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a whole class. But in truth Hobbes himself makes no claims to any discovery, and introduces this law of association, or (in his own language) discursion of mind, as an admitted fact, in the solution alone of which, and this by causes purely physiological, he arrogates any originality. His system is briefly his ;' whenever the senses are impinged on by external objects, whether by the rays of light reflected from them, or by effluxes of their finer particles, there results a correspondent motion of the innermost and subtlest organs. This motion constitutes a representation, and there remains an impression of the same, or a certain disposition to repeat the same motion. Whenever we feel several objects at the same time, the impressions that are left (or in the language of Mr. Hume, the ideas) are linked together.
Whenever therefore any one of the movements, which constitute !
a complex impression, is renewed through the senses, the others succeed mechanically. It follows of necessity, therefore, that Hobbes, as well as Hartley and all others who derive association from the connexion and interdependence of the supposed matter, the movements of which constitute our thoughts, must have reduced all its forms to the one law of Time. But even the merit of announcing this law with philosophic precision cannot be fairly conceded to him. For the objects of any two ideas need not
* [The Editor has never been able to find in the writings of Des Cartes anything coming up to the statement in the text. Certainly nothing of the sort follows the paragraph containing the story of the amputated hand. That Des Cartes was a Nominalist is clear from the following passage :
Et optime comprehendimus, qua pacto a varia magnitudine, figura et motu particularum unius corporis, varii motus locales in alio corpore excitentur ; nullo autem modo possumus intelligere, quo pacto ab iisdem (magnitudine scilicet, figura, et motu), aliquid aliud producatur, omnino diversæ ab ipsis naturæ, quales sunt illæ formæ substantiales et qualitates reales, quas in rebus esse multi supponunt; nec etiam quo pacto postea istæ qualitates aut formæ vim habeant in aliis corporibus motus locales excitandi. Princip. IV., 198 Ed.]
[See Human Nature. C. ii , 111. Leviathan ubi supra. Ed.] $ I here used the word idea in Mr. Hume's sense on account of its general currency amongst the English metaphysicians; though against my own judgment, for I believe that the vague use of-this word has been the cause of much error and more confusion. The word, idia, in its original have co-existed in the same sensation in order to become mutually associable. The same result will follow when one only of the two ideas has been represented by the senses, and the other by the memory.
sense as used by Pindar, Aristophanes, and in the Gospel of St Matthew, represented the visual abstraction of a distant object, when we see the whole without distinguishing its parts.* Plato adopted it as a technical term, and as the antithesis to sidwlov, or sensuous image; the transient and perishable" emblem, or mental word, of the idea. Ideas themselves he considered as mysterious powers, living, serminal, formative, and exempt from time. In this sense the word Idea became the property of the Platonic school; and it seldoin occurs in Aristotle, without sume such phrase annexed to it, as according to Plato, or as Plato says. Our English writers to the end of the reign of Charles II., or somewhat later, employed it either in the original sense, or Platonically, or in a sense nearly correspondent to our present use of the substantive Ideal ; always however opposing it, more or less, to image, whether of present or absent objects. The reader will not be displeased with the following interesting exempli. fication from Bishop Jeremy Taylor. “St. Lewis the King sent Ivo Bishop of Chartres on an embassy, and he told, that he met a grave and stately matron on the way with a censer of fire in one hand, and a vessel of water
[- τον είδον
ου γινώσκων, ότι του Πλούτου παρέχω βελτίονας άνδρας,
ήν δε και ιδία αυτού ως αστραπή, και το ένδυμα αυτού λευκόν ώσει χιών.-Μatt. xxviii., 3. Ed.]
+ See the Timeus. (Βekk. III., ii., 23.) ότου μεν ούν αν και δημιουργός προς το καπά ταύτα έχον βλέπων αεί, τοιούτω τινί προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, την ιδέαν αυτού και δύναμιν απεργάζηται, καλόν εξ ανάγκης ούτως αποτελείσθαι πάν. But the word idea is used by Plato in several senses, modified according to the natures, divine or human, in which he represents the ideas as placed See the fine moral passage in the Republic (vii., 3)-εν τα γνωστά τε εταια , του αγαθού ιδέα και μόγις δράσθαι, οφθίισα δε συλλογιστία είναι ως άρα πισι πάντων αύτη όρθιων τε και καλών αιτία, ίν τε ρατό φως και τον τούτου κύριον τε ούσα, και τε νοητώ αυτή κυρία αλήθειας και νουν παρασχoμένη, και ότι δεί τα την ιδείν τ» μέλλοντα εμφρόνως πράξεις και ιδία ή δημοσία.
