible material atoms, whirled round in vortices, and by their collision and the continuance of this vertiginous motion, without any other aid, thought that he had composed this sublime, beautiful, and beneficent universe. True philosophy does not guide facts, but is guided by them; she supposes nothing; she simply infers, but only on the authority of facts. Her steps are modest but sure; and though her progress is slower than that of bold hypothesis, truth invites her on with her encouraging smiles, and finally rewards her with a glorious triumph.

It is an unfortunate appendage to the doctrine of materialism, that it is thought

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