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the commercial establishments; the only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole kingdom, formed a centre, which was secured by the main body of the French, while on the circumference a number of strong posts gave support to the operations of their moveable columns. The garrison in Peniche secured the only harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place; the little port of Figueras, held by a small garrison, blocked the mouth of the latter river; the division at Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the northeast, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides. of the Zezere. From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and to Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open country suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English; a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached by a few marches, and immediately crushed; the connexion between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to communicate with South America, and nine Russian line-ofbattle ships and a frigate, under the command of Admiral Siniavin, which had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, forming an unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force.

These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal, only as a division of troops to be rendered subservient to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore, in the month of May, he ordered, that General Avril, with three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia; and that General Loison, with four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessières in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain. General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity, that prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville; and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind Bessières, in case the latter invaded Gallicia; moreover it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. The emperor's combinations, if they had been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

Such was the military attitude of the French in May; but their political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot's natural capacity, though considerable, was neither enlarged by study nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, prompt and brave in action, quick to give offence, yet ready to forget an injury, he was, at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity, and at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like

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the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity.* He had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good policy towards Portugal, yet he was not without resources for establishing a strong French interest, if he had possessed the ability and disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.

But the pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient usages, interfered with Junot's policy. The monks, and most of the nobility, were inimical to it, and all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious. On the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, he could offer novelty, so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon, to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many, and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress, in Portugal. Among the best educated men, especially at the universities, there existed a strong feeling against the Braganza family, and such an earnest desire for reformed institutions, that steps were actually taken to have Prince Eugene declared king of Portugal:† nor was this spirit extinguished at a much later date.

With these materials and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest; under an active government, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror, for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would not believe that it was weak. Meanwhile the ports being rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, and the troubles in Spain having interrupted the commerce in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, war-contributions, and a foreign yoke.‡ With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; yet the first five months of Junot's government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon, when the arms of Portugal were taken down, undisturbed by commotion. Nevertheless the whole country was ripe for a general in

surrection.

The harvest proved abundant, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty as a relief from his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese, and agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal; the capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied, the

Napoleon, in Las Casas-Foy.

+ Foy.

+ Thiebault.

pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to an explosion. The English agents were, of course, actively engaged in promoting this spirit, and the appearance of two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.

Among the various ways in which the people discovered their hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic; an egg being, by a chemical process, marked with certain letters, was exhibited in a church, and the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of Don Sebastian, King of Portugal, who, like Arthur of romantic memory, is supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in the most unpatriotic manner, yet the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of descrying the islands in which their long-lost hero, is detained.

CHAPTER 11.

The Spanish General Bellesta seizes General Quesnel and retires to Gallicia-Insurrection at Oporto-Junot disarms and confines the Spanish soldiers near Lisbon-General Avril's column returns to Estremos-General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Duero; attacked at Casiro d'Airo; recalled to Lisbon-French driven out of the Algarves-The fort of Figueras taken-Abrantes and Elvas threatened-Setuval in commotion-General Spencer appears off the TagusJunot's plan-Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed-Colonel Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots-The insurgents advance from Leiria, fall backAction at Leiria-Loison arrives at Abrantes-Observations on his march-French army concentrated-The Portuguese General Leite, aided by a Spanish corps, takes post at Evora-Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montemor-Battle of Evora-Town taken and pillaged-Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards-Loison reaches Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot-Observations."

THE first serious blow was struck at Oporto. The news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June, and General Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made the French General Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and captives. The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance, but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful; the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Duero and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which was not an easy operation. Caraffa's division was

above six thousand men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French; the suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one, quartered at Alcacer do Sal, had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief himself.* To avoid a tumult was also a great object, because in Lisbon fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and watercarriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difficul ties, Junot, in the night of that day, upon which he received the information of Bellesta's defection, arranged all his measures, and the next day, the Spanish troops being under various pretexts assembled in such numbers and in such places, that resistance was useless, were disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus, with the exception of eight hundred of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia, who escaped. Thus, in the course of twenty-four hours, and with very little bloodshed, Junot, by his promptness and dexterity, averted a very serious danger.

