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AN ESSAY ON MOODS.

PART I.

THERE is no part of grammar which is, in general, less satisfactorily explained than the theory and use of moods. Almost all the writers on this subject appear to content themselves with following the method that others have followed before them-or perhaps they add a few observations of their own, which are forced to coincide with the original system. Hence arises a degree of confusion in the use of terms, and an obscurity of expression, which it would be most desirable to avoid.

To attempt any practical improvement, in this respect, would probably be considered as a mere fanciful innovation. Age seems to have consecrated a particular arrangement, and particular names, which it would be little less than impiety towards the mighty dead to violate. But if we dare not change what has been long established, it is, at least, our business to form as clear conceptions on this important subject as possible; and, while we use the same terms that others have done, not to bind ourselves to adopt their opinions. That it is a subject of very considerable difficulty, every person will acknowledge; and that this difficulty was felt, even by the classic writers of Greece and Rome, is evident from the variety in their manner of expression, and the different uses which they make of the same forms of the verb. Hence it may be impossible to lay down unexceptionable rules with regard to the origin and use of moods; but, although we cannot accomplish all that we desire, we should not be discouraged from making an humble attempt to come near it.

Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.-Hor.

In order to form a clear conception, therefore, of moods, we must consider the subject in two points of view. First, as to the origin, which, of course, will be entirely speculative; and, secondly, as to the use, which can be deduced only from observations on languages as they are spoken, or written.

I. ORIGIN OF MOODS.

The nature of the human frame is such that it continually requires food, cloathing, and refreshment by repose after exertion. Almost all our actions are influenced, more or less, by sensations such as these. Without some object exciting our desires, we

should sink into a state of listlessness, apathy, and total inactivity. It would be wandering too far from my present purpose to enquire in what manner, and to what degree, the social affection of benevolence is interwoven with the selfish desire of action; or how much our own happiness is increased by the happiness that we communicate to others. It is sufficient to observe, that, as soon as we are capable of forming an idea of the wants of others, we are, in general, disposed to relieve them, and that this becomes an object of desire with us, as well as to supply our own immediate necessities.

I have mentioned only food, cloathing, and rest, as the primary wants of nature, being all that an infant desires. But, as age advances, conveniences, comforts, luxuries, superfluities are also desired. The passions exercise their influence on the mind, and desire to be gratified. The intellectual faculties expand, and desire to be supplied with knowledge; and that knowledge, when acquired, the mind desires to communicate to others, either in compliance with their wishes, or for self interest, or self gratification. The same observation will apply to all our pursuits. Still the one great principle, the desire of some good seems to pervade our nature, and influence all our conduct.

Now, if man could exist as a solitary individual, his time might be spent in a silent pursuit of the objects that he wished to obtainin a silent gratification of his desire. But this is not the case. From the first period of human existence men were social; and the most transient glance of one human being on the actions of another would convince him that their united efforts might accomplish what he could not do, or do so effectually, by himself-that another had it in his power to give him something, which he could not otherwise obtain; or to perform some action for him, that was not within the scope of his own exertions.

He would no longer then confine himself to that silent pursuit, which we have considered, but make use of the most easy and effectual means of making his desire known to his brother. And the natural faculty of forming articulate sounds would soon suggest the use of speech as the most expeditious method of accomplishing his object. When his eye fixed upon any thing that he wished the other to assist him in obtaining, his tongue would give a name to that object-perhaps accompanied with some significant look, or gesture. The name, thus given, would have the energy of a request, or command, and might be styled a verb in the

Imperative Mood.

It is probable, also, that this desire would be expressed in the shortest and simplest manner possible; and that the imperative

form would be either a single articulation of the voice, that is a monosyllable; or, at most, a very short dissyllable.

That this theory is not unreasonable will appear from what any person may observe in children, before they can understand the meaning of artificial language. However ludicrous the idea may appear, we may consider the faintest cry that expresses pain, or hunger, that is the desire for food or rest, as an imperative verb. Or, descending still lower, we may conceive that the inferior animals have this power of expressing their desires, in common with the human species. But their powers of intellect and of expression are equally limited. Having no minds to cultivate, or souls to store with knowledge, they possess all that is necessary for the use of the body in the faculty of thus communicating their feelings. As the child gradually ascends above the mere instinct of the brute, he begins to use the human power of speech, and invents, before he is capable of learning, names for those things that he wishes to obtain: and the manner in which these names are given expresses the desire of the child that utters them.

Indicative.

We have thus endeavoured to ascertain, from theory, and the observation of nature, the origin and purpose of the primary, or imperative mood. Let us proceed, in the same manner, to consider the effect produced upon another, by the expression of this desire.

