ment, and the utmost rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon, were sufficiently strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few days. The Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, or favourable to the French, was forced, by his fear of the English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely any garrisons, yet efficient instruments to control the city, without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and safe dépôts for powder and arms, which might otherwise have fallen into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delay. ing so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the assemblage of Alcacer do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a weak division to cover the march of Loison, Junot should have taken the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon, the moment he heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left bank of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela and the Bugio, which was necessary to the safety of his shipping; he should have seized upon the principal families of the capital, as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest; he should have threatened, and been prepared, to bombard the city if refractory; then, leaving nothing more than the mere garrisons of the citadel, forts, and ships behind him, have proceeded, not to Leiria, which was too near the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to Santarem, where both corps might have been united without danger and without fatigue. General Thomières, in the mean time, putting a small garrison in Peniché, could have watched the movement of the British general, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest, and from thence, one march would have brought the whole to Batalha, near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without trembling. If it proved unfavourable to the French, the ulterior object of renewing the campaign on the frontier was in no manner compromised. The number of large boats that Lisbon can always furnish, would have sufficed to transport the beaten army over the Tagus from Santarem in a few hours, especially if the stores had been embarked before Junot moved towards Batalha; and the French army, once in the Alemtejo, with a good garrison in Abrantes, could not have been followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced, and the fleet sheltered in the river. Thus, long before the British could have appeared in force in the Alemtejo, the fortress of Elvas would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison after the battle of Evora, and the campaign could have been easily prolonged until the great French army, coming from Germany, crushed all opposition.

The above is not a theory broached after the event. That Junot would attempt something of the kind, was the data upon which the English general formed his plans, and the intercepted memoir of Colonel Vincent treated such an operation as a matter of course. Junot's threats during the negotiation prove that he was not ignorant of his own resources, but his mind was depressed, and his desponding mood was palpable to those around him; it is a curious fact, that Sataro, the Portuguese agent, who, for some purpose or other, was in the British camp, told Sir Arthur Wellesley before the battle of Vimiero, that Junot would willingly evacuate Portugal upon terms.

4o. When the French, being fourteen thousand in number, occupied Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable; but though seventeen thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force, they might have turned it in a single march by the coast road, and Junot neither placed a detachment on that side, nor kept a vigilant watch by his patroles; hence, if Sir Arthur Wellesley's intended movement had not been arrested by orders from Burrard, it must have succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres Vedras from six o'clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in the morning of the 21st.* The two armies would thus have changed camps in the space of a few hours, without firing a shot; Junot would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous situation.

5°. In the battle, the Duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two separate attacks, an evident error, that enabled Sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. He was the less excusable, because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which the English army was heaped to the right when the position first opened to the view, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position: if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who escaped his sword; if repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place.

6°. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied, and recovered their order after such a severe check, was admirable, but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail; because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command, coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion; hence no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns are the very soul of military operations, in them is the victory and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat; the secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

ARMISTICE-CONVENTION.

1o. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras, occupied

* Thiebault.

Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained during his negotiation, that Sir John Moore was not arrived; it was clear that, until he did arrive, the position of Montechique could neither be attacked nor turned, and there was nothing in the armistice itself, nor the war in which it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage. The opening thus left for Junot to gain time, was Sir Arthur Wellesley's principal objection to the preliminary treaty.

2o. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, yet taken as a whole, it was a transaction fraught with prudence and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political grounds, let it even be supposed for the sake of argument, that Sir Arthur, unimpeded by Sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces, had been driven up the Tagus; he was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas, the thousand men left in Santarem would have joined him in the Alemtejo, or fallen down to the capital, and what then would have been the advantages that could render the convention undesirable? The British army, exclusive of Moore's division, had neither provisions, nor means of transporting provisions for more than ten days, and the fleet was the only resource when that supply should be exhausted; but a gale from any point between south and northwest, would have driven the ships away or cast them on a lee-shore. It was therefore indispensable first to secure the mouth of the Tagus, for the safety of the fleet; and this could only be done by occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and St. Julian's, the last of which would alone have required ten days open trenches, and a battering train, which must have been dragged by men over the mountains; for the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and no country animals were to be found.* In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, upon the heights of Almada, and in the men-of-war, retiring. tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would have united with Junot, or, if he had fallen back upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La Lippe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner, or joined the French with six thousand men; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of Sir John Moore, only twentyfive thousand British infantry were fit for duty.†

Let it now be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water; seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say, that six months more would have been wasted before the country would have been entirely freed from the invaders; but long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again! The

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Appendix, No. XXII.

conclusion is inevitable; the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; we are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that with twenty-five thousand good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, a momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, even a throne was within his view; when he proposed the convention the gorgeous apparition was gone; toil and danger were at hand, fame flitted at a distance, and he' easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words. "I was going to send Junot before a council of war, when, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!"

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people-The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious-Contracted policy of the English cabinet-Account of the civil and military agents employed-Many of them act without judgment-Mischievous effects thereof Operations of the Spanish armies after the battle of Baylen-Murcian army arrives at Madrid-Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza-General Verdier raises the siege-Castaños enters Madrid-Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo-Disputes between Blake and Cuesta-Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards-Sagacious observation of Napoleon-Insurrection at Bilbao; quelled by General Merlin-French corps approaches Zaragoza-Palafox alarmed, threatens the council of Castile-Council of war held at Madrid-Plan of operations-Castaños unable to march from want of money-Bad conduct of the junta of Seville-Vigorous conduct of Major Cox-Want of arms-Extravagant project to procure them.

THE Convention of Cintra followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, disconcerted the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people, being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people; a wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate reckless resentment, were common to both; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding, from time immemorial, a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she, ridiculously, assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited her in the days of Charles V.; whereas Portugal, always fearing the ambition of a powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately perceptible; at the period of the convention the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was