Crystal Palace, and was a grand idea! After some striking observations, such as never would have occurred to myself, or to any one but a dog, and one, too, of no little quaintness and acuteness, I said musingly, aloud, "A dog show! -humph! We shall have a cat show next!" on which Tickler, with a look of supreme disgust, got down from his chair, and went under the sofa. "Ay," I continued, infinitely tickled with the idea-"and a mouse show next!" I heard a queer little noise issuing from under the sofa; and what do you think it was Tickler, too, tickled by the idea, was laughing as if he would split his little black nose! He soon recovered his good-humour, and came from under the sofa still smiling: scratched his ear in an embarrassed kind of way, and resumed speech. I saw there was something or other in the wind, which would come in its own good time. So it did; and after a good deal of beating about the bush, he modestly intimated, that if he went, he thought it not impossible that he should gain the Skye Terrier prize!!!

TICKLER AND THE DOG SHOW.

"Nonsense, Tickler!" said I, but really I did not think it was: for, as I looked at Tickler, who had been carefully washed and combed that very afternoon, at his own request, I began to think I might win the prize! for such, a judicial friend tells me, would be the legal effect of Tickler's carrying off the prize. Tickler, not knowing what was passing through my mind, looked up timidly, and said in a low tone, that he heard Sir Edwin Landseer tell a lady who came to look at him (i.e. at the dog) that he, Sir Edwin, thought Tickler very likely to carry off the prize!

"Tickler!" I exclaimed, gravely. "He did, sir, indeed!" "Well-I'll write to Sir Edwin and see how it is!"

What, or whether anything, passed between Sir Edwin and me on the subject, does not much signify: but as soon as it got whispered about that Tickler was likely to figure in the Dog Show, troubles came round me like a cloud of gnats.

I AM PERSECUTED BY GREAT LADIES.

The Duchess of Tadcaster, the Marchioness of Birmingham, and a host of other lady dog-fanciers sent in to the committee of selection, a joint protest against a talking dog being sent to the Exhibition, which would be most unfair to the other exhibitors. When I thought I had got over the difficulty by entering into a bond that the dog should do nothing but join occasionally in the grand chorus of bow-wow! the ladies aforesaid, who had sat for the purpose in a little conclave at Almacks, came to a unanimous determination to send in a second protest against Tickler's going, unless I would also bind myself not to let it be known that it was OUR Tickler! Yours, 'Maga,' and mine! And these fair exacting competitors had devised such a complicated process for conveying Tickler anonymously, or under the name of Pop, that I wellnigh gave up the idea in despair. But when at length these pretty tyrants intimated that if I did not yield, Almacks would for the future be closed to my ladyhood, they thought the matter had become very serious indeed. Hereat my plagues came upon me from another quarter: all my chief lady friends sent me in a round robin, containing a threat of such a nature that I shall say here only, "bother the Dog Show!"

Yet the idea was excellent-but, heigho! This topic is far too important to come in at the tail of my paper. Besides, it is late in the month; and late in the day-so good night, Maga'!

Done at the sea-side, September 1862, in the presence, and by

Stealers of Tickler II.

ITALY has experienced another of those crises which have so frequently accelerated or retarded its fortunes during the last three years, and which are inevitable events in the history of a country which vacillates between order and revolution, between ardent patriotism and a repulsive subserviency to the policy of a foreign Power. This time the crisis threatened to produce "confusion worse confounded;" and so many varied and conflicting interests were involved that at first it was impossible to foresee the actual issue. Garibaldi was against Napoleon, and Napoleon was against him; nothing could change the respective attitudes of these two parties in the strife. But between these antagonists stood a third party, the Italian Government, which in heart was with Garibaldi, yet in act had to be the friend of France, the shield of a foreign occupation which was the misery of the new Italian kingdom. A like duality of sentiment perplexed the Italian people. Every man from the Alps to the sea desired with his whole heart the accomplishment of the object for which Garibaldi took up arms; yet all but the more enthusiastic spirits had to condemn his movement, because only a miracle could make it successful. When Garibaldi took his life in his hand, and calmly and deliberately commenced his desperate and romantic expedition to wrest the capital of Italy from the foreign tyrant, there was hesitation at Turin, anger and alarm at the Tuileries. Every one knew that the Solitary of Caprera would keep his word that the Sword of Italy would not falter in his course --and that the hero of Varesa and Marsala could make a handful of men give employment to an army. Preposterous, unheard-of as were the odds against him-two powerful Governments against a single

VOL. XCII.-NO. DLXIV.

handed adventurer-such was the known character of the man that the moment he proclaimed for his motto, "Rome or Death!" all Europe acknowledged the gravity of the crisis. Now that we have seen the combat of Aspromonte, which snuffed out the enterprise and stained Italian soil with Garibaldi's blood, we are apt to forget the intense excitement and disquietude which reigned a few hours before but had Garibaldi been allowed to march through the mountains, and been joined by the bands which were ready to co-operate with him, it would have been found that the general disquietude was not misplaced. As it was, we have seen more French troops despatched to Rome, and the French fleet cast anchor in the Bay of Naples, with instructions (it was alleged) to oppose Garibaldi; and rumours that the British Government had informed the Emperor that in such a case our Mediterranean squadron would receive instructions to oppose the intervention. Finally, in Italy itself, we see one-half of the country under martial law, we see the prisons filled with officers of the army and members of the Italian Parliament, -the popular agitation testified by risings at Genoa, Como, Milan, Brescia, Florence, and throughout Sicily, and blood shed in the streets in order to repress the demonstrations of sympathy for Garibaldi and of hatred to the French.

