they will be the proper principles of that which is demonstrated. For there may be a syllogism indeed without these conditions; but there will not be demonstration, since such a syllogism will not produce science. It is necessary, therefore, that the things from which demonstrative science consists should be true, because that which is not cannot be scientifically known; as, for instance, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with its side. It is also necessary that they should be from things first and indemonstrable, because they will not be scientifically known without demonstration, For to know scientifically things of which there is demonstration, and this not from accident, is to possess demonstration. It is likewise necessary that they should be the causes of, more known than, and prior to the conclusion. Causes, indeed, because we then know scientifically, when we know the cause: and prior because they are the causes. They are also previously known, not only from our understanding what they signify, but from our knowing that they are true. But things prior and more known subsist a twofold respect. For that which is prior to nature is not the same with that which is prior to us; nor is that which is more known to nature the same with that which is more known to us. By things prior and more known to us, I mean such as are nearer to sense; but things simply prior and more known are such as are more remote from sense. And things more remote from sense are such as are especially universal; but such as are most near to it are particulars, and these are opposed to each other." in If therefore it is impossible for demonstrative science to subsist without these conditions, and no scientific man will deny that it is impossible, how can any one be certain that his reasoning is demonstrative, if he is unacquainted with the above-mentioned properties of the demonstrative syllogism? For where the reasoning is not scientific, the conclusion may happen to be true, though the premises are false, as Aristotle has shown in many instances in his Prior Analytics; but then such premises are not the causes of the conclusion, nor the proper principles of that which is apparently demonstrated. Thus he who syllogizes as follows: Every stone is an animal every man is a stone: ergo, every man is an animal, asserts indeed, in the conclusion, what is true; but then this syllogism does not produce science, because both the major and minor propositions are false, and are not the proper principles of the conclusions. For they can only be admitted as principles by him who admits what is false to be true; since, as Aristotle justly observes, that which is not cannot be scientifically known. A man also may happen to reason scientifically without knowing the properties of the demonstrative syllogism, but then he is not certain that his reasoning is scientific; and to say with Locke, that syllogism is not the great instrument of reason, because many men reason ex ceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism, is just as if it should be said that sight is not necessary in walking, because many blind men in travelling happen to arrive at the end of their journey in the right road. And from all this I think it is most indisputably evident that Locke had by no means studied the logic of Aristotle, but was profoundly ignorant of its true nature and use. This want of knowledge in the moderns, of the writings of Aristotle, and consequent defamation of them, continues even to the present time. For Bonnycastle, in his Introduction to Astronomy, p. 23., says, that "Aristotle, who was the great oracle of antiquity, gave the earth the form of a timbrel;" whereas Aristotle confutes those ancients who thought it had this form, and also demonstrates that it is spherical. Of the truth of what I have asserted, the following extracts are a proof. In the 13th chapter of the 2nd book of his treatise On the Heavens, he says, "To some of the ancients the earth appeared to be broad, and to have the