partida, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the subsistence of his followers. That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved, by this fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops, and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be assumed as a truth, that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good-will of the nation would have been the extirpating of the partidas. Nevertheless a great and unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the British, from the existence of these bands; the French corps could never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage equal to a re-enforcement of forty thousand men. PORTUGUESE POWER. The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The ranks of the regular army, and of the militia were filling fast, and the arms and equipments were supplied by England. Means were taking to give effect to the authority of the Capitanos Mor, or chiefs of districts, under whom the ordenanças were to be gathered for the defence of the country, and the people, having been now a second time relieved from an invasion by the intervention of a British army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their deliverers. But the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom, and it is curious that, until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to become soldiers, and notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority of the soldier's condition over that of the peasant or artisan, the recruiting was always difficult. The odious spectacle was constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains, to re-enforce armies which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have been a sacred cause. The actual number of regular troops armed and organized, was about fifteen thousand; but notwithstanding the courage displayed by those employed in the late operations, Marshal Beresford was still doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in the first line; Abrantes and Peniche, in the second; the citadel and forts of Lisbon, Palmela, and Setuval, in the third. But there were many other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of the country to assemble upon; hence, Portugal offered, not only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in itself, central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the English general to act without reference to the Spanish government or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at the end of this 38 VOL. I. campaign than at the commencement. Such were the relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; yet to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European struggle against France. Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, had entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st of May, so shook his moral ascendency in Europe, that he deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and as their hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in England, where to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble and effectual warfare in Portugal, than of nourishing and aiding the secondary, and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, malecontents, and military adventurers in Germany. While Sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus for the scanty re-enforcements afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the French empire. The one, consisting of about twelve thousand men, drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England, where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could boast of,* and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world combined, composed an armament, intended to destroy the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an expedition had never before left the British shores, neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously conducted. The marine and land forces, combined, numbered more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest; the object in view was comparatively insignificant, yet was not obtained; and this illfated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal, to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, perished in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren. And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national honour, that men were found in parliament base enough to reprobate the convention of Cintra, to sneer at Sir John Moore's operations, and yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even glorious! The operation against Italy was less unfortunate, rather than more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted, although during that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen, and the energy of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops in Sicily, employed in the south of Spain, but yielding to the representations of Sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make this dis • Adjutant-General's Returns. play of military foolery; yet it is not with the bad or good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, but with that direful ministerial incapacity, which suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was left without an adequate force. For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsular war, sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, had been collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a British force; for the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny of France, the principal army of that country had met with an important check; the great conqueror's fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived when the British government was called to display all its wisdom and energy. The Duke of York had performed his duty. He had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on the frontier of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding them. Yet he commenced a campaign, upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for orders which doomed the one part to mockery, the other to an inglorious and miserable death. Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, under all the burden of their folly? OBSERVATIONS ON SOME PASSAGES IN CHAPTERS II. AND VI. OF THE FIRST BOOK. With respect to the tumult of the 2d of May, 1808, I drew my information from officers, some French, some Italian, who were present. On the veracity of my informants I had the firmest reliance, their accounts agreed well, and the prin cipal facts were confirmed by the result of my personal inquiries at Madrid in the year 1812. But, since the first edition of this work, the following notes from General Harispe have been sent to me, and I insert them in justice to the colonel of the imperial guard. At the same time, I have to remark that, in respect to the latter, my statement was made upon the authority of an officer of Murat's staff. Bayonne, 22 Mai, 1831. Au Colonel (anglais) George Napier. Monsieur,—J'ai lu avec un véritable intérêt les passages de l'ouvrage de monsieur votre frère, que vous m'aviez prié d'examiner. Je vous remercie de cette communication. J'ai porté en marge les rectifications nécessaires pour rétablir la vérité.-Recevez, monsieur, etc., etc. "Le Lieut. Général, Comte HARISPE." Marginal Notes by General Harispe. Book I., chap. II., page 24.-Aucun des quartiers des troupes françaises à Madrid ne fut attaqué, mais 350 à 400 hommes environ, qui se trouvaient isolés ou occupés à des distributions de pain, furent assassinés. Page 25.-Le colonel de la garde impériale ne fit mettre à mort personne. Chap. VI., page 57.-Le bataillon suisse ne fut pas pris au pont de Pajaso, mais bien le lendemain de l'attaque de los Cabrillos. Page 58.-L'attaque de la ville (Valencia) se termina à la nuit, sans que les Espagnols eussent fait aucune sortie. PAPERS RELATING TO THE FIRST AND SECOND VOLUMES. LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL F. PONSONBY TO After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve. The whole of your account of the charge made by General Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself. The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by General Anson and Colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under Captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line. You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third. Malta, December 30, 1829. Believe me NOTE SUR LA SITUATION ACTUELLE DE L'ESPAGNE.t Rochefort, le 6 Aout, 1808. 1o. Les événements inattendus du Général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite et de l'expérience du général. See vol. ii., page 35. + This Note, dictated by the Emperor Napoleon, and signed by General Bertrand, is a sequel to the first five Notes in the Appendix to this volume. |