white man (notwithstanding the barbarity of custom and prejudice) can have no right, by virtue of his colour, to enslave and tyrannize over a black man; nor has a fair man any right to despise, abuse, and insult a brown man. Nor do I believe that a tall man, by virtue of his stature, has any legal right to trample a dwarf under his foot. For, whether a man is wise or foolish, white or black, fair or brown, tall or short, and, I might add, rich or poor, (for it is no more a man's choice to be poor, than it is to be a tool, or a dwarf, or black, or tawney,) such he is by God's appointment; and, abstractedly considered, is neither a subject for pride, nor an object of contempt. Now if, amongst men, the differences of their powers of the mind, and of their complexion, stature, and accidents of fortune, do not give to any one man a right to abuse or insult any other man on account of these differences; for the same reason, a man can have no natural right to abuse and torment a beast merely because a beast has not the mental powers of a mau. For such as the man is, he is but as God made him; and the very same is true of the beast. Neither of them can lay claim to any intrinsic merit for being such as they are; for before they were created it was impossible that either of them could deserve; and at their creation, their shape, perfections, or defects, were invariably fixed, and their bound set which they cannot pass. And being such, neither more nor less than God made them, there is no more demerit in a beast's being a beast, than there is merit in a man's being a man; that is, there is neither merit nor demerit in either of them.

A brute is an animal no less sensible of pain than a man. He has similar nerves and organs of sensation; and his cries and groans, in case of violent impressions upon his body, though he cannot utter his complaints by speech or human voice, are as strong indications to us of his sensibility of pain, as the cries and groans of a human being, whose language we do not understand. Now as pain is what we are all averse to, our own sensibility of pain should teach us to commiserate it in others, to alleviate it if possible, but never wantonly or unmeritedly to inflict it. As the differences amongst men in the above particulars are no bars to their feelings, so neither does the difference of the shape of a brute from that of a man exempt the brute from feeling; at least,

we have no ground to suppose it. But shape or figure is as much the appointment of God, as complexion or stature. And if the difference of complexion or stature does not convey to one man a right to despise and abuse another man, the difference of shape between a man and a brute cannot give to a man any right to abuse and tor, ment a brute. For he that made man and man to differ in complexion or stature, made man and brute to differ in shape or figure. And in this case likewise there is nei ther merit nor demerit; every creature, whether man or brute, bearing that shape which the supreme Wisdom judged most expedient to answer the end for which the creature was ordained.

With regard to the modification of the mass of matter of which an animal is formed, it is accidental as to the crea ture itself; I mean it was not in the power or will of the creature to choose whether it should sustain the shape of a brute, or of a man: and yet, whether it be of one shape, or of the other; or whether it be inhabited or animated by the soul of a brute or the soul of a man; the substance or matter of which the creature is com posed would be equally susceptible of feeling. It is solely owing to the good pleasure of God that we are created men; or animals in the shape of men. For, He that † formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, that he might become a living soul, and endued with a sense of feeling, could, if he had so pleased, by the same plastic power, have cast the very same dust into the mould of a beast; which, be ing animated by the life-giving breath of its Maker, would have become a living soul in that form; and in that form would have been as susceptible of pain, as in the form of a man. And if, in brutal shape, we had been endued with the same degree of reason and reflection which we now enjoy; and other beings, in human shape, should take upon them to torment, abuse, and barbarously ill treat us, because we were not made in their shape; the injustice and cruelty of their behaviour to us would be self-evident: and we should naturally infer, that, whether we walk upon two legs or four; whether

* It is of no consequence as to the case now before us, whether the soul is, as some think, only a power, which cannot exist without the body; or, as is generally supposed, a spiritual substance, that can exist, distinct and separate from the body. Gen. i. 30, in the margin.

+ Gen. ii. 7.

our heads are prone or erect; whether we are naked er covered with hair; whether we have tails or no tails, horns or no horns, long ears or round ears; or whether we bray like an ass, speak like a man, whistle like a bird, or are mute as a fish; nature never intended these distinctions as foundations for right of tyranny and oppression. But perhaps it will be said, it is absurd to make such an inference from a mere supposition that a man' might have been a brute, and a brute might have been a inan; for, the supposition itself is chimerical, and has no foundation in nature; and all arguments should be drawn from fact, and not from fancy of what might be or might not be. To this I reply, in few words, and in general; that all cases and arguments, deduced from the important and benevolent precept of doing unto as we would be done unto, necessarily require such kind of suppositions; that is, they suppose the case to be otherwise than it really is. For instance, a rich man is not a poor man; yet, the duty plainly arising from the precept is this the man who is now rich ought to behave to the man who is now poor in such a manner as the rich man, if he were poor, would be willing that the poor man, if he were rich, should behave towards him. Here is a case which in fact does not exist between these two men, for the rich man is not a poor man, nor is the poor man a rich man; yet the supposition is necessary to enforce and illustrate the precept, and the reasonableness of it is allowed. And if the supposition is reasonable in one case, it is reasonable, at least not contrary to reason, in all cases to which this general precept can extend, and in which the duty enjoined by it can and ought to be performed. Therefore, though it be true that a man is not a horse; yet, as a horse is a subject within the extent of the precept, that is, he is capable of receiving benefit by it, the duty enjoined in it extends to the man, and amounts to this,-Do you, that are a man, so treat your horse, as you would be willing to be treated by your master, in case that you were a horse. I see no absurdity nor false reasoning in this precept, nor any ill consequence that would arise from it, however it may be gainsaid by the barbarity of custom.