The notes appended by the enthusiastic Thomas Taylor to his translatiop of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, are full of learned illustration upon this subject. Ed.]
Long,' however, before either Hobbes or Des Cartes the law of association had been defined, and its important functions set
in the other; and observing her to have a melancholy, religious, and phantastic deportment and look, he asked her what those symbols •meant, and what she meant to do with her fire and water; she answered, My purpose is with the fire to burn paradise, and with my water to quench the flames of hell, that men may serve God purely for the love of God. But we rarely meet with sạch spirits which love virtue so metaphysically as to abstract her from all sensible compositions, and love the purity of the idea.”* Des Cartes having introduced into his philosophy the fanciful hypothesis of material ideas,-or certain configurations of the brain, which were as so many moulds to the influxes of the external world,-Locke adopted the term, but extended its signification to whatever is the immediate object of the mind's attention or consciousness. Hume, distinguishing those representations which are accompanied with a sense of a present object from those reproduced by the mind itself, designated the former by impressions, and confined the word idea to the latter. I
[For the substance of the following paragraph, and in part for the remarks upon the doctrine of association of ideas as represented in the writings of Aristotle, Mr. Coleridge is indebted to the very interesting and excellent treatise of J. G. E. Maasz, On the Imagination, Versuch über die Einbildungskraft, pp. 343-4-5-6. A copy of this work (1797), richly annotated on the margins and blank spaces, was found among Mr. Coleridge's books; and in so “immethodical a miscellany of literary opinions” as this the insertion of these notes may not be out of place.
“ In Maasz's introductory chapters," says Mr. Coleridge, "my mind has been perplexed by the division of things into matter (sensatio ab extra) and form (i. e. per-et-con-ceptio ab intru). Now as Time and Space are evidently only the universals, or modi communes, of sensation and sensuous Form, and consequently appertain exclusively to the sensuous Einbildungskraft (=Eisemplasy, alárrei eis in), which we call Imagination, Fancy, &c., all poor and inadequate terms, far inferior to the German, Einbildung, the Law of Association derived ab extra from the contemporanëity of the impressions, or indeed any other difference of the characterless Manifold forth by Ludovicus Vives. Phantasia, it is to be noticed, is employed by Vives to express the mental power of comprehension, or the active function of the mind; and imaginatio for the receptivity (vis receptiva) of impressions, or for the passive per
* [The passage here ascribed to Bishop Taylor I cannot find in his works, nor have ! been able to light upon the expression, “him that reads in malice or him that reads after dinner," also attributed to him by Mr. Coleridge, in any of his writings. 8. C.]
[It (Idea) being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of th: understanding, when a man thinks ; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Human Understand. I. i., s. 8. Ed.]
[By the term, Impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from Ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we am conscijus, when wo reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned Inquiru concerning the Hum. Under., S. 2. Ed.)
(das Mannichfaltige) except that of plus and minus of impingence becomes incomprehensible, if not absurd. I see at one instant of time Rose and a Lily.--Chemistry teaches me that they differ only in forn being both reducible to the same elements. If then form be not an extei nal active power, if it be wholly transfused into the object by the esena plastic or imaginative faculty of the percipient, or rather creator, where and wherein shall I find the ground of my perception, that this is the Rose and that the Lily. In order to render the creative activity of the imagination at all conceivable, we must necessarily have recourse to the Harmonia præstabilita of Spinoza and Leibnitz: in which case the automtism of the Imagination and Judgment would be perception in the same sense as a self-conscious watch would be a percipient of time, and inclusively of the apparent motion of the sun and stars. But, as the whole is but a choice of incomprehensibles, till the natural doctrine of physical influx, or modification of each by all, have been proved absurd, I shall still prefer it: and not doubt, that the pencil of rays forms pictures on the retina, because I cannot comprehend how this picture can excite a mental fac-simile."
Maasz, Introd., S. 1. Denn die Merkmale, wodurch ein Objekt angestellt wird, müssen entweder individuelle oder gemeinsame seyn.
