&c. For are these things-and not rather mere general terms, signify. ing the mind determining itself? For what is a motive but a determining thought? and what is a thought but the mind acting on itself in some one direction? All that we want is to prove the possibility of Free-Will, or, what is really the same, a Will. Now this Kant had unanswerably proved by showing the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and by demonstrating that Time and Space are laws of the former only (αἱ σύνθεσεις αἱ πρῶται τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ὁ χρόνος μὲν, ἡ πρώτη καθ' όλον σύνθεσις τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς ἔσω· ὁ δὲ χῶρος, τῆς ἐξω.) and irrelative to the latter, to which class the Will must belong. In all cases of Sense the Reality proves the Possibility; but in this instance (which must be unique if it be at all), the proof of the Possibility only is wanting to effect the establishment of the Reality. Therefore I cannot but object to p. 468— sie fällt ausser aller Zeit, und daher mit der erster Schöpfung zusammen. (It takes place out of all Time and thence together with the first creation.) This has at least the appearance of a contradiction. S. T. C.

Ibid., pp. 469-70. "In the consciousness, so far as it is mere selfcomprehension and ideal only, doubtless that free deed which comes to pass of necessity, cannot take place; since it precedes it as existence (the deed precedes consciousness as actually existent)—first makes it; yet is it not therefore no deed of which the human being can ever take cognisance; since he who in some way to excuse an unrighteous action, says, 'Thus I am unalterably,' is yet very well aware that he is thus through his own fault, however true it may be that it has been impossible for him to do otherwise." Transl.

Note. I have long believed this; but surely it is no explanation beyond the simple idea of Free Will itself. S. T. C. (The remainder of this note is unfortunately lost.)

66

Ibid., p. 472. " And it is worthy of notice how Kant, who had not raised himself in theory to a transcendental fact determinant of all human existence, was led, in his later inquiries, through mere true observation of the phenomena of the moral judgment, to a recognition of a subjective, as he expresses it, ground of human actions, preceding every deed that occurs to the senses, which yet itself again must be an act of freedom." Transl.

Note. But why this asserted superiority over Kant? Where is the proof,-where the probability, that by mere faithful observation he could arrive (he alone of all other philosophers)—at this awful conclusion? Lastly, what has Schelling added to Kent's notion? S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 478. Here also is a note of Mr. C.'s partly obliterated, in which he exclaims, "How unfair is this, to attribute to Kant a slow motive-making process, separate by intervals of time. Most true, most

reverently true is it that a Being imperfect does feel an awe as in the presence of a holier Self-alter et idem, where the I distinguishable through imperfection, &c." S. T. C.

These remarks seem to be made in reference to those of Schelling aimed against unsre Empfindungsphilosophen, our sensation-philosophers." "To be conscientious," he affirms, "is for a man to act according as he knows, and not contradict in his deeds the light of knowledge. He is not conscientious, who, in any case that occurs, must first hold up to himself the law of duty, in order to decide upon right doing through respect to the same. Religiosity, according to the meaning of the word, leaves no choice between things opposed-no equilibrium arbitrii, the bane of all morality, but only the highest decidedness for that which is right, to the utter exclusion of choice."

Ibid., p. 493. “Still the question recurs, does Evil end and how ?— has Creation in general a final aim, and if this be so, why is this not reached immediately,-why is not Perfection even from the beginning? To this there is no answer but what is already given: because God is a Life, not merely a Being. But all Life has a destiny, and is subject to suffering and becoming. Even to this then has God, of his own free will, subjected Himself, when even at first, in order to become personal, He divided the Light world and the world of Darkness." Transl.

Note. These are hard sayings. Is not the Father from all eternity the Living one? and freywillig sich unterwerfen um persönlich zu werden! (The rest is lost.) S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 495. "Its state therefore is a state of not-being, a state of the continual becoming-consumed of the activity-(Verzehrtwerdens der Aktivitä'), or of that in it which strives to become active." Transl.

Note. Then will not the darkness become again what it was before its union with the light, and of course the object of the same process repeated? Surely this has too much the appearance of subjecting the supersensual to the intuitions of the senses, and really looks like pushing in a thing merely to take it out again. And still the question returns— Why not this in the first place? What can the process have effected?

Ibid., p. 502. Nole. It seems to me that this whole work pre-supposes Des Cartes' " quod clare concepimus, verum est."

Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Criticismus Philosoph.

Schrift.

P. 119. Note. I have made repeated efforts, and all in vain, to understand this first Letter on Dogmatism and Criticism. Substitute the World, die Welt, for a moral God, what do I gain in der reinästhetischen Seile more than in any other point of view? How can I combat or fight

up against that which I myself am? Is not the very impulse to contend or to resist one of the links in the chain of necessary causes, which I am supposed to struggle against? If we are told that God is in us both to will and to do, that is, as the sole actual agent, how much more must this apply to the World, or Fate, or whatever other phantom we substitute. I say how much more, because upon the admission of a supersensual being, this may possibly be, and we therefore, from other reasons, do not doubt that it is really compatible with Free Will; but with a World-God this were a blank absurdity. Der Gedanke mich der Welt entgegenzustellen,* not only hat nichts grosses für mich,† but seems mere pot-valiant nonsense, without the idea of a moral Power extrinsic to and above the World,—as much inconceivable by a sane mind, as that a single drop of the Falls of Niagara should fight up against the whole of the Cataract, of which itself is a minim!

