UNIVERSIT: MATERIALS FOR THINKING. LIBERALITY OF SENTIMENT. LIBERALITY of sentiment is the greatest ornament of man, it embellishes all his other good qualities, and makes them shine with double lustre, it softens all the harshness arising from difference of opinion, it lessens the frequency of private quarrels, and makes the Jew, the Christian, and the Infidel, live at peace with each other. This amiable quality, tho' occasionally possessed by the first teachers of Christianity, has, in very few instances, ever belonged to any description of Christians since their times, for sentiments of intolerance are early to A be found in the writings of the Fathers, and all established religions are essentially intolerant. The liberality of true philosophy is unrestrained by the narrow creed of opinions merely speculative, and estimates every man's merit by his conduct, considering the great end of philosophy to consist in utility. But all mankind are not philosophers, for with most men, violence is the test of sincerity, and to be liberal is but another name for being indifferent; such, however, have yet to learn, that sincerity in ópinions is to be shewn only by actions, and that belief is a personal affair. What I should believe, no man has a right to dictate or enquire; what I do, concerns others only so far as it may affect their interest. To be liberal, is only a virtue, because the perversity of the world has sanctioned the contrary, it is strictly that which every man has a right to expect, because no one has a right to say to another, "You ought to believe what I believe;" for belief should proceed from conviction, and conviction is not at any man's command. Liberality, tho' not inconsistent with a belief of our own, forbears to interfere with the faith or the hopes of another, and all attempts to dictate to others, are violations of that pure spirit of philosophy, whose only weapons of conver sion are advice and argument, whereas the instruments of persecution are various, keen, and cruel; and tho' (thanks to the temper of the times!) those coarse correctors of heresy, the gibbet and the stake, are now out of fashion, yet the ingenuity of power has invented other methods of enforcing silence or belief, not quite so effectual, but more painful to the mind of the sufferer. The force of parental authority, the power of situation, the influence of riches, on the hopes and expectations, the feelings and passions of men, have all been exerted to effect a similarity of belief, which is of little use either to the world or to individuals. The generality of mankind are ignorant, illiberal, and little qualified to judge of speculative opinions; if any one thinks for himself, and ventures to speak his sentiments, they harshly and hastily condemn him, without being able to enter into his motives; they cry out, "heretic! infidel! atheist!" and treat him with every species of insult and contempt. To quarrel with our friends for difference of opinion, is peevish and ridiculous; it is like a spoilt child, who, not being able to get every thing he wants, falls a crying in a pet. Why `should any man dislike another merely because he thinks differently from him, for if his actions are just, kind, and honorable, of what consequence is it to the world, much less to any individual, from what motive they proceed? Some men do good because they feel a pleasure in it; others, because they conceive it to be the will of God; others, because they believe it to be conformable to the eternal rule of right and the moral nature of things, and if their actions neither disturb the peace of the world, nor interrupt the harmony of social intercourse, what right has any man to say, " You ought to think otherwise." Opinions are of consequence only as they lead to actions, and when actions are destructive of public or private peace, it is the right of society to protect the safety of individuals by laws and punishments. To encroach on the right of thinking, is to invade liberty in her inmost sanctuary, and to reduce the greatest part of mankind to the rank of automata, for if a man's actions are not the result of his conviction, he might as well never think at all, but act like a puppet at the will of his mover. The professed object of all compulsion is uniformity of sentiment, an object, no doubt, desirable in matters of consequence, yet experience proves, that all attempts to produce it by force destroy their own purpose, for when left to themselves, men are generally more alike in their opinions, than when controled by others. Truth is uniform and consistent, but error is multifarious, and the child of constraint, and so natural is liberty to man, that the more he is dictated to, the more likely he is to do wrong. Tho' some men tell us, that variety is desirable in all things, yet it is not to be denied, that, in things of importance the greatest similarity of opinion, consistent with liberty, is to be wished for, but in things that are indifferent, the greatest variety produces the greatest pleasure. Liberality, therefore, which leaves every man to think and act as he pleases, is the best remedy for difference of opinion, and the surest promoter of harmony among all parties. The experience of the world sufficiently proves, that there are hardly opinions in themselves destructive of the peace of society; it is not opinions which do harm, but the opposition to them. Many errors, which would have vanished before time and reason, have grown strong and vigorous by being encountered, and the very force by which they were opposed, has destroyed many thousand lives, and left the opinions which it meant to root out, confirmed and strengthened. Liberality of sentiment is shewn not only in religious and political differences, but consists |