Although this stroke produced considerable effect, it did not prevent the insurrection from becoming general; all couriers and officers carrying orders, or commanding small posts of communications, were suddenly cut off; Junot, reduced by a single blow from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, found himself isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources, and the courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for the preservation of his army. The Russian squadron, indeed, contained six thousand seamen and marines, but while they consumed a great quantity of provisions, it was evident, from certain symptoms, that they could not be depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this situation the Duke of Abrantes would have seized Badajoz, but was deterred by the assembling of an Estremaduran army, then under the command of General Galluzzo. However, Avril's column, having failed to join Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never intended that it should do otherwise.

Meanwhile Loison, then in Upper Beira, was ordered to march upon Oporto. He had reached Almeida on the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta's defection, and on the 12th, when he read the order, partly by menace, partly by persuasion, got possession of Fort Conception, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish work on that frontier. He first attempted to penetrate the Entre Minho e Duero by Amarante, but as his division was weak, and that it was possible Bellesta might return and fall upon his flank, he advanced timidly. At Mezam Frias he was opposed, and his baggage was at the same time menaced by other insurgents, whereupon he fell back to Villa Real, and after a trifling skirmish at that place, crossed the Duero at Lamego, and marched to Castro d'Airo, where he turned and defeated the armed peasants of the mountains, who had particularly harassed his flanks. From Castro d'Airo he moved upon Coimbra, whence he dislodged a body of insurgents, and was about to scour the country, when he received one of twenty-five despatches, the rest had been intercepted, sent by Junot to recall him to Lisbon. He immediately united his columns, placed his sick and weakly men in Almeida, raised the garrison up to twelve hundred and fifty men, and then having ruined

*Thiebault.

the defences of Fort Conception, commenced his march to Lisbon by the way of Guarda.*

But while these events were passing in the Beira an insurrection also broke out in the Algarves where General Maurin commanded. It began near Faro, and Maurin himself, lying sick in that town, was made prisoner. Some Portuguese troops attached to the French force then joined the insurgents; the Spaniards from Andalusia prepared to cross the Guadiana, and General Spencer appeared off Ayamonte with five thousand British troops. The French Colonel Maransin, who had succeeded Maurin, immediately retired to Mertola, leaving his baggage, military chest, and above a hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots, who, finding that Spencer would not land, did not pursue beyond the Algarve mountains.

The circle of insurrection was now fast closing round Junot. Emissaries from Oporto excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra, where a French post was overpowered, and a junta was formed whose efforts spread the flame to Condeixa, Pombal, and Leiria. A student named Zagalo, mixing boldness with address, obliged a Portuguese officer and a hundred men to surrender the fort of Figueras at the mouth of the Mondego; Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Zezere, and the Spaniards, under Galluzzo, crossing the Guadiana, at Juramenha, occupied that place and Campo Mayor; thus a great, although confused body of men menaced Kellerman at Elvas; yet, supported by the strength of the town and Fort La Lippe, he easily maintained himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighbourhood of Setuval was in commotion, the populace of Lisbon was unquiet, and, at this critical moment, General Spencer, who had quitted Ayamonte and whose force report magnified to ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.

Junot held a council of war, and after hearing the opinions of the principal general officers decided on the following plan: i°. To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by the ships of war; 2°. To secure the Spanish prisoners by mooring the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the city; 3°. To arm and provision the forts of Lisbon, and remove the powder from the magazines to the ships; 4°. To abandon all other fortresses in Portugal, with exception of Setuval, Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche, and to concentrate the army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the Duke of Abrantes determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then crossing the Tagus, move upon Elvas, and from thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find it expedient.† This well-conceived plan was not executed, the first alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the insurrection was grappled with, it proved to be more noisy than dangerous. Kellerman having recalled Maransin from Mertola, was preparing to march on Lisbon, when the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa rose on a company of French troops, and drove them into an old castle; yet when Avril came from Estremos to their succour, the Portuguese fled, and a very few were killed in the pursuit. The town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa ; but Colonel Maransin, who was ready to retire from Mertola, marched in that direction with such rapidity, that he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly upon the patriots,

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