As soon as the application is made, the person to whom it is directed will consider his own power and inclination to do or not to do the thing that is desired. And, if he do not immediately and silently perform, or resolve not to perform it, he will intimate his intention to comply, or the contrary. The latter including an additional idea, viz. that of negation, along with the original one suggested by the imperative verb, will require an additional sound to express it, or another word besides one corresponding to that which was already used. Accordingly negative particles have been employed for this purpose, I believe, in all languages. But as these are always separate from the verb, or easily separable from it, I shall take no farther notice of them in the following observations; confining myself entirely to the affirmative, or simple, form of the verb.

We shall suppose, then, that the person addressed is disposed to comply with his brother's desire, and that he intimates his intention of doing so. The simplest, and most effectual method that he can employ will be to repeat the very name of the desired object, with a corresponding gesture, or an additional sound, identifying himself, as it were, with that object, and thus expressing his willing

ness to do what is desired. Here we have the origin of the indicative mood, formed from the imperative, by the addition of some sound representing the speaker, or actor. And, in the structure of language, it will be found, in general, that the terminations of the indicative are fragments of the several personal pronouns; expressing, in the concisest manner, the identity of the person and the thing.

When the word is once invented, it will do for every similar occasion, and may be used as indicative of an intention to act, even when no request has been made, or imperative previously used. Thus the indicative becomes, by degrees, not a mere respondent to an antecedent imperative expressed, but to one understood-and, proceeding still farther, in the same manner, it expresses the intention to do a thing, when no immediate reference to the will of another is conceived, but the design appears to originate with the speaker himself.

Thus far we have considered, chiefly, that class of verbs which express desires excited by external objects. But it is evident that the primary feelings of want, to which I slightly alluded, are experienced, before we have an idea what would gratify or relieve us. And, in the same manner, the internal emotions give rise to many of our expressions, when we have no external object immediately in view. Hence the inarticulate cry gradually changes into a word, expressive of that emotion, and its corresponding desire ; but without implying a direct request, or command, to any individual, to assist in obtaining the relief, or gratification, that is required as when I say, I hunger, or I thirst. Verbs of this kind may be considered as having a mixed signification, both indicative, and imperative-or as conveying an indefinite request, but incapable of having a distinct and separate imperative.

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Subjunctive, or Potential.

It may happen, however, that the person, to whom we suppose the request to be made, may not have it in his power immediately to comply with it. His doing so, at all, may perhaps depend upon other circumstances, over which he has no control. Some change in the form of his answer will then become necessary. He must include an allusion to this uncertainty, or these circumstances, along with the expression of his own identity with the object desired. But this combination of ideas will be most easily expressed by distinct and separate words. As we have observed, this is always the case, with regard to simple negatives. And, in the same manner, the subjunctive, or potential mood, will be found, in general, to be formed by the combination of two or more verbs, with conditional particles and circumstances expressed or understood. It is

only in a language of the most artificial construction that a change in terminations alone indicates the uncertainty, or conditional nature of the assertion.

Optative.

A still greater refinement, or a more ingenious contrivance is to combine, in one word, an expression of the thing desired, the person who acts, the uncertainty of accomplishment, and the intention to do it, if it be fit or possible. Yet all this is very fully, and clearly, expressed in the Greek optative mood.

We have thus traced the origin of the moods from nature itself, commencing with the imperative, as the simple expression of desire; to which the indicative corresponds. And it is evident that these two alone are sufficient for all the purposes of speech, when accompanied by words expressive of condition, uncertainty, or volition.

"Infinitive.

The infinitive can hardly be classed among the moods of a verb. It is simply the name of the action, or existence; and is, not improperly, styled by some writers, a verbal noun. When it refers to any visible, or sensible object the same word will answer as a name for that object; and even when an action only is expressed, a similar identity in the word which expresses the doing of the action, and its accomplishment, will produce no obscurity in language.

Connexion of Moods and Tenses.

It is evident that, according to the view which we are taking of this subject, the only two primitive moods have a reference to something that is to take place after the word is uttered. Whether one person desires to obtain an object, or another promises to give it, both the one and the other look forward to it, as a future event. In order, therefore, to have a clear conception of the nature of moods, it is indispensibly necessary to allude also to tenses; or, as an ingenious writer on grammar has called them, "the moods of time." Indeed it is impossible to think deliberately on the one without the other. We cannot conceive any desire, any action, or any state, without conceiving also some time in which it was, or is, or will be in existence. What Cicero says of decorum, as connected with the virtues in general, may, very well, be applied to this subject. "Pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum; et ita pertinet ut non recondita quadam

! Ward.