In the case of human cruelty *, the oppressed man has

* This term the author uses to express the cruelty of men unto ; and that of brutal cruelty, to express the cruelty of men anto beasts.

men

a tongue that can plead his own cause, and a finger to point out the aggressor; all men that hear of it shudder with horror; and, by applying the case to themselves, pronounce it cruelty with the common voice of humanity, and unanimously join in demanding the punishment of the offender, and brand him with infamy. But in the case of brutal cruelty, the dumb beast can neither utter his complaints to his own kind, nor describe the author of his wrong; nor, if he could, have they it in their power to redress and avenge him.

In the case of human cruelty, there are Courts and Laws of Justice in every civilized society, to which the injured man may make his appeal; the affair is canvassed, and punishment inflicted in proportion to the offence. But alas! with shame to man, and sorrow for brute, I ask tne question, What laws are now in force, or what Court of Judicature does now exist, in which the suffering brute may bring his action against the wauton cruelty of barbarous man? The laws of Triptolemus are long since buried in oblivion, for Triptolemus was but a heathen. No friend, no advocate, not one is to be found amongst the bulls nor calves of the people, to prefer an indictment on behalf of the brute. The Priest passeth by on one side, and the Levite on the other side? the Samaritan stands still, sheds a tear, but can no more; for there is none to help: and the poor, wretched, and unbefriended creature, is left to mourn in unregarded sorrow, and to sink under the weight of his burden.

But suppose the Law promulgated, and the Court erected. The Judge is seated, the Jury sworn, the indictment read, the cause debated, and a verdict fouud for the plaintiff. Yet what cost or damage? What recompense for loss sustained? In actions of humanity, with or without law, satisfaction may be made. In various ways you can make amends to a man for the injuries you have done him. You know his wants, and you may relieve him. You may give him clothes, or food, or money. You may raise him to a higher station, and make him happier than before you afflicted him. You may be feet to the lame, and eyes to the blind. You may entertain him, keep him company, or supply him with every comfort, convenience, and amusement of life, which he is capable of enjoying. And thus may

↑ Psalm lxviii. 30.

you make some atonement for the injury which you have done unto a man; and by thy assiduity and future tenderness, thou mayest perhaps obtain his pardon, and palliate thine own offence. But what is all this to the injured brute? If by thy passion or malice, or sportive cruelty, thou hast broken his limbs, or deprived him of hie eye-sight, how wilt thou make him amends? Thou canst do nothing to amuse him. He wants not thy money nor thy clothes. Thy conversation can do him no good. Thou hast obstructed his means of getting subsistence; and thou wilt hardly take upon thyself the pains and trouble of procuring it for him, (which yet by the rule of justice thou art bound to do.) Thou hast marred his little temporary happiness, which was his all to him. Thou hast maimed or blinded him for ever; and hast done him an irreparable injury.

LOUIS VIII. SURNAMED CŒUR DE LION.

This Prince died of the palsy, which he contracted on visiting the tomb of Thomas-à-Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, when he was advanced in years, in hopes of procuring, by the intercession of that Saint, the life of his eldest son, who was dangerously ill. Louis fondly hoped that the Saint would exert his utmost endeavours to return that kindness which he had shewn him whilst living, by giving him an asylum in his kingdom, when in that of his own Sovereign, Henry II. he had been proclaimed a rebel and a traitor.

Louis made an edict, that no courtesan should be allowed to wear a golden girdle (one of the marks of female elegance in dress of his time), under a very severe penalty. This edict gave rise to an old proverb, "Bonne renommé vault mieux que ceinture dorée-A good reputation is of more value than a golden girdle."

In 1566, Charles IX. caused the tomb of this monarch, in the Abbey of Barbeau, to be opened in his presence. The body was found entire, had rings on the fingers, and a chain of gold round the neck. Charles, not a Prince of great delicacy, had them taken off, and wore them many years.