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barrier against the flood, which still poured on with unabated fury. And as the divided, weak state of the English troops led the emperor to conclude that Sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal, he ordered Lasnes to pursue Palafox-to seize the important position of Monte Torrero-to summon Zaragoza, and to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests; a com-' manding height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish the fire of insurrection.*

CHAPTER II.

Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass of the Somosierra-St. Juan murdered by his men-Tumults in Madrid-French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed -Town capitulates-Remains of Castaños' army driven across the Tagus, retire to Cuenca-Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, clergy, and tribunals of MadridHis vast plans, enormous force-Defenceless state of Spain.

THE French patroles sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the 21st, that above six thousand men were intrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that General Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon having, however, resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the ariny of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps to continue its march from Carrion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia. The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people-overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile-protecting the right flank of the army-menacing Gallicia and Salamanca-keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction— threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadaramadispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid.

But the time lost in transmitting intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious consequences. The officer despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey (Lasnes was sick at Tudela,) each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction. The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza, recovering from the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Siguenza,

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without any further loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where General Maurice Mathieu's division came up with his rear-guard.

The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the first corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra. Head-quarters were at Boucequillas on the 29th, and a detachment being sent to attack the camp at Sepulveda, was beaten, with a loss of fifty or sixty men; yet the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action, quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra, where General St. Juan, whose force now amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted. Sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep and favourable for the defence; the infantry, advantageously placed on the right and left, were in lines, one above another, and some intrenchments, made in the more open parts, strengthened the whole position.

PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA.

At daybreak, three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the causeway in the centre, supported by six guns. The French wings, spreading over the mountain side, commenced a warm skirmishing fire, which was as warmly returned, while the frowning battery at the top of the causeway was held in readiness to crush the central column, when it should come within range. At that moment Napoleon rode into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene before him; the infantry were making no progress, and a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish cavalry of his guard to charge up the causeway, and seize the Spanish battery. In an instant the foremost ranks of the first squadron were levelled with the earth by the fire of the great battery, and the remainder were thrown into confusion; but General Krazinski as suddenly rallied them, and covered by the smoke and the morning vapour led them sword in hand up to the mountain. As these gallant horsemen passed, the Spanish infantry on each side fired and fled towards the summit of the causeway, and when the Poles, cutting down the gunners, took the battery, the whole army was in flight, abandoning arms, ammunition, and baggage.

This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in itself nearly impreg nable, and defended by twelve thousand men, should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped: yet some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been victorious at Baylen a few months before, and General St. Juan's dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding's at the former battle! The charge itself, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly rash; but taken as the result of Napoleon's sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage offered by the smoke and fog that clung to

the side of the mountain, it was a most felicitous example of intuitive genius. The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but the cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals, crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and were about to enter that capital, when the appearance of a French patrole terrified the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his mangled body to a tree, after which, dispersing, they carried dishonour and fear into their respective provinces.*

The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the mountains-the sixth corps hastened on from the side of Alcala and Guadalaxara―the central junta fled from Aranjuez, and the remnant of the forces under Castaños, being intercepted on the side of Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus. The junta flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured to deceive the people and the English general; a task in which they were strongly aided by the weak credulity of Mr. Frere, the British plenipotentiary, who accompanied them in their flight toward Badajoz; Mr. Stuart, however, being endowed with greater discretion and firmness, remained at Madrid until the enemy had actually commenced the investment of that town.

Castaños, after the combat of Burvieca, had continued his retreat unmolested by Ney, who never recovered the time lost by the false movement upon Mallen; but although the Spaniards escaped the sword, their numbers daily diminished, their sufferings increased, and their insubordi. nation kept pace with their privations. At Alcazar del Rey, Castaños resigned the command to General La Peña, and proceeded to Truxillo himself, with an escort of thirty infantry, and fifteen dragoons, a number scarcely sufficient to protect his life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and prepared, by the falsehoods of the central junta, and the villany of the deserters, to murder him.† Meanwhile Madrid was in a state of anarchy seldom equalled. A local and military junta were formed to conduct the defence, the inhabitants took arms, a multitude of peasants from the neighbourhood entered the place, and the regular forces, commanded by the Marquis of Castellar, amounted to six thousand men, with a train of sixteen guns; the pavement was taken up, the streets were barricadoed, the houses were pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work, which commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Don Thomas Morla and the Prince of Castelfranco were the chief men in authority; the people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered, or said, that it was mixed with sand, and as some persons accused the Marquis of Perales, a respectable old general, of the deed, a mob rushed to his house, murdered him, and dragged his body about the streets; many others of inferior note also fell victims to this fury, for no man was safe, none dared assume authority to control, none dared give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of the convents and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious armed men traversed the streets

* Colonel Graham's Correspondence.

VOL. I.

