drawn up in order of battle; at night, they bivouacked in square, enclosing him within their ranks. They were employed, throughout the hours of darkness, in keeping up their fires, or dozing with their elbows on their knees and their heads on their hands, thus doubled up to preserve what heat they could, and to avoid the torment of hunger as much as possible. The weather was tempestuous, and the situation of the bivouacks was indicated every morning by a circle of dead. Notwithstanding all their disadvantages and the overwhelming force brought against them by the three different armies, the French held the Russians at bay until the morning of the 29th. Tchitchakoff was actually beaten by Ney, and the ground was clear for the continuance of the retreat. On the evening of the 28th, Victor's corps was ordered to pass the river. The troops advanced, crushing and overthrowing in their way the wretched beings whom they had hitherto defended. Victor, however, left a rear-guard at Studzianka during the night. Trusting to this defence, multitudes still lingered round their baggage, refusing to leave it and take advantage of the darkness to make their escape. When morning came, the rear-guard passed on, and burned the bridge behind them. Thousands were then seen wandering in desolate groups on their enemy's bank; some, roused too late, threw themselves into the river and were lost amidst the ice; others rushed upon the flames of the bridge, which gave way under them; the rest, in helpless despair, waited the coming up of the Russians.

Napoleon remained at his post till the accomplishment of the dismal catastrophe, and then moved forward towards Zembin with the remains of his army. The amount of his loss, at this fatal point, has never been distinctly stated; but the Russian report concerning the bodies which were collected and burnt after the thaw, states that upwards of thirty-six thousand were found in the Beresina. The whole of the surrounding country was a vast morass. The French traversed it by means of three successive bridges constructed of wood. The Russians had most unaccountably neglected to burn these bridges, but Napoleon was not guilty of the like improvidence. They were fired, by his order, after his troops had passed. Kutusoff was still on the Dnieper, while his prey was thus escaping from his grasp. The old Russian had often replied to the remonstrances against his own inactivity, that the "marshes of the Beresina would complete the destruction of Napoleon;" but he had not made sufficient allowance for the energy of his adversary. One division only was compelled to surrender.

The late hardships and struggles had nearly completed the disorganisation of the French troops. Little order was observed in the

march. They pressed forward in a shapeless mass, officers and men intermingled. Prince Eugene led the advance; Ney preserved his perilous post in the rear. He was supported by a fresh division under Maisons, which had been despatched to the Beresina from Wilna, and marched, fighting at every step with Tchaplitz. Napoleon led the main body. It was observed, that he continued to order his marshals to take up positions on the road, just as if their corps were still under their command. One of them made some bitter complaints to him on the subject, and began to enumerate his losses, when Napoleon interrupted him with these memorable words,-" Why do you try to rob me of my serenity?" And when the marshal persisted, he stopped him by repeating in a tone of reproach,-"I beg to know, sir, why you try to rob me of my serenity?" An expression, says Hazlitt, "which shewed the sort of deportment he wished to maintain in his adversity, and that which he required from others."

Napoleon was no longer harassed by any enemies, except clouds of Cossacks, who dispersed on being attacked. The weather was temperate; he reached Pleszczentczy on the 30th, and on the 3rd of December he reached Maladeczno. Here he found forty couriers waiting him. He halted, and employed himself in making important regulations. He ordered the Poles upon Warsaw, by way of Olita; the dismounted cavalry on the Niemen, by way of Merecz. It was hence, also, that he despatched his twenty-ninth bulletin, which filled Paris with mourning. Nothing had been heard there of the grand army for one and twenty days, when this dreadful document told its fate. It disclosed, in concise and simple terms, the disastrous history of the retreat the truth could, in fact, be concealed no longer. Napoleon had resolved, however, not to leave it to work its effect on all Europe, while he was struggling through the dreary tracts of Lithuania and Poland. After completing his dismal task, he suddenly announced to Duroc and Daru his resolution to leave the army, and set off for Paris immediately. "I must return to France," he said, "to quiet apprehensions there; to raise new troops, to keep my German subjects to their allegiance. But, in order to accomplish this, I must traverse four hundred leagues of allied territory alone; and, to do so without danger, my resolution must be unexpected, my route unknown, and the report of my reverses uncertain. I must be beforehand with the news, and the effect it might produce, and the defections it would occasion. I have, therefore, no time to lose." His advisers had nothing to reply to reasons so cogent, and which were, doubtless, perfectly sufficient to justify him in leaving his army at a period when it was already extricated from its most pressing dangers, was near its resources, and when its chief enemy was