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But he apprehends, that several objections will be made to this history, as that it will contain false facts, erroneous experiments, and disagreeable, subtile, vulgar or abstruse particulars. But all this he shews amounts to little; because (1.) a few errors, and even falshoods, must necessarily happen in the beginning of a history of nature; and will not prove of any very bad consequence (though they should indeed be cautiously guarded against,) for such errors and falshoods, where but few, are easily discovered and corrected, when axioms come to be raised, or the interpretation of nature to be entered upon. (2.) Vulgar things being usually as much unknown, with respect to their causes, as things uncommon; such vulgar things should not be rejected, but received into a history of nature. (3.) Disagreeable or sordid matters, such as core ruptions, putrefactions, &c. must be here necessarily considered, no less than others; because they give great light into the operations of nature; and things for this design must not be judged of by the rules of elegancy, but according to utility. And (4.) subtile, speculative matters, are not here received for the sake of subtilty and speculation, but only as they afford information, lead to practice, and assist in the interpretation of nature.

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The author apprehends, it will appear strangely

shocking, insolent and monstrous, that he should at one stroke set aside all the ancient philoso phies and all the sciences, and go entirely upon a new scheme of building up philosophy from a different foundation. But he judges, that this procedure, when duly considered, will be found more rational, modest, and serviceable, than to have used artful accommodations, and patched up a deceitful system of new and old materials; for as the ancients raised their philosophies upon false notions, or false principles, discovered in an erroneous manner, there was an absolute necessity of beginning the whole work anew. Nor does he think it insolence, if by means of an engine for the mind, or particular helps which the ancients never knew, any one of common abilities, should raise a more serviceable structure of philosophy, than they by means of the naked understanding.

To the objection, that the end of all this labour is wrong fixed, as tending to practice, and the accommodation of life; and not to the abstract contemplation of truth, which is a much nobler thing; it is answered, that the latter is indeed preferable to the former; but that, in the method proposed, both ends are answered at once, the design being here to give a genuine, a native, and just representation of the world, such as it exists, which is not only the most

useful knowledge, but the noblest contemplation; that unites theory and practice together, in their highest degree, and makes them one and the same thing.

To the objection, that perhaps the author's new method is no more than some old one, and therefore not of any extraordinary use; he answers, that the ancients have delivered their method of forming the sciences; which was by flying immediately from a few particulars to general conclusions; a method very different from the method he proposes, by a rigorous and care ful induction: that, in particular, his method does not tend to scepticism, but to a scientifical doubting at first, that the greatest certainties may be afterwards discovered; and that this me thod regards not any one particular art or science, but all arts and all subjects universally.

But the author hopes that no one will suspect his design is to abolish, and utterly destroy the arts and sciences at present in use: especially as he has, in his De Augmentis Scientiarum, taken so much pains to improve, and shew the way of perfecting them: all he aims at, in this respect, being to convince the mind, that the sciences in vogue are of no use for enlarging the bounds of knowledge, and discovering new, arts, and practical works: which end, his own method is entirely calculated to promote. And

yet he does not pretend that this method of his is absolutely perfect or unimproveable; but, on the contrary, that it will doubtless improve, as new arts are found, or new discoveries made. And thus he concludes the first, or preparatory part of this work.

The second part, as was before observed, is wholly doctrinal, or scientifical: and goes directly upon delivering the new art of induction, or method of interpreting nature, in order to form an extensive philosophy; or procure an exact copy of the universe, for perfecting the understanding, and leading to an unlimited practice. And here, as the most excellent things are often the most difficult to obtain; the doctrine delivered will appear somewhat abstruse, till the mind becomes a little acquainted with it; after which all the difficulties vanish, and an agreeable prospect is obtained of a sure and practicable way of procuring, in a moderate time, with the proper assistances, such a philosophy as shall highly improve the state of hu

man nature.

The foundation of the thing is laid in finding a method of increasing the human powers and knowledge, to their greatest possible perfection. And this the author shews may be done by discovering what he, in a new and peculiar sense, calls the forms of things; that is, the laws or

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powers of nature, by which things physically exist, are generated, or have their effects. And these forms, or laws of nature, he holds to be discoverable by men; and shews how to discover them: in which single point the whole of his new engine centers. There are but two sec tions finished of this second part: the first whereof lays the foundation of the doctrine of forms; and exemplifies it by a general example, and a set of tables for the purpose: and the second section shews how to shorten enquiries, conduct+ ed in this method; by selecting only the more eminent facts and observations, or capital in stances, that lead to a full and perfect discovery; without ranging, in an endless manner, through that immense variety of particulars, to be found in nature.

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But as it would be a fruitless labour to go ups on discovering these forms, without knowing their use, when found; the first section of this second part shews, that the end of philosophy is to increase either the knowledge, or power of man; so as to enable him to understand the ways and procedure of nature; or else to pros duce such effects as make for his own advantage: and that to discover forms, is at once to acquire both this knowledge, and this power; because by finding the laws of nature, and her ways of pro ducing effects, men will be enabled, so far as

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