form of a drum. Of the truth of this opinion, they urge as an argument, that when the sun rises and sets, he appears to make a rectilinear, aud not a circular occultation, from the earth; though it would be requisite (say they) if the earth were spherical, that the abscission should be circular. These do not attend to the distance of the sun from the earth, and the magnitude of the circumference, and do not consider that in apparent small circles, a circumference at a distance appears to be a right line." Τοις δε πλατεια, και το σχημα τυμπανοειδης· ποιουνται δε τεκμήριον, οτι δυνων και ανατελλων ο ηλιος, ευθειαν, αλλ' ου περιφερη την αποκρυψιν φαίνεται ποιούμενος υπο της γης· ως δεον ειπερ ην σφαιροειδης, περιφερη για νεσθαι και την αποτομην, ου προσλογιζόμενοι το, τε αποστημα του ηλίου προς την γην, και το της περιφειας μέγεθος, ως εν τοις φαινομένοις μικροις κύκλοις ευθεια φαινεται πορρωθεν. But that the earth is spherical, Aristotle demonstrates in the 15th chapter of the above mentioned treatise, employing the whole of the chapter for this purpose, the beginning of which is as follows: σχημα δε εχειν σφαιροειδες αναγ καιον αυτην' εκαστον γαρ των μορίων βαρος εχει μεχρι προς το μεσον και το ελαττον υπο του μείζονος ωθούμενον ουχ οιον τε κυμαίνειν, αλλά συμπιέζεσθαι μαλλον, και συγχωρείν έτερον ετέρω, έως αν έλθη επί το ecov. i. e. "The earth also has necessarily a spherical figure; for each of its parts gravitates as far as to the middle; and a less when impelled by a greater part cannot fluctuate, but is rather compressed, and the one yields to the other till they arrive at the middle." μεσον. ' In the course of this chapter also Aristotle makes use of the very same argument, to prove that the earth is spherical, which is employed for this purpose by the moderns. For he says, "If the earth were not spherical, VOL. XIX. NO. XXXVII. D Cl. Jl. And thus I have shown, and I trust satisfactorily, that the greatest of the moderns have defamed the philosophy of Aristotle without understanding it, have ascribed to him tenets which he never maintained, have decided on the merit of the whole from a very superficial inspection of a part of his works, and, as the colophon of lawless innovation, have promulgated a new philosophy before they were adepts in the old. The moderns of less celebrity, who, actuated by the same lawless ambition and desire of novelty as those I have already noticed, have presumed to attack the Stagirite, though they had not even a dreaming perception of his profundity, I shall pass by in silence, and consign them to that oblivion to which they are rapidly tending. For the opposition which both the latter and the former of these men have made to the philosophy of Aristotle, is just as idle as are the incursions of the sea against some lofty rock; which, swelling on high, breaks its billows, and exhibits no vestige of its rage, though for so many ages it has been lashed by its waves.' PHILALETHES. STANLEII NOTÆ QUÆDAM IN No. IV. [Continued from No. xxxvI. p. 365.] IN HYMN. IV. Εἰς Δῆλον. 1. uμs.] Sic Oppian. Cyneg. 1. ἀτὰρ καταβῆθι, φιλὴ φρὴν, Οἶμον ἐπὶ σκυλάκων. Exquatioμ eximio orationem exornat, dum suum ipsius animum alloquitur, et cohortatione quadam quasi stimulo admoto excitat the eclipses of the moon would not have such segments as they now have. For now the moon, in her monthly configurations, receives all divisions; viz. the right-lined, the curved on both sides, and the hollow. But in eclipses the bounding line is always convex. Hence since the moon is eclipsed through the interposition of the earth, the periphery of the earth, which is of a spherical figure, will be the cause of this." Ούτε γαρ αι της σεληνης εκλείψεις τοιαύτας αν είχον τας αποτομας νυν μεν γας εν τοις κατα μηνα σχημα τισμοις, πάσας λαμβάνει τας διαιρέσεις. και γαρ ευθεία γινεται, και αμφίκυρτος, και κοίλη. περι δε τας εκλείψεις, αει κυρτην έχει την διορίζουσαν γραμμήν, ωστ' επείπερ εκλείπει δια την της γης επιπροσθησιν, η της γης αν ειη περιφέρεια του σχήματος αιτια σφαιροειδής ουσας atque impellit. Similiter Pindarus, Olymp. 