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are very fit to be premised-at the same time that the mental constration of Sring eranres, and in we must admit the question to be one only of class treating of the Soal's Immorally, a becomes nefication and technolgy Having so stated the d-cessary to enter more at arge me the schreet, and visions of the subject and the meaning of the terms therefore, the tand and the first sensuites are Dor, like used in relation to those divisions, I shall assume the others, mere logical discourses in wild the this arrangement and adhere to this phraseology, as doctrines of Natural Theology are assumed rather convenient, though far from representing it to be than explained. The subjects of those two sections the best. In such discussions it is far more import- have not been sufficiently handled in professed ant to employ one uniform and previously explain- treatises upon Natural Theology, which have been ed language or arrangement, than to be very caricas almost wedly confined to the first branch of the in adopting the best. No classification, indeed, can, science-the procts of the Dey's existence and from the nature of things, be ngorously exact. All attriotes-and to the physical person of tha the branches of science, even of natural philosophy, branch. This defect I have endeavored to supply. much more of metaphysical, run into each other, and are separated by gradations rather than by lines of demarcation. Nor could any scientific language we possess help breaking down under us in an attempt to maintain a perfectly logical arrangement.

ANALYSES OF THE WORK.

The order of this Discourse is thus set out:
The FIRST PART treats of the nature of the sub-
ject, and the kind of evidence upon which Natural
Theology rests.

The SECOND PART treats of the advantages derived from the study of the science.

The former part is divided into seven sections.The first is introductory, and treats of the kind of evidence by which the truths of Physical and Psychological science are investigated, and shows that there is as great an appearance of diversity between the manner in which we arrive at the knowledge of different truths in those inductive sciences, as there is between the nature of any such inductive investigation, and the proofs of the ontological branches of Natural Theology. But that diversity is proved to be only apparent; and hence! it is inferred, that the supposed difference of the proofs of Natural Theology may also be only ap parent.

The Second Part, which treats of the advantages of the study, consists of the sections.

The first shows that the precise kind of pleasure derived from the investigation of scientific truths is | derived from this study.

The second treats of the pleasures which are pe culiar to this study.

The third treats of the connection of Natural with Revealed Religion.

PART THE FIRST.

NATURE OF THE SCIENCE, AND OF ITS
EVIDENCES.

SECTION L

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
PURSUED IN THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SO-
ENCES.

THE faculties, as well as the feelings of the human mind, its intellectual, as well as its active powers, are employed without any intermission, although with varying degrees of exertion, in one of two The second section continues the application of ways; either in regard to some object immediately this argument to the Physical branch of Natural connected with the supply of our wants, or in reTheology, and shows further proofs that the first gard to subjects of mere contemplation. The first branch of Natural Theology is as much an induc- class of exertions relates to all the objects of neces tive science, as Physics or Natural Philosophy-sity, of comfort, or of physical enjoyment: in the The first section compares the ontological branches of Natural Theology with all inductive science, physical as well as psychological. The second compares the physical branch of Natural Theology with physical science only.

The third section compares the psychological branch of Natural Theology with psychological science, and shows that both rest alike upon induc

tion.

pursuit of these, the powers of the understanding. or the passions, or both together, are with nearly the whole c mankind employed during the greater portion of their existence, and with the bulk of mankind, during almost the whole of their existence. The other class of mental exertions, which engrosses but a very few men for the greater part of their lives, and occupies the majority only occasionally and at considerable intervals, comprehends The fourth section shows that the argumentum a within its scope all the subjects of meditation and priori is unsound in a great degree-that it is in- reflection, of merely speculative reasoning and dissufficient for the purpose to which it is applied-cussion: it is composed of all the efforts which our that it serves only to a limited extent—and that to this extent it is in reality not distinguishable from induction, or the argumentum a posteriori. The fifth section treats of the second or Moral, the deontological branch of Natural Theology, and shows that it rests upon the same kind of evidence with moral science, and is, strictly speaking, as much a branch of inductive knowledge.

The sixth section examines the doctrines of Lord Bacon respecting Final Causes, and shows that he was not adverse to the speculation when kept within due bounds.

The seventh section examines the true nature of inductive analysis and synthesis, and shows some important errors prevailing on this subject. In treating of the proofs of design displayed by

* Note I.

understanding can make, and all the desires which we can feel upon subjects of mere science or taste, matters which begin and end in intellectual or moral gratification.

