is a clear and certain previous notion contained. For in the first, there is required somewhat agreeable to order; in the second, an image is required, that has some agreement, or relation, to those fixed places; in the third, words that will stand in a verse: so that infinity is thus cut off or prevented; and the search limited and re strained.

Other instances will give this second species; that whatever brings an intellectual thing to strike the sense, (which is the method principally used in artificial memory)* helps the remembrance.

Other instances will give this third species; that those things which make an impression by means of a strong affection or passion, as by causing fear, surprize, blushing, delight, &c. assist the memory.

Other intances will give this fourth species; that those things sink the deepest, and dwell the longest in the memory, which are chiefly impressed upon a clear mind, that remains unprejudiced, either before or after the impression; as the things we learn in childhood, or think of just before going to sleep; as likewise all the first times that things are taken notice of.

Other instances will give this fifth species; that

* See the Art of Memory, in the de Augment. Scientiar Sect. XV.

a multitude of circumstances, or, as it were, handles, or holds to be taken, help the memory: as the making of many breaks in writing, or printing; reading or repeating aloud, &c.

Lastly; other instances will give this sixth species of help; that those things which are expected, and raise the attention, stick better, than such as pass slightly over the mind: whence, if a man should read a writing twenty times over, he would not remember it so well, as if he should read it but ten times, with trying between whiles to repeat it; and consulting the copy where his memory failed.

Hence there are, as it were, six lesser forms of helps for the memory; viz. (1.) the cutting off infinity; (2.) reducing intellectual to sensible things; (3.) impression by a strong passion; (4.) impression upon a mind free and disengaged; (5.) variety of handles, or occasions; and, (6.) expectation conceived.

In like manner, let the nature sought be taste, or tasting; and the following instances are constituent: viz. (1.) those who naturally want their smell, do not perceive or distinguish by the taste, such meats as are musty or tainted; or again, such as are mixed with garlic, roses, and the like. 5. (2.) Those who have their nostrils obstructed, by the accidental falling down of a rheum, do not distinguish, or perceive things that are putrefied, musty, or sprinkled with rose-water.

(3.) If those who are troubled with this kind of rheum, hold any fetid or perfumed thing in their mouth, and at the same time strongly blow their nose, they immediately perceive the stench or perfume.

These instances will afford, or constitute, this species, or rather part of the form of taste; viz. that the sense of tasting is, in some measure, no more than an internal smell, passing and descending from the upper cavities of the nostrils, to the mouth and palate.

(4.) On the contrary; saltness, sweetness, acrimony, acidity, roughness, bitterness, &c. are all perceived, as well by such persons as want their smell, or have it obstructed, as by any others. Which shews that the sense of taste is a certain composition of an internal smell, and a kind of exquisite touch:* but this is no place to prosecute the subject.

Again, for example, let the nature sought be the communication of quality without commixture of substance. The instance of light will here afford, or constitute one species of communication; and heat, and the loadstone another: for the communication of light is, in a manner, momentary, and ceases immediately upon re moving the original illuminating body; but heat

*See the Sylva Sylvarum, p. 155, 180, &c.

and the magnetic virtue, when communicated, or rather excited, in any body, lodge and remain therein for a considerable time after the first cause is taken away.

Lastly; these constituent instances have a very high prerogative; as being eminently serviceable in the forming of definitions, especially the particular kind; and again, in the making of divisions, or distributions of natures; with regard to which, Plato said well, That he is to be held as a God, who knows perfectly how to define and divide.*

27. The sixth place may be assigned to those instances which we call parallel, conformable, or proportional instances, and sometimes physical parallels and similitudes; that is, such as shew a similitude, correspondence, and relation be twixt things, not in the lesser forms, like consti tuent instancest, but entirely in the concrete; and are therefore, as it were, instances of the first and lowest degree, for the uniting of na

This use will appear evident, by recurring to the beginning of the present Aphorism. And without frequently going back, and comparing one part of these Aphorisms with another, it cannot be expected that their doctrine and use should be fully comprehended.

See Aph. 26

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ture*. Nor do they constitute any Axiom immediately from the beginning; but only point out, indicate, or present certain relations of bodies. And although these instances are of nọ great use in the disclosing of forms, yet they'very advantageously lay open the structure of the parts of the universe, or make a kind of anatomy in the members thereof; and therefore sometimes lead up to sublime and noble Axioms, especially such as belong to the configuration of the world, rather than to simple natures and forms +.

For example, parallel, or conformable instances, are such as these; viz. a speculum and the eye, the structure of the ear, and of the cavernous places that yield an echo, &c. from which conformity, besides the observation of the similitude or correspondence (which is useful in

* Viz. For discovering the similarity, sameness, or unity of nature, in dissimilar subjects. See above, Part II. Aph 3.

This, and the like general descriptions of instances, will be usually intricate and abstruse of themselves, till the subsequent exemplifications are read, which render the whole plain and intelligible. Whence, after reading the examples, it may be proper to go over the general description again, in order the better to take the sense, and observe the correspondence.