passed to make Blake, Deane, and Popham, or any two of them, Admirals and Generals of the Fleet, for the year ensuing.

The next service intrusted to this able commander was the reduction of the Isles of Scilly, which still held out for the king. These islands not only afforded shelter for privateers, but it had been discovered that the Dutch were forming views upon them, and had despatched Admiral Van Tromp and a squadron of twelve ships of war, with instructions either to purchase or reduce them. On the arrival of Blake, with a body of eight hundred troops on board, Sir John Greenville, who commanded for the king, after some little resistance submitted upon terms; and retired to Guernsey, which had also been preserved for Charles II. by Sir George Carteret, aided by a garrison of four thousand men. The reduction of this island was forthwith undertaken by Blake, assisted by a strong body of troops commanded by Colonel Haynes. They reached Guernsey in October, 1651, but the defence was so spirited, that in spite of the most active exertions both by the squadron and troops, the various forts could not be mastered until the following January, when the Governor capitulated, and was treated by the Admiral with all the respect due to his bravery and honourable character. For these services, the two Commanders were thanked by the House of Commons. It was during this stay of Blake before Guernsey, that he was appointed one of the Council of State for the ensuing year. The schemes of Cromwell were now reaching maturity, and he felt all the value of the support of such an able officer and national favourite.

The following year, Blake was constituted sole Admiral for nine months, in the prospect of a Dutch war; and here a period of the naval history of England and Holland commences, which, while it strongly exhibits the spirit and energy of the people of both countries, affords a melancholy proof of the barren and futile nature of much of the warfare which has distracted the world. The enmity between the English and Dutch at this period, originated principally in commercial and maritime rivalry, directed in each state to party and personal purposes. It is difficult

Hist. of Rebellion, vol. iii. p, 265.

now to ascertain which of the governments was the first aggressor; but there is no doubt that both were grievously to blame and that the hostilities which followed exhausted and weakened both sides, without proving in any essential respect serviceable to either. Hitherto indeed national emulation has been but another name for national enmity; but are there not some signs to show that a gradual improvement is taking place? And though it would be too sanguine to expect that powerful states will soon cease to be dangerous to their weaker neighbours, is it too much to anticipate, that with the increasing diffusion of knowledge, the gratification of mere personal ambition will be restrained; and that all those fancied necessities for war, which originate in mistaken views of political expediency, will yield to more enlightened principles, and more humane feelings? Highly indebted as were the United Provinces to the policy of Queen Elizabeth, for their emancipation from the intolerable yoke of Spain, the perpetually recurring stimulus of.mercantile rivalry gradually overcame the recollection of those eminent services; especially as it was easy to interpret them into a political interference, which, considering the designs of Spain against England, it was as expedient for the latter to grant, as for the United Provinces to accept. Whatever the reason, their rapid growth into a maritime and commercial power was accompanied by envy of all correspondent advancement, on the part of a nation so admirably situated for the acquirement of that kind of superiority as Great Britain. This was exhibited in various ways during the reign of James I., whose anxiety for a close alliance with their formidable enemy, Spain, had still further excited their jealousy. Charles I. also obliged them to pay for a license for the right of herring fishing on the British coast, which claim, however reasonable, they resented, and resisted to the utmost of their power. The subsequent marriage of the Princess Mary, eldest daughter of Charles, with the Prince of Orange, likewise formed a strong party against the English Commonwealth, and (after the execution of that prince) in favour of Charles II.; a circumstance of itself quite sufficient to produce a disposition to war on the part of the English rulers.

Thus, on the death of Charles I. in 1649, satisfied that no molestation

would ensue from France or Spain, the attention of the Independent leaders was drawn strongly towards the United Provinces, the strength of whose navy might render their espousal of the cause of the exiled king a source of considerable annoyance. Under these impressions, therefore, they sent Dr. Dorislaus, a civilian of Leyden, who had been naturalized in England, to the Hague, in order to produce a good understanding between the two republics; but unfortunately, he was assassinated by some Scottish royalists in that town the very evening of his arrival.* A suspected connivance at the escape of the murderers, produced a considerable sensation in England; but as the Parliament wished to form an alliance with the United Provinces, and as the death of the Prince of Orange afforded a favourable opportunity, the assassination of Dorislaus produced no interruption of these overtures, and in March, 1651, Oliver St. John, and Walter Strickland, were sent to the Hague, in the place of Dorislaus, to complete a treaty of union. This negotiation altogether failed, owing, as the Dutch writers affirm, to the unreasonable conditions insisted upon by the English; but more probably in consequence of an opinion that the affairs of Charles II. were not entirely hopeless, he being about to head his final expedition into Scotland, whither, indeed, the states themselves conveyed him. The Orange party was also strongly against any alliance which might defeat the future ascendancy of the infant prince; and thus the English envoys returned, not only disappointed, but incensed at the insults they had received from the common people at the Hague. No notice of this was however taken, until after the battle of Worcester, and the success of Monk in Scotland, which left the English government at leisure to follow the dictates of its resentment. The mere gratification of revenge, in a national sense, being a poor motive for war, it has been thought that the enemies of Cromwell sought to promote it, in hopes that such great expenses at sea might lead to the reduction of the army, which was visibly conducting him to the summit of power on land. On the other side, it has been argued, that Cromwell himself promoted the war in order to retain the very army it was thus proposed to reduce; which

