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an individual of a lower species of one ge-, nus is more remote from an individual of a higher species of another genus, than the individuals of two species of the same genus are removed from each other. A clay differs ' more from a horse than a dog, a bird, or even a fish does; and it would revolt the commonest understanding, as well as that of a philosopher, to say that the clay and the horse are not exceedingly different in nature. Yet there may be some properties common to them both, which shall form an alliance between them, and argue, a still higher genus, to which each belong. These are form, colour, magnitude, solidity, resist
These are qualities essential to the three great genera already noticed ; and under the denomination of body or matter, as characterized by these qualities, is constituted the highest genus of all, comprehending all that is visible, or tangible in the system around us. . If in these three great genera; or if in two of them, and in every individual of each, there could not be found
one common property, and this property constant and unalterable; it would be deemed, not merely únphilosophic, to say that they áre of the same genus, that they are of the same nature, but would be condemned as absurd and untrue. We might give to them a common name, but the name would have ÃO - meaning, because not founded in any truth that we know; the name would be the proclamation of folly, presumption, or a deliberatel intention to deceive. - I will however acknowledge, as in the title to this essay I was aware of the propriety of this acknowledgment, that there may be, though undiscoverable by us, some great and important property, common to both these genera and to the species and individuals included in each, which the Creator knows, and which in his wisdom he has imparted to each, as essential to their respective characters and uses. But possibility is not cer: tainty; we cannot move a step in sober reasoning beyond the authority of facts, and we ought to be thankful, that the Cre
ator has enabled us to penetrate, so far as we do, into the plan, design, and uses of the component parts of his universe, retiring with modesty, wherever he is pleased to assign limits to our inquiry. Assumption is an arrogant and unpardonable presumption, whenever it is used as the corner-stone of a theoretic structure, discreditable to man; the parent source of the wildest and absurdest theories, and the grand obstruction to all sound and useful science.
Now there is another existence, of high and dignified character, marked with strong features, signified by facts as irresistible as any which body reports ;
yet istence has not one property that is common to body, as body has not one property that is common to it. This singular existence is denominated mind. The great and leading properties of mind are consciousness, perception, reasoning, volition, with not a few subordinate qualities, which it is not necessary in this essay to enumerate.
Of these we have as clear and positive evidence, evidence in fact, as we have of any of the properties of body; but the mind is never reported to us under the ideas of form, colour, magnitude, solidity, resistance, which are the definitive properties of body. No one is foolish enough to say of the thing which he knows under the characters of consciousness, perception, reasoning, volition, that he ever formed the conception of its shape, hue, bulk, weight, or even of resistance, in the sense in which we ascribe resistance to matter. The resistance of mind is that of will. Matter has no will, and therefore the resistance of body must be a thing totally different from that of mind. It is merely a community of term or name, which the imperfection of language, reduced to the necessity of a figurative sense, admits, which constitutes a seeming resemblance. If it be objected, as by the materialists, that the brain is this mind, and that the brain has all the properties of body, this would be an
extraordinary petitio principii indeed, in the present discussion, and a Gordian solution of the knot with a vengeance.
Ridiculous as this objection is, in any other view than that of a possible supposition; yet, as materialism has hardly any other ground to stand upon, it is contended, that, from certain indubitable facts in the history of man*, it is of necessity to conclude, that the seat of the soul must be looked for somewhere in the head, or even in the brain. This
be admitted ; but the inference thence that it must be the identical brain, or any part of the brain, is step from Earth to Heaven. The soul, whatever it is, must be somewhere in the human
* One of these facts is curious and conclusive, if well attested. In an account of an earthquake at Lima, I remember to have read the following history :- A human monster was about that period born at Lima, with two heads, united from the neck downwards to one simple uniforin body. The Roman Catholic priest was at a loss how to baptize it, whether as one or two human beings. The difficulty was removed, by observing in more instances than one two distinct and opposite wills at the same instant. Two baptisms were administered. * : VOL, II.