19

+ Castaños' Vindication.

in all the madness of popular insurrection. Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for defence were made, and each day the public effervescence had increased, the dominion of the mob had become more decisive, their violence more uncontrollable; the hubbub was extreme, when, on the morning of the 2d of December, three heavy divisions of French cavalry suddenly appeared on the high ground to the northwest, and like a dark cloud overhung the troubled city.

At twelve o'clock the emperor arrived, and the Duke of Istria, by his command, summoned the town, but the officer employed was upon the point of being massacred by the irregulars, when the Spanish soldiers, ashamed of such conduct, rescued him. This determination to resist was, however, notwithstanding the fierceness displayed at the gates, very unpalatable to many of the householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters; deserters also came over to the French, and Napoleon, while waiting for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city.* Madrid was for many reasons incapable of defence. There were no bulwarks; the houses, although strong and well built, were not, like many Spanish towns, fire proof; there were no outworks, and the heights on which the French cavalry were posted, the palace, and the Retiro, completely commanded the city; the perfectly open country around would have enabled the French cavalry to discover and cut off all convoys, and no precaution had been taken to provide subsistence for the hundred and fifty thousand people contained within the circuit of the place. The desire of the central junta, that this metropolis should risk the horrors of a storm, was therefore equally silly and barbarous; their own criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of procrastinating its defence until relieved from without, and there was no sort of analogy between the situation of Zaragoza and this capital. Napoleon knew it well; he was not a man to plunge headlong into the streets of a great city, among an armed and excited population;t he knew that address in negotiation, a little patience, and a judicious employment of artillery, would soon reduce the most outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital of his brother's kingdom.

In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived, and were posted at the most favourable points. The night was clear and bright, and in the French camp all was silent and watchful, but a tumultuous noise was heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was struggling and howling in the toils. At midnight a second summons was sent through the medium of a prisoner, and the captain-general Casteller attempted to gain time by an equivocal reply; but the French light troops stormed the nearest houses, and one battery of thirty guns opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the opposite quarter, to distract the attention of the inhabitants. This building, situated on a rising ground, was connected with another range of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado, which is a public walk nearly encircling the town, and into which some of the principal streets opened, upon the above-mentioned range. In the morning, a practicable breach was made in the Retiro wall, and the difference between military courage and ferocity became apparent; for Villatte's division breaking in, easily routed the garrison, and, pursuing its success, seized all the public buildings connected with it, and then crossing the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the

* Fourteenth Bulletin.

† Appendix, No. III, 40.

entrance of the streets, and took possession of the immense palace of the Duke of Medina Celi, which was in itself the key to the city on that side.* Such a vigorous commencement created great terror, the town was summoned for the third time, and in the afternoon, Morla and another officer came out to demand a suspension of arms necessary, they said, to persuade the people to surrender. The emperor addressed Morla in terms of great severity, reproaching him for his scandalous conduct towards. Dupont's army. "Injustice and bad faith," he exclaimed, "always recoil upon those who are guilty of either." A saying well applied to that Spaniard, and Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times. "The Spanish ulcer destroyed me!" was an expression of deep anguish which escaped from him in his own hour of misfortune.

Morla returned to the town, his story was soon told: before six o'clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish! Dissensions arose. The violent excitement of the populace was considerably abated, but the armed peasantry from the country, and the poorest inhabitants, still demanded to be led against the enemy, and a constant fire was kept up from the houses in the neighbourhood of the Prado, by which the French general Maison was wounded, and General Bruyères killed. Nevertheless the disposition to fight became each moment weaker, and finally Morla and Castelfranco prepared a capitulation; the captain-general Castellar, however, refused to sign it, and as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him sixteen guns. The people then sunk into a quiescent state, and at eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered.

That Morla was a traitor there is no doubt, and his personal cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco appears to have been rather weak and ignorant than treacherous, and certainly the surrender of Madrid was no proof of his guilt; that event was inevitable. The boasting uproar of the multitude, when they are permitted to domineer for a few days, is not enthusiasm; the retreat of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue, and proves that he acquiesced in the propriety of surrendering. That the people neither could nor would defend the city is quite evident; for it is incredible that Morla and Castelfranco should have been able to carry through a capitulation in so short a period, if the generals, the regular troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had been all, or even a part of them, determined to resist.

Napoleon, cautious of giving offence to a population so lately and so violently excited, carefully provided against any sudden reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline; a soldier of the imperial guard was shot in one of the squares for having a plundered watch in his possession; the infantry were placed in barracks and convents, the cavalry were kept ready to scour the streets on the first alarm, and the Spaniards were all disarmed. The emperor then fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a country house four miles from Madrid, and in a few days every thing presented the most tranquil appearance, the shops were opened, the public amusements recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of capital cities are easily moved, and easily calmed, self-interest and sensual indulgence unfit them for noble and sustained efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, but are seldom constant and firm.

Fourteenth Bulletin.

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