Hist. of the Rebellion, vol. iii. p. 229.

contradiction only proves that nothing is more vague and inconsistent than conjectures respecting the designs of artful politicians. The real state of the case probably was, that Cromwell deemed it necessary to lower the naval predominance of the Dutch; and to defeat their grasping endeavours at a commercial monopoly. The latter of these objects was still more effectually promoted by the celebrated Navigation Act, which prohibited the importation of all foreign commodities, except in English bottoms, or in those of the country where the goods were produced. By this Act, which took place the first of December, 1651, the parliament quietly transferred a large share of the carrying trade from the Dutch shipping to that of Great Britain, and effected a most serious blow by an apparently simple and domestic regulation. Parliament also granted letters of marque to those merchants, who complained of Dutch aggression, so that it soon became evident to the government of the United Provinces that war was resolved upon.

The conflicting authorities of the English and Dutch historians, leave it doubtful to this day which of the countries was really most anxious for war; for there is much plausible evidence to show, that jealous of the rising spirit and energy of the English Commonwealth, the Dutch were resolved to strike a blow that might cripple its navy and lessen its increasing reputation. But whatever was the real inclination, on either side, as if conscious that it could scarcely be vindicated, each party was solicitous to throw the odium of commencing the war upon the other. On the passing of the Navigation Act, therefore, the Dutch sent an embassy to London, which was received with great apparent respect; but instead of a revocation of the Act complained of, the Dutch ambassadors encountered a formidable recapitulation of all the injuries received from the United Provinces, at Amboyna, in India, Persia, Muscovy, Greenland, and other places, for the last thirty years, terminating with a demand of 1,700,000l. by way of reparation. The murder of Dorislaus was also adverted to; and satisfaction required for

The policy and expediency of this measure were as evident at the time, as the necessity of some re

laxation has been since. Possibly one of the most useful accomplishments for a modern politician is the art of discovering, when that which was once wise is wise no longer.

patch positively asserts, that he backed his sails and lowered his flag to the British Admiral, who nevertheless fired the first broadside, and wounded several of his crew; while, on the other hand, Blake's letter as expressly states the contrary. It is difficult to doubt the assertion of an individual so personally honourable as Blake; and it appears that his conduct was fully justified by a report from the Council of State at home, as well as by the popular feeling, which was so much irritated, that it became necessary to grant a guard to the Dutch ambassadors, who attributed the engagement to accident and misconception on both sides. The States sent another envoy, ostensibly to effect a pacification; but the parliament persisting in the same high tone as before, the United Provinces at last recalled their ambassadors, and prepared for a continuation of the war. Both sides issued manifestoes on this occasion; the Dutch to demonstrate that they were attacked without provocation, and the parliament to recapitulate the preceding grievances, to which was now to be added the refusal to strike the flag. To this demand the States had pleaded, that although the Republic, in its infancy, had paid that compliment to the royal dignity of England, they did not hold it due to the Commonwealth. A more indiscreet plea could scarcely have been advanced, to men of the character of those who then ruled the destinies of England; and accordingly it was determined to maintain the national honour at all hazards. "But after all," continues Rapin, with great simplicity, or rather with that conventional language, which it is so usual to apply to commonplace political falsities, "this was by no means the true ground of the war; but these manifestoes were necessary to vindicate the rulers of both Republics, and to impose a belief on the subjects, that they were not plunged into these extraordinary expenses to support a war, without the most evident necessity."+ That is to say, the people were to be deluded into the supposition of a necessity which did not actually exist. It is gratifying to feel assured that this species of delusion, at least, becomes every day more impracticable; and that it is only necessary for the people to be thoroughly convinced of the atrocity as

La Vie de Tromp, p. 17.

+Rapin's Hist. of Englaud, vol. xi. p. 62.

well as folly of war undertaken upon any but the most solid grounds, to render it wholly impossible.

The fleet of Blake was rapidly reinforced by the personal exertions of Cromwell and Bond, who repaired to Dover to consult with him on the subject. Some time elapsed before it was in a condition to meet that of the Dutch, which soon amounted to seventy sail; so vigorous were the exertions of those Republicans to obtain a naval superiority over the English. In about a month, Blake deemed himself strong enough to meet the enemy; and, aware of the arduous nature of the expected conflict, he proclaimed a solemn fast and day of humiliation, which both officers and seamen were called upon to observe. The two main fleets, however, did not encounter each other so soon as was expected; and in the mean time, the admiral most effectually exerted himself to annoy the Dutch trade. He then sailed with a strong squadron northward, and in less than a month, captured thirteen Dutch ships of war, being the whole of their Herring convoy. With great and considerate humanity, however, he did not destroy the fishing vessels, but only claimed the tenth Herring, the former tax, for the liberty of fishing on the British coast; nobly declaring his reluctance to waste so much food, to the probable hunger and distress of thousands.*

CHAPTER III.

