The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. During this day's journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan and Claros, but he was well content to find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended by Vives. His situation was, however, extremely critical: Lazan and Claros had, the one on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected, at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country abounded; the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close in the rear, the somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixty rounds of ammunition. St. Cyr's design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there was a track by which it could be effected, and, when the efforts of the staffofficers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, yet nearly fell into the hands of the somatenes during the search. However, at daybreak, the 15th, the troops being put in motion, turned the fortress and gained the main road, and the garrison of the place, endeavouring to harass their rear, was repulsed; yet the somatenes on the flanks, emboldened, because the French, to save ammunition, did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome, and near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions of migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin. Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr's approach, was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Cordera the French thus gained the defile of Trentapasos; but they were now so fatigued that all desired to halt, save the general, who insisted upon the troops clearing that defile, and reaching a plain on the other side, which was not effected before ten o'clock. Lazan's troops did not appear during the day, but Vives' army was in front, and its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas. Information of St. Cyr's march, as I have already observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera, before the French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr.* He had, on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan, and, on the 12th, after receiving Lazan's report, he re-enforced Reding, who was still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu.† The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mataro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu. The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at San Celoni, but, in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas. A Spanish council of war had been held on the 13th. Caldagues * Cabanes. + Doyle's Correspondence, MS, advised that four thousand migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr; good and soldierlike council; but Vives was loath to abandon the siege of Barcelona, and adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between Cardadeu and Llinas, where, exclusive of Milans' division, he united in the night of the 15th about eight thousand regulars, besides several thousand somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues; yet St. Cyr's position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been very dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words; they called the French army, in derision, "the succour ;" and, in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second "bull-fight," in which Reding was again the "matadore," would be exhibited. Dupont and St. Cyr were, however, men of a different stamp: the latter knowing that the Spaniards were not troops to stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid mass at daybreak on the 16th, and without hesitation marched against the centre of the enemy, ordering the head of the column to go headlong on, without either firing or forming line.* BATTLE OF CARDADEU. The hills occupied by the Spanish army were high and wooded. Vives, in person, commanded on the left, the other wing was under Reding; the somatenes clustered upon a lofty ridge which was separated from the right of the position by the little river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led through the centre of the line, and a second road branching off from the first, and running between the Mogent and Reding's ground, went to Mataro. The flank of the French attacking column was galled by the somatenes, and halted; General Pino, who led it, instead of falling on briskly, sent for fresh instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to his left. St. Cyr reiterated the order to fight in column, but he was sorely troubled at Pino's error; for Reding advancing against the front and flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which it could not nourish from the want of ammunition. In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and vigour; Pino's second brigade was directed to do that which the first should have done, two companies were sent to menace the left of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr himself rapidly carried Souham's division, by the Mataro road, against Reding's extreme right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards overthrown on the centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, were beaten, and dispersed in every direc tion, leaving their artillery, ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind. Vives escaped on foot across the mountain to Mataro, where he was taken on board an English vessel; but Reding fled on horseback by the main road, and the next day, having rallied some of the fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to Molino del Rey. The * St. Cyr. loss of the French was only six hundred men, and the battle, which lasted one hour, was so decisive, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops. The French had scarcely quitted the field of battle when Milans arrived, and, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, giving notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr's rear was thus cleared; but meanwhile Duhesme, heedless of what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues, who had concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, and repulsed Lecchi, but then retired behind the Llobregat, leaving behind some artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the siege. Thus St. Cyr reached Barcelona, without encountering any of Duhesme's troops, and in his Memoirs of this campaign, he represents that general as astonishingly negligent; seeking neither to molest the enemy nor to meet the French army, treating every thing belonging to the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving at gross malversation in his generals. Duhesme, however, has not wanted defenders. St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if unmolested, would reassemble in number behind the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual blow; for his design was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges which he meditated, nor was he deceived in his calculations. Reding having joined Caldagues, rallied from twelve to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat; and Vives, who had relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to join him there by the way of Valles; the arrival of the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, who knew of these orders, judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran's division to his own, and on the 20th, advanced to St. Felieu de Llobregat. The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of San Vincente, and their position, lofty and rugged, commanded a free view of the approaches from Barcelona; the Llobregat covered the front, and the left was secured from attack, except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, which was intrenched, guarded by a strong detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding's cavalry amounted to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; his right was, however, accessible, because the river was fordable in several places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass of Ordal offered another post of great strength. Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca the same day hence when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp was thrown into confusion, and a council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another for retreating to Ordal, finally an officer was sent to Vives for orders, and he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat if he could not defend his post; but the latter fearing that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing but disaster.* The season was extremely severe, snow was falling, and both armies suffered from cold and wet; the Spanish soldiers were, however, dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and irresolution of their generals could not escape observation, while the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies passed the night. BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY. St. Cyr observing that Reding's attention was principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran's division to that side, with instructions to create a diversion by opening a fire from some artillery, and then retiring as if his guns could not resist the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This stratagem succeeded, Reding accumulated troops on his left, and neglected his other flank, which was the real point of attack. For Pino's division crossing the Llobregat at daylight on the 21st, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, marched against the right of the Spanish position; Chabot's division followed; Souham's, which had passed at a ford lower down and then ascended by the right bank, covered Pino's passage; the light cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabot's division, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey. The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent. The troops of the right wing being exceedingly weakened, were immediately chased off their headland by the leading brigade of Pino's division, and Reding then seeing his error, changed his front, drawing up on the other mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat, but he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which was thus in rear of his left. The French division formed rapidly for a fresh effort, Souham was on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left; and the latter gained ground in the direction of Villa Franca, endeavouring to turn the Spaniards' right, and cut off their retreat, while the light cavalry making way between the mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran at Molino. The other two columns, having crossed the ravine that separated them from the Spaniards, ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans forming quickly, opposed their enemies with an orderly but ill directed fire, and their front line advancing, offered to charge with an appearance of great intrepidity; but their courage sinking, they turned as the hostile masses approached, and the reserve immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties; in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey. Meantime a detachment from Chabran's division, passing the Llobregat above Molino, blocked the road to Martorel, and in this miserable situation the Spaniards being charged by the light cavalry, scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran had obeyed his orders, by pushing across the bridge of Molino upon their rear. But that general, at all times feeble in execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action until the right of Souham's division reached the bridge; thus the routed troops escaped by dispersion, throwing away every thing that could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the field of battle just as the rout was complete, and was forced to fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns; Chabran's in the direction of Igualada; Chabot's by the road of San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal; Souham's by the royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to the gates of Tarragona; but the loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than might have been expected. Not more than twelve hundred fell into the hands of the French, yet many superior officers were killed or wounded, and, on the 22d, was taken the Count de Caldagues, a man apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of the artillery, vast quantities of powder, and a magazine of English muskets, quite new, were captured; yet many of the migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their demands for succours of this nature! but the history of any one province was the history of all Spain. CHAPTER V. Tumult in Tarragona-Reding proclaimed general-Re-enforcements join the SpaniardsActions at Bruch-Lazan advances, and fights at Castel Ampurias-He quarrels with Reding, and marches towards Zaragoza-Reding's plans-St. Cyr breaks Reding's line at Llacuna-Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St. Magi-Unable to take the abbey of Creuz, St. Cyr turns it, and reaches Villa Radoña-Joined by Souham's division, takes post at Valls and Pla-Reding rallies his centre and left wing-Endeavours to reach Tarragona-Battle of Valls-Weak condition of Tortosa-St. Cyr blockades TarragonaSickness in that city-St. Cyr resolves to retire-Chabran forces the bridge of Molino del Rey-Conspiracy in Barcelona fails-Colonel Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon-St. Cyr retires behind the Llobregat-Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa-Reding dies-His character-Blake is appointed captain-general of the Coronilla-Changes the line of operations to Aragon-Events in that province-Suchet takes the command of the French at Zaragoza-Colonel Pereña and Baget oblige eight French companies to surrender-Blake advances-Battle of Alcaniz-Suchet falls back-Disorder in his army -Blake neglects Catalonia-St. Cyr marches by the valley of Congosto upon VichAction at the defile of Garriga-Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia-St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war-Barcelona victualled by a French squadron-Observations. BARCELONA was now completely relieved, and the Spanish magazines supplied it for several months; there was no longer a Catalan army in the field, and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine thousand of the fugitives, from this and the former battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching for something to vent their fury upon; they called aloud for the head of Vives, and to save his life he was cast into prison by Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief. The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was as usual a general * Cabanes. |