How much more sublime, and, in other points of view, how infinitely more beautiful, even in respect of Taste or æsthetic judgment, is the Scriptural representation of the World as in enmity with God, and of the continual warfare, which calls forth every energy, both of act and of endurance, from the necessary vividness of worldly impressions, and the sensuous dimness of Faith, in the first struggles! Were the impulses and impresses from the faith in God equally vivid, as the sensuous stimuli, then indeed all combat must cease, and we should have Hallelujahs for Tragedies and Statues. S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 122. Note. I cannot see the force of any of these arguments. By theoretic, as opposed to practical Reason, Kant never meant two Persons or Beings; but only that what we could not prove by one train of argument, we might by another, in proportion to the purposes of knowledge. I cannot theoretically demonstrate the existence of God, as a moral Creator and Governor, but I can theoretically adduce a multitude of inducements so strong as to be all but absolute demonstration; and I can demonstrate that not a word of sense ever was, or ever can be, brought against it. In this stage of the argument my conscience, with its categorical command, comes in and proves it to be my duty to choose to believe in a God-there being no obstacle to my power so to choose With what consistency then can Schelling contend, that the same mind, having on these grounds fixed its belief in a God, can then make its former speculative infirmities, as applied to the idea of God, a pretext for turning back to disbelieve it?

Ibid., pp. 123–4.

"With what law would you reach unto that Will?

The thought of opposing myself to the world.

+ Has nothing great for me.

With the moral law itself? This is just what we ask, how you arrive at the persuasion that the Will of that Being is agreeable to this law? It would be the shortest way to declare that Being himself the author of the Moral Law. But this is contrary to the spirit and letter of your philosophy. Or must the Moral Law exist independently of all Will? Then we are in the domain of Fatalism; for a law, which is not to be explained by any Being that exists independently of it, which rules over the highest power as well as over the least, has no sanction, save that of necessity." Transl.

Note. Just as well might Schelling have asked concerning the Wisdom or any other attribute of God-and if we answered, they were essential,— that is God himself,-then object, that this was Fatalism. The proper answer is, that God is the originator of the Moral Law; but not per arbitrium (Willkühr), but because he is essentially wise and holy and good— rather, Wisdom, Holiness, and Love. S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 142. “It is indeed no such uncommon case in human life, that one takes the prospect of a future possession itself." Transl.

Note. Is there not some omission of the press here-that is für den Besitz after Besitz,-that we take the look out on a future possession for the possession itself? S. T C.

Ibid., 152. (In a note.) "It is remarkable enough that language has distinguished so precisely between the Real,-dem Wirklichen (that which is present in the sensation or perception, which acts on me and whereon I react), the Actually Existing, dem Daseyenden (which, in general, is there present in Space and Time), and Being, dem Seyenden, which is, through itself, quite independently of all conditions of Time." Transl.

Note. But how can we know that anything is, except so far as it works on or in us; and what is that but Existence ? Answer :-The means, by which we arrive at the consciousness of an idea, are not the idea itself. S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 175. Note. It is clear to me that both Schelling and Fichte impose upon themselves the scheme of an expanding surface, and call it Freedom. I should say,-where absolute Freedom is, there must be absolute Power, and therefore the Freedom and the Power are mutually intuitive. Strange that Fichte and Schelling both hold that the very object, which is the condition of Self-consciousness, is nothing but the Self itself by an act of free Self-limitation.

P. S. The above I wrote a year ago; but the more I reflect, the more convinced am I of the gross materialism, which lies under the whole system. It all arises from the duplicity of human nature, or rather per.

haps the triplicity. Homo animal triplex. The facts stated are mere sensations, the corpus mortuum of the volatilized memory. S. T. C..

Ibid., p. 177. "Perhaps I should remind them of Lessing's confession, that with the idea of an infinite Existence he connected a representation of an infinitely tedious duration of Time, which was to him torment and misery; or even of that blasphemous exclamation, 'I would not for all the world be (eternally) blessed."" Transl.

Note. Surely this is childish,-a mere confusion of Space with Intensity, of Time with Eternity. I cannot think that by the word "adequate " Spinoza meant" commensurate," but simply "immediate.”

Abhandlungen zur Erlaüterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. Philosoph. Scrift.

P. 219. "I have sometimes heard the question asked, how it was possible, that so absurd a system, as that of the so-named Critical Philosopher should-not merely enter any human being's head-but take up its abode there." Transl.

Nole. I cannot see the mystery. The man who is persuaded of the being of himself, seines Ichs, as a thing in itself, and that the bodily symbols of it are phenomena, Erscheinungen, by which it manifests its being to itself and others, easily, however unreasonably, conceives all other phenomena as manifestations of other consciousnesses-as unseen, yet actually separate powers, or Ichs, or monads. S. T. C.

Ibid., p. 221. "It is evident, that not only the possibility of a representation of outward things in us, but the necessity of the same, must be explained. Further, not only, how we become conscious of a representation, but also why on this very account we are under the necessity of referring it to an outward object. Transl.

Note. I cannot comprehend how it should be more difficult to assume a faculty of perception than of sensation, that is of self-perception.

Ibid., p. 224. "Now that which is an object (originally), is, as such, necessarily finite. As then, the spirit is not originally an object, it cannot according to its nature be originally finite." Transl.

Note. That the Spirit is, in the modified sense here stated, infinite, may be proved by other reasons; but this is surely a strange twist of logic. If all Finites were necessarily objects, then indeed the Spirit, as far as it is no object, might be infinite. But that it is therefore infinite, by no means follows. The Finite may be the common predicate of both-of the one essentially, of the other by the will of the Creator. S. T. C.

Ibid., pp. 228-9. "We cannot abstract from the product of the intuition without acting freely, that is without freely repeating the original mode of action (of the Spirit) in the intuition, &c., &c. Now first