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yet I hold that in the end all such must be handed over to religion to be determined and defined. Otherwise they will be subject to many errors and illusions of the sense. For since the substance of the soul in its creation was not extracted or produced out of the mass of heaven and earth, but was immediately inspired from God; and since the laws of heaven and earth are the proper subjects of philosophy; how can we expect to obtain from philosophy the knowledge of the substance of the rational soul? It must be drawn from the same divine inspiration, from which that substance first proceeded.

The doctrine concerning the sensible or produced soul, however, is a fit subject of inquiry even as regards its substance; but such inquiry appears to me to be deficient. For of what service are such terms as ultimate act, form of the body, and such toys of logic, to the doctrine concerning the substance of the soul? For the sensible soul — the soul of brutes - must clearly be regarded as a corporeal substance, attenuated and made invisible by heat; a breath (I say) compounded of the natures of flame and air, having the softness of air to receive impressions, and the vigour of fire to propagate its action; nourished partly by oily and partly by watery substances ; clothed with the body, and in perfect animals residing chiefly in the head, running along the nerves, and refreshed and repaired by the spirituous blood of the arteries; as Bernardinus Telesius and his pupil Augustinus Donius have in part not altogether unprofitably maintained. Let there be therefore a more diligent inquiry concerning this doctrine; the rather because the imperfect understanding of this has bred opinions superstitious and corrupt and most injurious to the dignity of the human mind, touching metempsychosis, and the purifications of souls in periods of years, and indeed too near an affinity in all things between the human soul and the souls of brutes. For this soul is in brutes the principal soul, the body of the brute being its instrument; whereas in man it is itself only the instrument of the rational soul, and may be more fitly termed not soul, but spirit. And so much for the substance of the soul.

The faculties of the soul are well known; understanding, reason, imagination, memory, appetite, will; in short all with which the logical and ethical sciences deal. But in the doctrine concerning the soul the origins of these faculties onght to be handled, and that physically, as they are innate and inherent in the soul; the uses only and objects of them being deputed to those other arts. In which part nothing of much value (in my opinion) has as yet been discovered; though I cannot indeed report it as deficient. This part touching the faculties of the mind has likewise two appendices, which themselves also, as they are handled, have rather produced smoke than any clear flame of truth. One of these is the doctrine of Natural Divination, the other of Fascination.

Divination has been anciently and not nfitly divided into two parts; Artificial and Natural. Artificial makes prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; Natural forms a presage from an inward presentiment of the mind, without the help of signs. Artificial is of two sorts; one argues from causes; the other only from experiments, by a kind of blind authority. Which latter is for the most part superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of entrails, the flights of birds, and the like. And the more solemn astrology of the Chaldeans was little better. But artificial divination of both kinds is dispersed among different knowledges. The astrologer bas his predictions, from the position of the stars. The physician likewise has his predictions of approaching death, of recovery, of coming symptoms of diseases, from the urine, the pulse, the look of the patient, and the like. The politician also has his; “O venal city, that will quickly perish, if it finds a purchaser:"? which prediction was not long in being verified; being fulfilled in Sylla first, and afterwards in Cæsar. Predictions of this kind therefore are not to our present purpose, but are to be referred to their own arts. But Natural Divination, which springs from the inward power of the mind, is that which I now speak of. This is of two sorts ; the one Primitive, the other by Influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, has of its own essential power some prenotion of things to come. Now this appears most in sleep, in extasies, and near death; and more rarely in waking apprehensions, or when the body is healthy and strong. But this state of mind is commonly induced or furthered by those abstinences and observances

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Sallust, in Bell. Jugurth. 38.

which most withdraw the mind from exercising the duties of the body, so that it may enjoy its own nature, free from external restraints. Divination by influxion is grounded upon this other conceit; that the mind, as a mirror or glass, receives a kind of secondary illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; and this also is furthered by the same state and regimen of the body as the other. For the retiring of the mind within itself gives it the fuller benefit of its own nature, and makes it the more susceptible of divine influxions; save that in divinations by influxion the mind is seized with a kind of fervency and impatience as it were of the present Deity (a state which the ancients noted by the name of divine fury); while in primitive divination it is more in a state of quiet and repose.

Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon the body of another (for of the power of imagination upon the body of the imaginant I have spoken above); wherein the school of Paracelsus and the disciples of pretended natural magic have been so intemperate, that they have exalted the power and apprehension of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, looking with a clearer eye at the secret workings and impressions of things, the irradiations of the senses, the passage of contagion from body to body, the con

, veyance of magnetic virtues, have concluded that it is much more probable there should be impressions, conveyances, and communications from spirit to spirit (seeing that the spirit is above all other things both strenuous to act and soft and tender to be acted on); whence have arisen those conceits (now become as it were popular) of the mastering spirit, of men unlucky and ill omened, of the glances of love, envy, and the like. With this is joined the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have so much power, it is worth while to know how to fortify and exalt it. And here comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation and defence of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be speciously pretended that ceremonies, characters, charms, gesticulations, amulets, and the like, do not derive their power from any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen and exalt the imagination of him who uses them. As likewise in religion the use of images to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of those who pray before them has grown common. My own judgment however is this: though it be admitted, that imagination has power, and further that ceremonies fortify and strengthen that power; and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose, and as a physical remedy, without any the least thought of inviting thereby the aid of spirits; they are nevertheless to be held unlawful, as opposing and disputing that divine sentence passed upon man for sin, “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” 1

For magic of this kind proposes to attain those noble fruits which God ordained to be bought at the price of labour by a few easy and slothful observances.

There remain two doctrines, which refer principally to the faculties of the inferior or sensible soul, -as that which is most connected with the organs of the body; the one concerning Voluntary Motion, the other concerning Sense and the Sensible. In the first of these, which has in other respects also been very barrenly inquired, one entire part almost is wanting. For the proper office and structure of the nerves and muscles, and of the other parts required for this motion; and what part of the body is at rest, while another moves; and that the imagination is as it were the director and driver of this motion, insomuch that when the image which is the object of the motion is withdrawn the motion itself is immediately interrupted and stopped (as in walking, if you begin to think eagerly and fixedly of something else, you immediately stand still); these, I say, and some other subtleties which are not amiss, have long ago come into observation and inquiry. But how the compressions, dilatations, and agitations of the spirit (which is doubtless the source of motion) can sway, excite, or impel the corporeal and gross mass of the parts, has not as yet been diligently inquired and handled. And no wonder ; seeing the sensible soul has been regarded rather as a function than as a substance. But since it is now known that it is itself a corporeal and material substance, it is necessary to inquire by what efforts a spirit so small and tender can put in motion bodies so gross and hard. Of this part therefore, since it is deficient, let inquiry be made.

Concerning Sense and the Sensible there has been much fuller and more diligent inquiry, both in general treatises concerning them and also in particular arts, as perspective and

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music; how correctly, is nothing to the purpose, seeing they cannot be ranked as deficients. Yet there are two noble and distinguished parts, which I pronounce deficient in this doctrine; the one concerning the Difference of Perception and Sense, the other concerning the Form of Light.

A good explanation of the difference between Perception and Sense should have been prefixed by philosophers to their treatises on Sense and the Sensible, as a matter most fundamental. For we see that all natural bodies have a manifest power of perception, and also a kind of choice in receiving what is agreeable, and avoiding what is hostile and foreign. Nor am I speaking only of the more subtle perceptions, as when the magnet attracts iron, flame leaps towards naphtha, one bubble coming near another unites with it, rays of light start away from a white object, the body of an animal assimilates things that are useful and excerns things that are not so, part of a sponge attracts water (though held too high to touch it) and expels air, and the like. For what need is there of enumerating such things ? since no body when placed near another either changes it or is changed by it, unless a reciprocal perception precede the operation. A body perceives the passages by which it enters; it perceives the force of another body to which it yields; it perceives the removal of another body which held it fast, when it recovers itself; it perceives the disruption of its continuity, which for a time it resists; in short there is Perception everywhere. And air perceives heat and cold so acutely, that its perception is far more subtle than that of the human touch, which yet is reputed the normal measure of heat and cold. It seems then that in regard to this doctrine men have committed two faults; one, that they have for the most part left it untouched and unhandled (though it be a most noble subject); the other, that they who have happened to turn their minds to it have gone too far, and attributed sense to all bodies; so that it were a kind of impiety to pluck off the branch of a tree, lest it should groan, like Polydorus. But they should have examined the difference between perception and sense, not only in sensible as compared with insensible bodies (as plants with animals), one body with another; but also in the sensible body itself they should have observed what is the reason why so many actions are performed without any sense

I Virg. Æn. iii. 39.

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