or interior policy. His plans were based upon the notion that the central junta would be able and provident, the Spaniards united, the armies strong and well guided, none of which was true. Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake's armies at eighty thousand, and considered them as one body; but they were never united at all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to sixty thousand. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came too late; he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid, or at least before the central government was established at that capital. His operations might have been successful against the miserable armies opposed to him, but against good and moveable troops they would not, as the emperor's admirable notes prove. The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered, for, according to the king's estimate of the Spanish force, thirty thousand men on each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, while sixty thousand could still have been united at Logroño; these might pass the Ebro, excite an insurrection in Navarre, Guipuscoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and Miranda, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which, thus cut in two, and its communications intercepted, would have been extremely embarrassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos, as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but if the Spaniards retired, and refused battle with their left, while the centre and right operated by Logroño and Sanguessa, what would have been the result? the French right must, without any definite object, either have continued to advance, or remained stationary without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual situation of affairs, the king's force was no longer an independent body, it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole mass that was to be engaged in the execution: in short, to permit an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a precipitate flight. "War is not a conjectural art!" CHAPTER V. Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies-Blake moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to Bilbao; French retire from that town-Ney quits his position near Logroño, and retakes Bilbao-The armies of the centre and right approach the Ebro and the Aragon-Various evolutions-Blake attacks and takes Bilbao-Head of the grand French army arrives in Spain-The Castilians join the army of the centreThe Asturians join Blake-Apathy of the central junta-Castaños joins the army; holds a conference with Palafox; their dangerous position; arrange a plan of operations-The Spaniards cross the Ebro-The king orders a general attack-Skirmish at Sanguessa, at Logroño, and Lerim-The Spaniards driven back over the Ebro-Logroño taken-Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion, surrenders at Lerim-Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presumption; controls and insults Cas taños-Force of the French army increases hourly; how composed and disposed-Blake ascends the valley of Durango-Battle of Zornosa-French retake Bilbao-Combat at Valmaceda Observations. THE emperor overruled the offensive projects of the king, and the latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon's instructions; but he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by the Aragon river. The 18th of September, the French army was posted in the following manner :* Total, 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in Catalonia; and when the communications were secured, the fortresses garrisoned, and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above fifty thousand sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle extending from Bilbao to Alfaro. To oppose this formidable force the Spanish troops were divided into * Journal of the King's Operations, MS.—Appendix, No. XXVIII. three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right, centre, and left. This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at this time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government. The Spaniards pretended that above one hundred and forty thousand men in arms were threatening the French positions on the Ebro, whereas less than seventy-six thousand were in line of battle, and those exceedingly ill-armed and provided. The right, under Palafox, held the country between Zaragoza and Sanguessa, on the Aragon river; the centre, under Castaños, occupied Borja, Taranzona, and Agreda; the left, under Blake, was posted at Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro. The relative position of the French and Spanish armies was also very disadvantageous to the latter. From the right to the left of their line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance between Bayonne and Vittoria, and the roads more difficult; the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military communication with King Joseph's army than the Spanish wings were with each other. The patriots were acting without concert upon double external lines of operation, and against an enemy far superior in quickness, knowledge, and organization, and even in numbers. The French were superior in cavalry, and the base of their operations rested on three great fortresses,-Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and Pampeluna; they could in three days carry the centre and the reserve to either flank, and unite thirty thousand combatants without drawing a man from their garrisons. The Spaniards held but one fortress, Zaragoza, and being divided in corps, under different generals of equal authority, they could execute no combined movement with rapidity or precision, nor under any circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at a given point. In this situation of affairs, General Blake, his army organized in six divisions, each five thousand strong, broke up from Reynosa on the 17th of September. One division advanced on the side of Burgos, to cover the march of the main body, which, threading the valley of Villarcayo, turned the right of Marshal Bessières, and reached the Ebro; two divisions occupied Traspaderna and Frias, and established a post at Oña, on the right bank of that river; a third division took a position at Medina; a fourth held the town of Erran and the Sierra of that name; a fifth halted in the town of Villarcayo, to preserve the communication with Reynosa; and at the same time, 8,000 Asturians, under General Acevedo, quitted the camp at Llanes, and advanced to St. Ander.