Coleridge. “ Deceptive. The mark in itself is always individuai. By · an act of the reflex understanding it may be rendered a sign or general term. The word Vorstellung has been as often mischievous as useful in German philosophy." Ed.]
10 (Originally thus—" by Melancthon, Ammerbach, and L. Vives ; more especially by the last ;"-part of which statement appears to have been an imperfect recollection by Mr. C. of the words of Maasz, who, after observing that in the sixteenth century the spirit of inquiry took a new turn, and that men then came forth who knew the value of empirical psychology, and took pains to enforce and elucidate its truths, proceeds as follows:
“ Among the first to whom this merit belongs were Melancthon, Ammerbach, and Lud. Vives, whose psychological writings were published all together by Getzner (Zurich, 1662). But far the most was done by Vives He brought together many important observations upon the human sowa, and made striking remarks thereon. More especially in the theory of the association of representations, which Melancthon and Ammerbach do not bring forward at all, he displays no ordinary knowledge.” Transl.,
Philip Melancthon, a reformer in Philosophy as well as in Religion,
ception." The power of combination he appropriates to the former : "quæ singula et simpliciter acceperat imaginatio, ea con. jungit et disjungit phantasia. And the law by which the published, among other philosophical works, a book De Anima, 1540. in 8vo.
Vitus Ammerbach, a learned author and Professor of Philosophy at Ingol. stadt, was born at Wedinguen in Bavaria, and died in 1557, at the age of seventy. He also published, amongst other works, one on the Soul-De Anima, lib. iv., Lugd. Bat., 1555, 8vo , and one on Natural PhilosophyDe Philosophia Naturali, lib, vi , 8vo.
John Lewis Vives was born in 1492 at Valencia in Spain, died at Bruges, according to Thuanus in 1541 : was first patronized by Henry VIII. of England, who made him preceptor in Latin to the Princess Mary, and afterwards persecuted by him for opposing his divorce. He was a follower of Erasmus, and opponent of the Scholastic Philosophy. His works, which are of various kinds, theological, devotional, grammatical, critical, as well as philosophical, were printed at Basle in 1555, in two vols. fol. The Treatise De Anima et Vita is contained in vol. ii., pp. 497–593. S. C.]
11[Et quemadmodum in altrice facultate videre est inesse vim quandam, quæ cibum recipiat, aliam quæ contineat, aliam quæ conficiat, quæque distribuat et dispenset: ita in animis et hominum et brutorum est functio, quæ imagines sensibus impressas recipit, quæ inde Imaginativa dicitur : est quæ continet hæc, Memoria ; quæ conficit, Phantasia : quæ distribuit ad assensum aut dissensum, Extrimatrix. Sunt enim spiritalia imagines Dei, corporalia vero spiritalium quædam veluti simulachra: ut mirandum non sit, ex corporalibus spiritalia colligi, ceu ab umbris aut picturis corpora expressa. Imaginativæ actio est in animo, quæ oculi in corpore, recipere imagines intuendo: estque velut orificium quoddam vasis, quod est Memoria. Phantasia verò conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simplicia Imaginatio acceperat. Equidem haud sum nescius, confundi duo hæc a plerisque, ut Imaginationem Phantasiam, et vice versa hanc Imaginationem nominent, et eandem esse functionem arbitrentur. Sed nobis tum ad rem aptius, tum ad docendum accommodatius visum est ita parliri : propterea quod actiones videmus distinctas, unde facultates censentur Tametsi nihil erit quandoque periculi, si istis utamur promiscue. Accedit his sensus, qui ab Aristotele communis dicitur, quo judicantur sensilia absentia : et discernuntur ea, quæ variorum sunt sensuum : hic sub Imaginationem et Phantasiam venire potest. Phantasia est mirifice expedita et libera: quicquid collibitum est, fingit, refingit, componit, devincit, dissolvit, res disjunctissimas connectit, conjunctissimas autem longissime separat. Itaque nisi regatur, et cohibeatur a ratione, haud secus animum percellit ac perturbat, quam procella mare. Jo. Ludovici Vivis, De Anima et Vita Lib. i , opera, tom. ii., p. 509. Basil., 1535
S. C.) 19 [Maasz, p. 34. Note. Vives De Anim. i., s. d. cogn. intern. Phan.