Return from the North-Engagement with and Defeat of De Witt and De Ruyter--Exertions on both sidesA great Force placed under the Command of Van Tromp—Inferiority of the English Fleet under Blake-Result of the ensuing Engagement— Vain Glory of Van Tromp-Quick Recovery of Superiority by the English-Series of Engagements with the Dutch-Behaviour of Blake and his Colleagues on the turning out of the Long Parliament-Cromwell assumes the Protectorate- Peace with the Dutch.

BLAKE returned from the north with his prizes, and 900 prisoners; and reached the Downs on the 12th of August, 1652, where he was joined by several more ships; and his fleet being now

Lives English and Foreign, vol. ii. p. 101. Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, vol. vi.

sufficiently strong, he steered over to the Dutch coast. During this cruise he fell in with a French squadron, proceeding to the relief of Dunkirk, and on account of some hostile proceedings at Newfoundland; he captured and carried it into Dover, by which means the former town fell into the hands of the Spaniards. On the 28th of the following month, of September, he met the Dutch fleet, under the command of De Ruyter and De Witt, who, in consequence of the popular dissatisfaction with Van Tromp, in Holland, had succeeded that officer. When Blake discovered the Dutch, he had but three of his ships with him, Vice Admiral Penn's squadron being at some distance; and the remainder of the fleet a league or two astern. He, however, bravely bore in among them, and being soon admirably seconded by the divisions under Penn and Rear Admiral Bourne, the fight began with great animation; and lasted until night, by which time the Dutch saw their Rear Admiral captured, and three other ships destroyed. Blake would have renewed the fight the next day, but the Dutch made all the sail in their power, and reached Goree. The English lost but few men, and not one ship, while the Dutch fleet landed more than 2000 wounded; the disadvantage, according to De Witt, being caused by the cowardice, or disaffection of his captains, irritated by a great arrear of pay and the unprofitable nature of the contest*.

The impolicy of such a war, on the part of a commercial people like the Dutch, was by this time apparent; for Blake, with his usual activity, had made use of his success, so as to annoy their trade in all quarters. The ill humour created by their losses vented itself with great asperity upon De Witt, who was in another way unpopular, from his republican opposition to the ascendancy of the House of Orange. On his return to Flushing, a tumult ensued; and so much disappointment was expressed, that De Ruyter was anxious to resign his commission, and De Witt took to his bed from pure chagrin. Considerable pains were taken by the States to remedy the late disasters; commissioners were appointed to inquire into the conduct of the offending captains; and the fleet being refitted, was once more put under the command of

Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 5.6. Ludlow's Me moirs, vol. i. p. 428. Heath's Chron., p. 526.

Van Tromp. The English, on their side, were equally active; an act was passed by the Parliament, requiring all English seamen to return home in forty days, and such as were in India in twelve months: it also directed that all English carpenters, shipwrights, and other efficient artisans found on board the enemy's ships, should be thrown overboard without mercy. In point of fact, the war was essentially injurious to both countries; except upon that inhuman theory, which holds occasional warfare to be necessary as a species of exercise, and national prosperity to rest securely on established ascendancy alone. Were the power of self-preservation exclusively implied by this doctrine, it might be difficult to controvert it; but unhappily ascendancy in all its guises is disposed to be aggressive, and the power to oppress is almost invariably followed by the inclination. It must, however, be admitted, that the welfare of Great Britain is so intimately connected with naval superiority, that it is difficult altogether to condemn a course of proceedings which has materially conduced to it. Such was certainly the case with this otherwise profitless warfare. Whatever may now be thought of the motives on both sides, the merit of Blake will remain the same: if the contest was necessary, he carried it on with triumphant vigour, and ultimate success; and even if impolitic, he still rendered it as beneficial as it could be made, by the energy and spirit which he infused into the sea service, and the manner in which he made it redound to the honour of the English name.

Nothing is more remarkable during this war, than the transient superiority acquired on either side; at least as regards the number of ships employed, and the power of riding paramount on the high seas. This was partly owing to the smallness of the vessels of war, as compared with such as are now admitted into the line of battle.* Ships

The comparative ease with which this could be effected, will be apparent when it is understood that at this time any merchantman, capable of carrying guns, could with a few alterations be converted into a man of war. It appears on the authority of the Parliamentary Journals of 1651, containing a list of merchantmen thus altered for the navy, that a vessel of 900 tons burthen could be made a man of war of 60

guns; and those of 700, 400, 200, 100, and 60 tons, rendered ships of war respectively, of 46, 34, 20, 10, and 8 guns; five or six men being allowed for each gun. It is further to be observed, that naval battles were not tion being the celebrated sea nght of the third of June, then fought in line, the first engagement of that descrip1665, in which the Duke of York, afterwards James II., gained a victory over the Dutch Admiral Opdam, whose ship was blown up in the conflict. James, in