* General Broderick arrived in the Spanish camp, Blake importuned him for money, and obtained it; but treated him otherwise with great coldness, and withheld all information relative to the movements of the army. English vessels hovering on the coast were prepared to supply the Biscayans with arms and ammunition, and Blake thinking himself in a situation to revive the insurrection in that province, and to extend it to Guipuscoa, detached his fourth division, and five guns, under the command of the Marquis of Portazgo, to attack General Monthion at Bilbao.† The king, getting knowledge of the march of this division, ordered a brigade from his right wing to fall on its flank by the valley of Orduña, and caused General Merlin to re-enforce Monthion by the valley of Durango, while Bessières aided these dispositions with a demonstration on the side of Frias. The combination was made too late, Portazgo was already master of Bilbao; Monthion had retired on the 20th to Durango, and Bessières fell back with his corps to Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara, having first injured the defences of Burgos.+ The king then took post with the reserve at Vittoria, and Ney immediately abandoning his position on the Ebro, carried his whole force, by a rapid march, to Bilbao, where he arrived on the evening of the 26th; at the same time, General Merle's division executed a combined movement from Miranda upon Osma and Barbaceña. Portazgo being thus overmatched, occupied the heights above Bilbao, until nightfall, and then retreated to Valmaceda, where he found the third division, for Blake had changed his position, and now occupied Frias with his right, Quincoes with his centre, and Valmaceda with his left; all the Spanish artillery was in the town of Villarcayo, guarded by a division; and in this situation holding the passes of the mountains, Blake awaited the arrival of the Asturians, who were marching by the valley of Villarcayo.§ Thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed of success. In the mean time, O'Neil, following Colonel Doyle's plan before mentioned, entered Sanguessa, and was beaten out of it again, with the loss of two guns. However, the Castilian army approached the Ebro by the road of Soria; General La Peña occupied Logroño, Nalda, and Najera; Llamas and Caro occupied Corella, Cascante, and Calahorra, and O'Neil took post in the mountains, on the left bank of the Aragon, facing Sanguessa. The peasantry of the valleys assembled in considerable numbers, the country between Zaragoza and the Aragon river appeared to be filled with troops, and Moncey withdrawing from the Ebro, took a position, with his left flank at the pass of Sanguessa, his centre at Falces, and his right at Estella. Ney also, leaving Merlin with three thousand men at Bilbao, returned to the Ebro, but finding that Logroño was occupied in force by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia on the 8th of October, and remained in observation.|| On the 4th, the king and Bessières, at the head of Mouton's and Merle's divisions, quitted Miranda, and advanced along the road of Osma, with the intention of feeling for Blake on the side of Frias and Medina; the • Captain Carrol's Correspondence-General Broderick's Correspondence. Journal of the King's Operations, MS. Spaniards were then in force at Valmaceda, but Joseph, deceived by false information, imagined that they were again in march towards Bilbao, and therefore pushed on to Lodio, with the intention of attacking Blake during the movement: at Lodio he ascertained the truth, and being uneasy about Moncey, returned the 7th to Murguia, where he left Merle to protect the rear of the troops at Bilbao, and then proceeded to Miranda with the division of Mouton.* On the 12th, Blake, still intent upon the insurrection of Biscay, placed a division at Orduña, and attacked Bilbao with eighteen thousand men. Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as Zornosa, but being joined there by General Verdier, with six battalions, turned and checked the pursuit. At this time, however, the leading columns of the great French army were passing the Spanish frontier; Laval's division advanced to Durango; Sebastiani, with six thousand men relieved Merle at Murguia, who repaired to Miranda; Verdier returned to Vittoria, and Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, assumed the command of the three divisions posted at Durango. On the Spanish side the Marquis of Romana's division had disembarked on the 9th at St. Ander, and the infantry, eight thousand strong, completely equipped and provided from the English stores, proceeded by slow marches to join Blake. The Asturians had halted at Villarcayo, but the Estremaduran army, under the Conde de Belvedere, was put in motion, and the Castilian forces arrived upon the Ebro; the first and third divisions of the Andalusian army were on the march from La Mancha, and Castaños, quitting Madrid, proceeded towards Tudela. All things announced the approach of a great crisis, yet such was the apathy of the supreme junta, that the best friends of Spain hoped for a defeat, as the only mode of exciting sufficient energy in the government to save the state, and by some it was thought that even that sharp remedy would be insufficient. A momentary excitement was, however, caused by the intercepted letter of Jourdan before spoken of;† the troops in the second line were ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches, letters were written, pressing for the advance of the British army, and Castaños was enjoined to drive the enemy, without delay, beyond the frontier. But this sudden fury of action ended with those orders. Sir David Baird's corps was detained in the transports at Coruña, waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded to Sir John Moore; and although the subsidies, already paid by England, amounted to ten millions of dollars, and that Madrid was rich, and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment, the central junta, while complaining of the want of money, would not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the armies "to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery."§ The natural consequence of such folly and wickedness ensued; the people ceased to be enthusiastic, and the soldiers deserted in crowds. The conduct of the generals was not less extraordinary. Blake had voluntarily commenced the campaign without magazines, and without any plan, except that of raising the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa. With the usual blind confidence of a Spaniard, he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or situation of his adversaries, never dreaming of a defeat; and so little experienced in the detail of command, that he cal culated upon the ordinary quantity of provisions contained in an English * Journal of the King's Operations. + See page 178. |