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assume the aggressive long before the preparations of her antagonists were complete. In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobilisation of the army; every officer and every official knows during peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the moment the decree for the mobilisation is issued; and the instant that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most distant stations, every one sets about his necessary duty without requiring any further orders or any explanations.' When the troops are mobilised, or, to use our vernacular, placed upon a war footing, the reserves are called in, assigned to their respective battalions, and the army is increased from 217,000 to nearly 500,000 trained soldiers. If necessary, the Landwehr, or militia, also trained, follow in nearly equal numbers. Especially interesting to the soldier is the mode in which the waste of war in the several organizations is supplied, and yet the recruits sent forward for that purpose are so combined as to be easily handled, easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different arms as to be capable of independent action. The military organization of the provinces annexed by the late war is, with slight modifications, upon the same system, and will add about 75,000 combatants to the standing army. In view of the important influence Prussia seems likely to exert hereafter in European politics, an acquaintance with her military resources can not but be desirable to the general as well as to the professional reader, and invests with peculiar interest the chapter which Mr. Hozier has devoted to that subject. The military reader would wish even more full and explicit details. Take the book as a whole, it is remarkable for accuracy of observation, clear sound criticism, and graphic narration, while the subject of which it treats is of unusual interest.

ART. IX.- The Sumter and the Alabama; or Memoirs of his Services Aflat during the War between the States. By Admiral Raphael Semmes, of the late Confederate States Navy. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Company. 1868. Pp. 833.

Admiral Semmes, the 'Stonewall Jackson of the Seas', has, in the volume before us, given a most graphic and profoundly interesting narrative of his adventures during the late War. We have not, for twenty years, devoured a novel with half the interest with which we have read this absorbing narrative of his own adventures, by one of the very truest, bravest, greatest heroes of the age. We shall let him speak for himself, for his comrades at sea, and for the cause in which they were enlisted. Our appreciation of his book, as well as of ourselves, is, indeed, far too just, to permit us to occupy the attention of the reader with any poor words of our own, to the exclusion of those of the gallant Admiral himself.

The book is all, nay, far more than all, that is imported by the title at the head of this article. It embraces the memoir, personal and historical, of the Admiral, from his withdrawal from the Federal navy to the close of the war; the operations of the Sumter and the Alabama; the running of various blockades by both ships; and, finally, the engagements of the Alabama with the Hatteras and the Kearsarge. It was the courage, the dash, the heroism, displayed in this last glorious engagement, which drew, with electric force, from the hearts of British naval officers, a wild, enthusiastic burst of admiration and applause, and, from their pockets, a present of the most beautiful sword the writer has ever seen; manufactured, by the best artists of London, expressly for the Admiral; and covered with significant costly devices, as well as blazing with precious stones and gems. Such a testimonial, coming, as it did, from officers of the British navy, speaks more for the gallantry of Admiral Semmes, than could a thousand articles from our poor pen.

The work, however, is not exclusively confined to the above

exciting themes. It is, on the contrary, diversified and enlivened with biographical sketches of his officers and men, with notices of the countries and peoples visited by him; with descriptions of terrible storms and dead calms, as well as of other interesting phenomena at sea, relative to land, air, ocean, and the starry heavens; and also with able and learned, though not tiresome, discussions of the most interesting questions of international law, which, in the course of his service, he was called upon, as a jurist, to examine and decide. In addition to these discussions, and to the grand glimpses of the glorious Cosmos around us, the Admiral notices the progress of the contest on land, and so skilfully interweaves this with its progress at sea, as to give the reader a comprehensive view of the whole drama of the war.

As to mechanical execution, the work is, like 'apples of gold in pictures of silver', in the best style of the art. The paper, the letter-press, the numerous steel engravings, and the chromolithographs, are all handsome. If some of the portraits are not handsome, the fault may possibly be in the originals; the likenesses, so far as we can judge from a personal knowledge, are certainly good. Who so absurd as to expect heroes to be handsome? A hero may be handsome, it is true; but then it is as a woman, rather than as a hero, that he dares to look an ugly world in the face with a handsome face of his own. The offence is a very serious one far worse than the sin of ugliness itself. Ugliness is, we insist upon it, the only natural, normal condition of the hero. He departs from it at his peril. He is safe in no other condition. But then in the real hero, whether a Lee or a Semmes, there is always a certain simple, noble, majestic mien the truthful expression of the soul within which is infinitely better than beauty itself. Or, more correctly speaking, it is beauty itself- the beauty of mind, heart, soul—and not its outward sign merely in comeliness of form or feature. The outward sign, without the inward grace, or thing signified, is shadow without substance; a fair shadow, it it true, but fleeting as it is fair. The beauty of the soul, is the soul of beauty, and, like the soul itself, survives all fairest forms of dust.

