one, which has God for its author, with what evidence must it be accompanied?

With respect to the first and the last of these, I will not suppose it necessary to add anything to what was said in the last chapter. I will suppose it to be admitted, that a revelation from God is not a thing in itself incredible, and that if one were actually given, it must be as capable of satisfactory proof, as any other matter of fact. I will presume also, that the views which have been given of what human reason has actually done, the extremely defective and corrupt systems that have prevailed, whenever men have been left to its sole guidance, are sufficient to show, that a revelation from God was highly desirable; that to a very large proportion of men it was even necessary in order to their having any just and competent views of the principal doctrines, and of the obligations of natural religion.

I shall, therefore, confine myself now to the second question. What must be the attributes of a revelation, what the characteristics, without which its divine origin could not be supported, but which, accompanying the pretence of a revelation, would make it a proper subject of inquiry, to be received or rejected upon its own proper evidence?

We certainly know, that in a revelation from God, nothing immoral, nothing absurd, nothing contradictory to reason can be taught. Not anything immoral,for that would contradict the clearest and best notions we are able to obtain of his character and will by the light of nature, which we know is from him; and it

is utterly incredible, that by one set of instructions he should lead us to a contrary opinion of his character, from what he had before given us by another; and, besides that, one that contradicts all the feelings and the notices, which he has impressed on our own nature. Not anything absurd or contradictory to reason, for the reason he has implanted in us, which is our only guide, and by which alone we can judge of any instructions that are offered, and all that we see of the other works of God convince us, that he is himself the most perfect reason, and that nothing contradictory to reason can come from him.

If then we be called upon to receive a doctrine, as from God, which is clearly of immoral tendency, representing God as an impure, or cruel, or unjust being, as delighting in rites of worship that are impure and cruel, and inculcating a correspondent morality; we can be under no obligations to examine the evidence on which its claims are founded, since it carries in its very face intrinsic proofs, that it cannot be from God. We are authorized from its internal character alone, to pass by unnoticed any external evidence to which it may appeal.

Thus, the ancient philosophers were not bound to examine carefully the pretensions of the several forms of the popular religion to a divine original. They were authorized to reject them without further inquiry, when they discovered in their representations of the Author of nature, of the rule of duty, of the motives of action, in the whole moral tendency of the system, clear contradictions of what was taught by the light

of nature, or decisive marks of folly and absurdity; for the same reason that it can now be no part of our duty to examine the external proofs of the modern systems of paganism, while they present in their very substance and texture the marks, that they cannot have proceeded from the same being, who is the author of our moral nature, and who gave us that reason, by which alone we are to judge of their character and their claims.

Must the Christian, who visits Hindostan, before he rejects a religion, that sacrifices the wife on the funeral pile of the husband, and teaches the mother, as an act acceptable to God, to toss her infant to the crocodile in the Ganges, must he so examine the grounds of the faith that requires this, as to be able to detect its imposture, and show its defect of external proof? In Japan, must he institute a laborious. investigation of the historical proofs, upon which rests the worship of the great image and its thirty three thousand attendant images in the Temple of Jeddo, in order to be justified in neglecting to join in the worship? In Tartary, when he is called upon to worship the Grand Lama, may he not dismiss the subject, and decline all inquiry into historical proofs, under the convictions, that no historical evidence can prove him to be the eternal God, creator and govenor of all worlds, who appears in the form, and is subject to the infirmities of a man ; · who grows old and dies like other men, and is perpetuated only by a reputed transition from one human body to another?

But while, on the one hand, there may be thus

decisive internal marks to set aside the claims of a religion to a divine origin; we are not able, on the other hand, to say with equal confidence, by what positive marks of a divine origin such a religion will in fact be attended. Though we may say with certainty what it cannot contain, it is not in our power with the same certainty to say what it will contain.

When, therefore, a book is offered to us purporting to contain a revelation from God, declared to have been written by persons authorized by God himself to give us important instructions, to reveal his will, make known his purposes, publish his laws, and teach his true worship, and calling upon us to receive it as a divine revelation; if it present not the decisive marks of imposture, which have been mentioned, we are bound to listen to its claims, to examine its evidences, and to receive or reject it on its own proper proofs.

In pursuing this examination, there are a few cautions, which we ought to carry with us to prevent a wrong judgment.

In the first place, we are not to conclude immediately, because the doctrine is reasonable, and the precepts are agreeable to our best natural notions of a pure morality, that they therefore must have been from God in the sense, that the terms, Divine Revelation imply. The inference would be unauthorized. That is still to be determined by direct and positive proof; and however reasonable an opinion may be, and however useful and important we may think it, and however confident, we may feel of its truth, the

question whether it be a part of revelation, must still stand on its own proper proof. So also as to the contents of a book purporting to be a divine revelation, or a whole system of doctrines and duties. Their being perfectly reasonable and highly important is no proof that they are actually a revelation from God. This circumstance shows, that there is no intrinsic incredibility; it shows also, that there is some presumption, if he, who delivers them, solemnly declares them not to have been his own discovery or invention, but a divine revelation, that they are so in reality; still, however, it is a presumption which will amount to nothing, if there be the entire absence of positive proof, or even a great deficiency of proof.

Thus, however perfect the institutions of Moses had been, and however excellent, and of salutary tendency the moral system he taught; and though they had been far more perfect, and better suited to the most important ends, than anything before known; yet, had they been accompanied with no sensible proofs of a divine interposition in their promulgation, there would have been no just reason for acknowledging their claims and admitting their authority. The same may be said with respect to the instructions of our Saviour. Had he wrought no miracles, had no prophecies received their accomplishment in his person and the circumstances of his life, and had he delivered no prophecies, that were afterward fulfilled, however his doctrines might have claimed our assent as valuable truths, and his precepts deserved to be received as rules of life, they would have had no