The story of this most recent crisis may be told in a few lines. The whole affair was over in a few days.

But the movement of Garibaldi was not an isolated event. It has a nexus which indissolubly unites it with the history of the last three years, and with the selfish and domineering policy of the French Government towards Italy. How was it that the most loyal and devoted man in Italy became a rebel? Or can he be called a rebel 2 L

who did everything in the name and for the advantage of his king? And how came it that the King should oppose and imprison the man who had given him a kingdom, who was the greatest support of his throne, and whose object was to terminate a foreign occupation against which the King ceaselessly murmured, and which every Italian statesman had condemned?

From the hour when peace was signed at Villafranca, it became manifest that the Emperor of the French was making a tool of Italy, and that his supreme object was to keep that country divided and weak. Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, had declared themselves united to Sardinia: but at Villafranca Napoleon decreed that they should be sundered from their new connection, and given back to their former rulers. He proposed that Italy should be formed into a Confederation, of which the head was to be the Pope, and whose jarring and irreconcilable elements would prevent all common action, and present a most favourable field for the tactics of French policy. He also claimed and wrenched from the Sardinian Government two Italian provinces, to compensate himself for that war, which he had proclaimed to Europe was waged solely for an "idea."

Count Cavour, however, was as bold and unscrupulous a schemer as the Emperor; and he was as resolved to accomplish the unification of Italy as the Emperor was to oppose it. Deliberate and repeated votes of the population in Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, first by universal suffrage and afterwards by the medium of the constituted authorities, united these provinces so firmly to Sardinia, that the Emperor, who prides himself on being the "elect of the people," could at last no longer oppose, though he exacted a heavy 'compensation" for the annexation. But Count Cavour was resolved to push the game further. It was the wretched condition of the Papal

States that had first rendered urgent the Italian question: it was a demand for reforms in the Roman States that Napoleon had made the pretext for his quarrel with Austria. The Austrians were now expelled, the French remained,—but not a single reform had been made, and the Romans were discontented as ever. Count Cavour desired to settle this business while the Italians were still elate with the desire for unity, but he knew he could only accomplish his purpose by indirect action.

Then it was that Garibaldi first offered himself to accomplish what his King and Government desired but had not the courage or the power to attempt. He entered the Romagna (which, as Napoleon refused to recognise its annexation to Sardinia, was still beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Turin), was unanimously elected Generalissimo of Central Italy, established his headquarters at Bologna, and issued an address to the Swiss mercenaries of the Pope-inviting them as sons of a free country to sheath their swords rather than use them against a people which rose for its rights. An invasion of the Papal States seemed imminent. In our own country," Peter's pence' were being collected for the one side, and a Garibaldi fund for the other. The occasion is memorable for the letter which it called forth from the Earl of Ellenborough, who publicly announced that he had subscribed to the Garibaldi fund, and called upon "all those who wish well to the cause of independence in Italy" to do likewise as a means of supplying "arms, organisation, and discipline" to the population of Central Italy. The creation of a great, united, and independent State in Italy, he said, would tend more than any other measure which could be adopted to secure the peace of Central Europe. "Incapable of entertaining projects of conquests beyond the Alps, such a State would have a common interest with Aus

tria in closing that natural barrier against the foreigner; and Austria, relieved from all apprehension on the side of Italy, would, in union with Germany, present on the Rhine and on the Vistula a concentrated strength which no ambition would assail, because none could hope to overcome. This," said the noble Earl, was the opinion I formed at the Congress of Vienna. I expressed it in the House of Commons in 1816. I have adhered to it through life."