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But, from this short digression, we now return to Admiral

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Semmes, and his book. This opens with a discussion of the great doctrine of Secession; and, in a simple, clear, satisfactory manner, sets forth the 'reason of the faith that was in us, of the South', who withdrew from the Union. The judgment which posterity', says he, 'will form upon our actions, will depend, mainly, upon the answers which we may be able to give to two questions: First, Had the South the right to dissolve the compact of government under which it had lived with the North? and, secondly, was there sufficient reason for such dissolution'? (p. 19.) We rejoice to see this discussion where it is, not only because it is so able and unanswerable, but also because the work containing it will be so extensively read, in all parts of the civilized world. The South needed such an advocate; and such an advocate the South has found in Admiral Semmes. It is not our purpose to dwell on this portion of his work; which, for the general reader, will be found far less exciting than those relating to the cruise of the Sumter and the Alabama. A few words only, in passing, is all we can devote to this great argument of an author, who is able to produce such noble prose in speculation, as well as such splendid poetry in action.

The first chapter, entitled 'A brief historical retrospect', sets forth the two great questions above-mentioned: Had the South the right to secede from the Union? and was there sufficient reason for such secession? In discussing these questions, he shows, in the first place, that the principle of law is settled. Both Webster and Story, the two great jurists of the North, concede that the right of secession results from the nature of the Constitution; if it be, indeed, ' a compact of the States.' (pp. 24-5.) Hence, it only remains for our author to settle the great question of fact, the only one in dispute, is the Constitution 'a compact between the States'? This question is discussed as follows: In 'Chapter 11', 'the nature of the American compact' is clearly exhibited, and illustrated by an appeal to opinions of its authors and other leaders of the country. In the following chapter, it is shown, that' From the foundation of the Federal Government down to 1830, both the North and the South held the Constitution to be a compact between the States.' Having established this position, the Admiral proceeds, in the fourth chapter of his work,

to answer the question, ' Was Secession Treason?' It was not treason, he answers, because the Constitution was, as he had shown, a compact between the States, and because, as it is conceded by the great jurists of the North themselves, the States have a right to secede from such a compact, either with or without cause. 'It resulted', says he, in the opening of his fifth chapter, 'from this statement of the question, that the States had the legal and constitutional right to withdraw from the compact, at pleasure, without reference to any cause of quarrel.' (p. 52.) This was a constitutional right', says he, because it resulted from the very nature of the Constitution as 'a compact between the States.' Thus, having settled the first great question pertaining to the doctrine of secession, he proceeds to consider the second,Was there sufficient ground for the dissolution' of the Union? Not sufficient ground to justify it in the eye of the Constitution, for no ground or reason whatever was necessary for that purpose, inasmuch as secession was 'a constitutional right', but to justify it in the eye of expediency, or according to the maxims of political wisdom. In this discussion, as well as elsewhere, our author bears in mind the distinction between the right of secession and the right of revolution. The first, as 'a constitutional right', is a peaceable remedy; the last, as an extraconstitutional right, is a violent remedy. The first claims, and is entitled to, the olive branch of peace; the last defies the sword of coercion. Such is the just distinction made and borne in mind, by our author; who, accordingly, never speaks of any cause as necessary to keep the act of secession,- the exercise of a clear 'constitutional right',— from being a breach or violation of the Constitution. The first cause of secession is thus stated:

'The American Republic, as has been said, was a failure, because of the antagonism of the two peoples, attempted to be bound together in the same government. If there is to be but a single government in these States, in the future, it cannot be a republic. De Tocqueville saw this, thirty years ago. In his "Democracy in America", he described these States, as "more like hostile nations, than rival parties, under one government."

'This distinguished Frenchman saw, as with the eye of intuition, the canker which lay at the heart of the federal compact. He saw looming up, in the dim distance, the ominous and hideous form of that unbridled and antagonistic majority, which has since rent the country in twain - a majority based on the views and interests of one section, arrayed against the views and interests of the other

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