tively so, every other display when contrasted with his passing into evanescence, is also a fact beyond all contradiction. And if not born with him, if not provided for him by that Being from whom the provisionary furniture of every thing else has appeared to issue, who will presume to ascertain the period at which the capacity is received by him, and affirm that he is sensible of its communication? But the conclusion would be the same; it is sufficient that it is a provisionary gift, that the capacity of intellect is not his own creation. If he had such a power, the very will to possess it would be argument of a preexistent intellect. Man, therefore, in one great character of mind, is conformed to the plan, which in so large a survey of nature we have found to be uniformly observed. Designed to be a rational being, and act with a deliberate purpose to an end, he has a provisionary constitution of mind fitting him for this dignified walk.

But whence is derived to him the worth

and importance of the various ends and enjoyments, to the attainment of which intellect is so valuable a minister? One of these ends is the gratification of appetite, the delight in food. This is not simple as in other animals; appetite in him comprehends a diversity of tastes, multifarious almost as the supply of the vegetable and animal kingdoms. This character, though not to the same extent in all, and subject to the control of higher considerations, to which in their order we shall advert, is general in man. It is difficult to ascertain the precise limits, which separate the different classes of animal being, to say where one specific character absolutely begins, and where it ends, and therefore in a few animals an appetite for a variety of food, beyond what they discover in their untutored state, may be excited by the management of man. But this is so rare, so very limited in extent, that he must be sceptic indeed, who will not allow to man a very striking and characteristic difference in this attribute of his nature, designing

him even in this lowest walk of gratification, and lowest end of his being, for a wider range of action, and a wider range of enjoyment, as an incitement to the exertion of his active powers.

But it is remarkable in man, in all this gratification of appetite, extensive and varied as it is, and great as is the portion of time, attention, and exertion, which is directed thereto, that he feels no sense of dignity as attached to the pursuit; the enjoyment is fugitive; often leaves a palling and disgust behind it; and is one of those pleasures, which cannot be reviewed with delight, or reenjoyed by reflection, unless by a few, who are considered as among the debased of our species. Fugitive however as the enjoyment is, it has answered to all the end of multiplying the sum of human gratification; and to all, though in various degrees, and often without being directly perceived, this higher purpose; of inviting to exercise, to health; of provoking intellect, design, and plan; of associating with

0 3

with all the nobler qualities of our nature, with the love of order, of the elegant, the beautiful; and what is of still superior import, the rational and friendly intercourse of fellow man. It is the association with these nobler propensities which corrects, limits, chastises the grossness of appetite; separates it from indecency and excess, and gives to it a dignity, a grace, and even a worth, which of itself it would be incapable of.

If, then, analogy be in any instance a safe guide to man, here we without fear may commit ourselves to its instruction. From the extensive view that we have taken of the provident wisdom of the Creator, it is indeed an irresistible conclusion, thạt mind is not in one instance neglected by him, and therefore, least of all, in a moral view, the sublimest purpose, which man as a creature of the all-forming artist is designed to answer. It must be, that in this, as in every

other part of the character for which he is destined, he should have a provisionary, an elementary

1

elementary constitution, not derived from any secondary, but immediately from the primary cause of all; and that his future character, all the phænomena of his succeeding history, should be only the development of his elementary constitution. There are many other circumstances, which may come in aid of this elementary constitution, and cooperate to the ultimate purpose for which mind and moral mind are in any degree at first conferred; and there are also, which may counteract, pervert, and almost destroy this purpose. But of these I take no notice; first, because there is nothing singular in this, since in every direction of man and of his mind, there are both favourable and unfavourable attendant circumstances; and secondly, because a complete system of mind and moral is very far from being my object. I wish only to esta blish a first leading principle, as the foundation of all subsequent inquiry in moral, as, a safe guide to every one, who would modestly and soberly philosophize on man; and,

0 4