of art or of science, is to multiply, as far as possible, the number of those who can observe, and judge; and, whatever may be the conclusions of my readers with regard to my own particular opinions, I shall not have occupied their attention in vain, if I can lead them to think and to feel for themselves-to employ the powers which are given them to the ends for which they were given; and, upon subjects where all men are entitled to judge, to disregard alike the abstract refinements of the philosopher who speculates in the closet, and the technical doctrines of the artist who dictates in the school. Of the nature of the emotions of sublimity and beauty. CHAP. I.-SECT. I. Of the effect produced upon the 呼 17 CHAP. II. SECT. I. Analysis of this exercise of ima- Part I. Of the sublimity of forms, Part II. Of the beauty of forms, Part III. Of the composition of forms, SECT. II. Of the relative beauty of forms, ESSAY I. ON THE NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY. CHAPTER I. OF THE EFFECT PRODUCED UPON THE IMAGINATION BY OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY. SECTION I. THE emotions of sublimity and beauty are uniformly ascribed, both in popular and philosophical language, to the imagination. The fine arts are considered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, and the pleasures which they afford are described, by way of distinction, as the pleasures of the imagination. The nature of any person's taste, is, in common life, generally determined from the nature or character of his imagination, and the expression of any deficiency in this power of mind, is considered as synonymous with the expression of a similar deficiency in point of taste. Although, however, this connexion is so generally acknowledged, it is not, perhaps, as generally understood in what it To what are the emotions of sublimity and beauty uniformly ascribed? To what are the fine arts addressed, and how are the pleasures which they afford described? From what is the nature of any person's taste, in common life, generally determined; and how is the expression of any deficiency in this power of mind considered? Although this connexion is so generally acknow consists, or what is the nature of that effect which is produced upon the imagination and by objects of sublimity and beauty. I shall endeavor, therefore, in the first place, to state what seems to me the nature of this effect, or, in what that exercise of imagination consists, which is so generally supposed to take place, when these emotions are felt. When any object, either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe every man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination, analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind, unless, according to common expression, our imagination is seized, and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought, which are allied to this character of expression. Thus, when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery-the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean-we are conscious of a variety of images in our minds, very different from those which the objects themselves can present to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontane. ously within our minds; our hearts swell with emotions, of which the objects before us seem to afford no adequate cause; and we are never so much satiated with delight, as when, in recalling our attention, we are unable to trace either the progress or the connexion of those thoughts which have passed with so much rapidity through our imagination. The effect of the different arts of taste is similar. The landscapes of Claude Lorrain, the music of Handel, the poetry of Milton, excite feeble emotions in our minds, when our attention is confined to the qualities they present to our senses, or ledged, yet what is not perhaps, as generally understood? What does our author, therefore, in the first place, propose to do? When any object, either of sublimity or beauty, is presented to the mind, of what is every man conscious? Under what circumstances do we frequently find the simple perception of the object, insufficient to excite these emotions? How is this remark illustrated? From what does it appear that the effect of the different arts of taste is simi |