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A corps of the French army, consisting of five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, was still at Milan-besides the army of occupation at Rome; and the Turin Government succumbed to the menaces from the Tuileries. At the eleventh hour, the utmost pressure was brought to bear upon Garibaldi to make him desist from his enterprise; and at the personal instance of the King, he gave up his project, resigned his command of the army of Central Italy, and withdrew into private life. This was the first occasion on which Garibaldi, inflexible with others, showed that almost Quixotic devotion to the wishes of Victor Emmanuel which marked his whole career, and which again and again held him back when on the eve of prosecuting his most cherished enterprises. In a proclamation to the Italians, from Nice, on 18th November 1859, he said: I leave for the moment the military service. On the day when Victor Emmanuel shall again call his soldiers to arms for the redemption of the country, I will again find a weapon of some sort, and a place by the side of my valiant companions. The miserable tortuous policy which for a time disturbs the majestic march of our affairs must convince us that it is necessary for us to draw close round the valorous and loyal soldier of independence, who is incapable of retrograding in his sublime and generous path." Thus, in the very pressure of French influence which thwarted his plans and caused his resigna

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tion of his command, Garibaldi saw only a fresh reason for rallying round the King to strengthen his hands by the support of a united people. A few days later, as he set sail from Genoa to his little island of Caprera (Nov. 23), he took farewell of his "companions in arms in Central Italy" in a proclamation which contained the following sentences: "Diplomacy does not know that in your free and independent hearts there germinates the seeds of a worldwide revolution, if our rights shall not be recognised, and if people will not allow us to be masters in our own home. We desire to invade no foreign soil; let us remain unmolested on our own! Whosoever attempts to gainsay this our determination will find that we will never be slaves, unless they succeed in crushing by force an entire people ready to die for freedom. But even should we all fall, we shall bequeath to future generations a legacy of hatred and vengeance against foreign domination; the inheritance of each of our sons will be a rifle and the consciousness of his rights; and, by the blessing of God, the oppressor will never sleep soundly."

We recall these old proclamations, they so thoroughly depict the man. Garibaldi was open as the day,and the purposes of his heart never changed. He would free Italy or die. There is one curious point in the above proclamation. Up to this time he had made no appeal to Hungarians or any other nationality to rise in insurrection. All that he wanted was, that Italy should be allowed to manage her own affairs. "We want to invade no foreign soil; let us remain unmolested on our own." It was not till nearly a year afterwards-it was not until he found that the "foreign domination" continued, and that the Italians were not allowed to be masters in their own home, that he began to appeal for co-operation to other peoples in order to obtain, "by a worldwide revolution," those

rights of independence which his own country was not strong enough to vindicate for herself. Whose, then, was the "foreign domination?" It is singular how Garibaldi avoids naming France or Napoleon in his repeated proclamations. As if not to embarrass his Government, it is always in a general way that he alludes to them. It was not till matters had reached the last crisis, and when he was ready to break with the Government itself rather than tolerate the foreign domination" any longer, that he denounced the Emperor Napoleon by name as the archenemy of Italian unity and freedom.

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Ever since the peace of Villafranca, Austria has kept aloof from the affairs of Italy. She guarded her own possessions in Venetia, but beyond that she did nothing. She has professed and observed throughout a policy of most rigorous nonintervention. The only time that her bitter enemy, Cavour, could find a pretext for impugning her neutrality, was when recruits proceeded from her shores to join the army which Lamoricière was forming for the Pope but in that instance, if blame there were at all, it was shared to at least an equal extent by England, Belgium, France, and Spain. France, on the other hand, has never ceased to interfere with the affairs of Italy. At the close of the war, in July 1859, the Emperor engaged before Europe that all his troops should immediately be withdrawn from Italy. Nevertheless he kept a full corps of his army at Milan until he had wrung from the Sardinian Government the cession of Savoy and Nice; finally withdrawing them in such a manner that the regiments passed through the ceded provinces at the very time that the farce was gone through of obtaining from the people a vote of annexation to France! Rome also was held with a grasp that seemed rather to tighten than to relax. In the spring of 1859 the grand complaint which Napoleon brought against Austria was, that

he was most anxious to withdraw his troops from Rome, as that was an unjustifiable occupation, but that he could not withdraw from Rome unless the Austrians withdrew from Ancona. Like the score of excuses since invented for retaining possession of Rome, this was sheer hypocrisy as the event has amply proved. The Austrians withdrew entirely from Central Italy at the very outset of the war, but Napoleon, instead of withdrawing his garrison, reinforced it until it became an army of occupation, and took up strategical positions commanding the whole patrimony of St Peter. "Ote-toi de là que je m'y mette," was Napoleon's sole object in making war upon Austria. He desired to take from Austria her ascendancy in Italy in order that he himself might step into her place. An independent and . united Italy was the very last thing which he desired; and, while Austria has wholly abstained from meddling with the Italians in their work of unification, the Emperor of the French has never ceased to harass and obstruct them to the utmost. It is a striking contrast! The "old enemy" proclaims and observes the most perfect neutrality, and, far from seeking to profit by the troubles of Italy, declares that she has no thought of reacquiring the provinces which she lost; whereas the " generous friend," the "magnanimous ally," wrenches provinces from the new kingdom, retains military possession of her most important region, and seeks to make the Court of Turin the satellite of his power and the registrar of his decrees.

After nine months' delay-during which time Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna had by Napoleon's policy been kept without a Government, in the hope that they might weary of their position, and give up their desire for union with Sardinia - Savoy and Nice were yielded up to France, and the King was permitted to accept the sovereignty of his new provinces in