nations when in lower stages of civilization, and this, even among the most distinguished writers.1 We may, indeed, make a critical comparison of different forms, each of which answers perfectly to its object or contents; but such a comparison can possess historical objectivity, only when it is based on a correct view of the peculiar course of development followed by the people in question. The forms of the period of maturity may be considered the most perfect; earlier forms as the immature, and the later as those of the age of decline. But it is a matter of the greatest difficulty, accurately to determine the culminating point of a people's civilization. The old man believes, as a rule, that the times are growing worse, because he is no longer in a way to utilize them; the young man, as a rule, that they are growing better, because he hopes to turn them to account. It is, however, always a purely empirical question; and in the solution of it, the observer's eye may acquire a singular acuteness by the comparative study of as many nations as possible, especially of those which have already passed away.3 Could anyone contemplate the history of mankind as a a whole, of which the histories of individual nations are but the parts, the successive steps in the evolution of humanity would of course afford him a similar objective rule for all these 1 Ad. Müller, an essentially mediæval mind, is guilty of this same braggadocio in an opposite direction, when he calls the "present with its political disorders simply an intermediate state,-the transmission of the natural or unconscious wisdom of the fathers, through the inquisitiveness of their children to the rational acknowledgment of that wisdom by their grandsons." (Theorie des Geldes, 1816, pref.) Thus, for instance, it can not be said that a model university is better than a model public school; and yet the former is higher, because the age to which it is adapted is doubtless intellectually higher. 3 Knies (Polit. k., 256 seq.) remarks, that it would be a great mistake, and it is the mistake of the majority, to consider what has been achieved or striven for in the present, as the absolute non plus ultra, and thus to look upon all future generations as called upon to play the parts of apes and ruminators; a remark worthy to be taken to heart. points in which whole peoples permanently differ from one another." SECTION XXIX. THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. Before I close, I must refer to a possible objection which may be made to historical or physiological Political Economy: that it may indeed be taught, but that it cannot be a practical science. If it be assumed that those principles only are practical, which may be applied immediately by every reader, in practice, this work must disclaim all pretensions to that title. I doubt very much if, in this sense, there is a single science susceptible of a practical exposition.1 Genuine practitioners, who know life with its thousands of relations by experience, will be the first to grant that such a collection of prescriptions, when the question is the knowledge and guidance of men, would be misleading and dangerous in proportion as such prescriptions were positive and apodictic, that is non-practical and doctrinarian. Our endeavor has been, not to write a practical book, but to train our readers to be practical. To this end, we have sought to describe the laws of nature which man cannot control, but, at most, only utilize. We call the attention of the reader to the different points of view, from which every economic fact must be observed, to do justice to every claim. We would like to accustom the reader, when he is examining the 4I have, myself, no doubt, that up to the present time, mankind, as a whole, has, from the beginning of historical knowledge, always advanced. In individual cases, their movement has been interrupted by so many pauses, and even by so many occasional retrogressions, that great care must be taken not to infer superior excellence from mere subsequency. 'Buckle writes of people whose knowledge is about limited to that which they see going on under their eyes, and who are called practical, only because of their ignorance; and he adds that, although they assume to despise theory, they are in fact slaves of theory, of others' theories. most insignificant politico-economical fact, never to lose sight of the whole, not only of public economy but of national life. We are very strongly of the opinion, that only he can form a a correct judgment and defend his views against all objections, on such questions as to where, how and when certain liens and charges, monopolies, privileges, services etc., should be abolished, who fully understands why they were once imposed or introduced. Especially, do we not desire to impress a certain number of rules of action on those who have confided themselves to our guidance, after having first demonstrated their excellence. Our highest ambition is to put our readers in a way to discover such rules of direction for themselves, after they have conscientiously weighed all the facts, untrammeled by any earthly authority whatever.2 29 2 Compare this whole chapter with Roscher, Leben Werk und Zeitalter des Thukydides, 1842, pp. 25, 239–275; Roscher, Grundries zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft nach geschichtlicher Methode, 1843, preface; Roscher Geschichte der Nat. ŒŒk. in Deutchland (1874), 882 f., 1017 seq., and D. Vierteljahrsschrift, ff. See also J. Kautz's learned and accurate Theorie und Geschichte der N. ŒEkonomik, vol. I, 1858, II, 1860. I find no real contradiction between the views here expressed and those of Kautz, when he (I, pp. 313 ff.) introduces history and ethico-practical reason with their ideals as sources of Political Economy, to the end that the science may be something more than simply a picture, namely, a model of economic life. Apart from the fact that it is only the ethico-practical reason that can understand history at all, the ideals of a period constitute one of the most important elements of its history. The aspirations of an age find in them their best expression. The historical political, economist as such, is certainly not disinclined to form plans of reform, nor can it be said that he is not adapted to the performance of such a task. Only, he will scarcely recommend his reforms as absolutely better than what they are intended to supplant. He will confine himself to showing that there is a want which may, probably, be best satisfied by what he proposes. See Sartorius, Einladungsblätter zu Vorlesungen über die Politik, 1793. "There is a book which youth may use to grow old, and the old to remain young-History." (K. S. Zaccharia). |