2. ἔπεχε νῦν σκοπῷ τόξον ἄγε θυμέ, τινα βάλλομεν ; sic Archilochus sæpe in suis versi bus; et in Psalmis Davidicis nihil crebrius hoc ornamento. Vid. xlii. ciii. civ. &c. Propertius item, II. viii. Surge, anima, ex humili jam carmine-- B. (In not. ad oram libri additur, Omitte citationem Oppiani.) 23. Κεῖμαι μὲν πύργοισι, κ. τ. λ.] Hippocrates, in Ep. ad Abderitanum Senatum, in eandem sententiam; Μακάριοι γε δήμοι ὁκόσοι ἴσασι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρὸς ἕρματα αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐ τοὺς πύργους, οὐδὲ τὰ τείχεα, ἀλλὰ σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν σοφὰς γνώμας. Εt Theognis, 227. de viro bono : ̓Ακρόπολις καὶ πύργος ἐὼν κενεόφρονι δήμῳ. Β. 40. 'Αστερίη.] Schol. Apollon. Η πρὶν μὲν Δῆλος, ὕστερον δὲ Αστερία. Sic item Solinus, et Stephanus. 106. ̓Ανηλεές ήτορ.] Vid. Drus. Proverb. Sacr., Smyrn. libr. v. et xii. σιδήρεον ἦτορ et κῆρ, et Hom. Il. Β. χάλκεον ἦτος. 110. περιπλέξασθε γενείῳ.] Supplicantium cuipiam mos erat apud veteres barbam ejus manu apprehendere, et ita orantia verba profari. Hom. Il. Κ. 454. *Η, καὶ ὁ μὲν μὲν ἔμελλε γενείου χειρὶ παχείη Αψάμενος λίσσεσθαι· ὁ δ ̓ αὐχένα μέσσον ἔλασσε. Alia exempla in Hecuba et Andromeda Euripidis ; et mos idem Hebræorum indicatur Amasæ exemplo, 2 Sam. xx. 9., Eurip. Bacchid. 416. παρηίδος ψαύων, supplicum more, et Hom. ll. Θ. καὶ ἔλλαβε χειρὶ γενείου Euripidis Commentator, Οἱ παλαιοὶ ἱκετεύοντες ἐδράπτοντο τῆς γενειάδος, καὶ τῆς χειρὸς, καὶ τοῦ γούνατος· τῆς μὲν γενειάδος, ὡς κατανεῦσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν τι πρὸς ἀλλὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεομένου, εἴγε δεήσει τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τῆς δὲ χειρὸς, ὡς ἐνεργῆσαι· τοῦ δὲ ποδός, ὡς βαδίσαι. Eustath. Τοῖς παι λαιοῖς ἔθος ἦν ὁπηνίκα ἱκέτευον, κεφαλῆς τε λαμβάνεσθαι τῆς τοῦ ἱκετευομένου· κεφαλῆς μὲν, διὰ μέσης γενειάδος, κατὰ Εὐριπίδην, ἢ ἀνθερεῶνος καθ' Ομηρον, διὰ τὸν ἡγεμονικόν. Νonnus 6. Dionys. λισσομένη δὲ Δεξιτερή, ψαύεσκε βαθυσμήριγγος ὑπήνης. Plin. II. 45. Antiquis Græcis in supplicando mentum attingere mos erat. B. 112. ἀνέμοισιν ἐρίζεις.] Apud Q. Smyrn. viii. equi Achillis, Οὓς τέκεθ ̓ Αρπυια Ζεφύρῳ πάρος εὐνηθεῖσα. Sic noster in Dian. 94. Θάσσονας αὐράων κυνοσουρίδας. Et Virg. Qui candore nives anteirent, cursibus auras. Vid. Fulv. Urs. ad loc. Item Ocyor Euro. Hor. Od. II. xvi. 122. Αναγκαίη μεγαλη θεός.] Οppian. Hal. II. Thales dixit, Ισχυρότατον Ανάγκη, κράτει γὰρ πάντων. Ρίγιον ἀνθρώποισι κακῆς ἐπιβήσετ ̓ ἀνάγκης. Simonides (apud Suid.) 'Ανάγκῃ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται. Plura in eandem sententiam, ex Tragicis plerumque, Frischlinus in loc. congessit. 141. Αἰτναίου ὄρεος.] Ignium Atnæ meminerunt Oppian. Cyneg. I. 273., Pind. Pyth., Esch. Prometh., Lycurg. contra Leocrat., Orpheus Argonaut., Auctor libri de Mundo ad Alex., Cic. de Nat. Deor. II., Lucret. II. Β. 152. 'Αντ' ἐλεημοσύνης.] Latona beneficium a Peneo collatum sibi ἐλεημοσύνην dixit, non magis sane quam si οἰκτιρμὸν dixisset ; non magis, inquam, quam cum Israël a Josepho filio petit ne in Ægypto sepeliatur; additque, καὶ ποιήσεις ὑπ ̓ ἐμὲ ἐλεημοσύνην ἀληθείαν τὸ μὴ θάψαι με ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. Gen. xlvii. 29. See Heins. in Ν. Τ. p. 94. N. 173. Κελτὸν ἀναστήσαντες "Αρηα.] Sic Oppian. Halieut. v. 685. Ως δ' ὅτε δυσμενέεσσιν ἐπιστήσωνται "Αρηα. Homerus his verbis uti solet, ὀρίνειν, οτρύνειν, ὀροθύνειν "Αρην. Β. 175. ἢ ἰσάριθμοι Τείρεσιν.] Sic Ovid. quot in athere sidera lucent. Et Catull. Ille pulvis Erythrii Siderumque micantium Subducat numerum. (Jul. et Manl. Epithal. lis. 206. &c.) Vid. Genes. 176. βουκολέονται.] Lucret. I. Sidera pascit Æther. Et Virg. Æn. V. Polus dum sidera pascet. 178. Καὶ πεδία Κρισσαΐα. Cirrha, Delphorum navalis, olim Crissa dicta teste Pausania Phoc.; "Ομηρος μέντοι Κρίσσαν ἐν τῇ ̓Ιλιάδι ὁμοίως καὶ Ὕμνῳ εἰς ̓Απόλλωνα ὀνόματι τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καλεῖ τὴν πόλιν. |