It is unquestionably true that these two grand branches of exertion have an intimate connection with each other. The pursuits of science lend constant assistance to those of active life; and the prac tical exercise of the mental powers constantly for thers the progress of science merely speculative But the two provinces are nevertheless perfectly distinguishable, and ought not to be confounded.The corollary from a scientific discovery may be the improvement of a very ordinary machine or a common working tool; yet the establishment of the speculative truth may have been the primary ob ject of the philosopher who discovered it; and to learn that truth is the immediate purpose of him

who studies the philosopher's system. So, the bet- certainly think he had seized on a sound principle ter regulation of the affections or the more entire of classification, if he should divide the objects with control of the passions, may be the result of an ac- which philosophy, Natural and Mental, is converquaintance of our mental constitution; but the ob- sant, into two classes-those objects of which we ject of him who studies the laws of mind is merely know the existence by our senses or our conto become acquainted with the spiritual part of our sciousness; that is, external objects which we see, nature. In like manner, it is very possible that the touch, taste, and smell, internal ideas which we knowledge of a scientific truth may force itself up-conceive or remember, or emotions which we feel on one whose faculties or feelings are primarily en--and those objects of which we only know the exgaged in some active exertion. Some physical law, or some psychological truth, may be discovered by one only intent upon supplying a physical want, or obtaining a mental enjoyment. But here, as in the former case, the scientific or speculative object is incidental to the main pursuit; the matter of contem-heavenly bodies; the mind-for we are supposing plation is the corollary, the matter of action the proposition.

istence by a process of reasoning, founded upon something originally presented by the senses or by consciousness. This superficial reasoner would range under the first of these heads the members of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms; the him to be so far capable of reflection, as to know that the proof of the mind's separate existence is, at the least, as short, plain, and direct as that of the body, or of external objects. Under the second head he would range generally whatever objects of examination are not directly perceived by the senses, or felt by consciousness.

The merely contemplative pursuits, which thus form one of the great branches of mental exertion, seem again to be divisible into two classes, by a line that, to a careless observer, appears sufficiently defined. The objects of our inquiry and meditation appear to be either those in the physical and spi- But a moment's reflection will show both how ritual worlds, with which we are conversant through very short a way this classification would carry our our senses, or by means of our internal conscious- inaccurate logician, and how entirely his principle ness; or those things with which we are made ac- fails to support him even during that little part of quainted only by reasoning-by the evidence of the journey. Thus, the examination of certain vithings unseen and unfelt. We either discuss the sible objects and appearances enables us to ascertain properties and relations of actually perceived and the laws of light and of vision. Our senses teach us conceived beings, physical and mental-that is, the that colors differ, and that their mixture forms other objects of sense and of consciousness; or we carry hues; that their absence is black, their combination our inquiries beyond those things which we see and in certain proportions, white. We are in the same feel; we investigate the origin of them and of our-way enabled to understand that the organ of vision selves; we rise from the contemplation of nature and of the spirit within us, to the first cause of all, both of body and of mind. To the one class of speculation belong the inquiries how matter and mind are framed, and how they act; to the other class belong the inquiries whence they proceed, and whither they tend. In a word, the structure and relations of the universe form the subject of the one branch of philosophy, and may be termed Human Science; the origin and destiny of the universe form the subject of its other branch, and is termed Divine Science, or Theology.

It is not to be denied that this classification may be convenient; indeed, it rests upon some real foundation, for the speculations which compose these two branches have certain common differences and common resemblances. Yet it is equally certain, that nothing but an imperfect knowledge of the subject, or a superficial attention to it, can permit us to think that there is any well-defined boundary which separates the two kinds of philosophy; that the methods of investigation are different in each; and that the kind of evidence varies by which the truths of the one and of the other class are demonstrated. The error is far more extensive in its consequences than a mere inaccuracy of classification, for it materially impairs the force of the proofs upon which Natural Theology rests. The proposition which we would place in its stead is, that this science is strictly a branch of inductive philosophy, formed and supported by the same kind of reasoning upon which the Physical and Psychological sciences are founded. This important point will be established by a fuller explanation; and we shall best set about this task by showing, in the first place, that the same apparent diversity of evidence exists in the different subjects or departments of the branch which we have termed Human science. It seems to exist there on, a superficial examination: if a closer scrutiny puts that appearance to flight, the inference is legitimate, that there may be no better ground for admitting an essential difference between the foundations of Human science and Divine.

The careless inquirer into physical truth would

performs its functions by a natural apparatus resembling, though far surpassing, certain instruments of our own constructing, and that therefore it works on the same principles, But that light, which can be perceived directly by none of our senses, exists, as a separate body, we only infer by a process of reasoning from things which our senses do perceive. So we are acquainted with the effects of heat; we know that it extends the dimensions of whatever matter it penetrates; we feel its effects upon our own nerves when subjected to its operation; and we see its effects in augmenting, liquefying, and decomposing other bodies; but its existence as a separate substance we do not know, except by reasoning and by analogy. Again, to which of the two classes must we refer the air? Its existence is not made known by the sight, the smell, the taste; but is it by the touch? Assuredly a stream of it, blown upon the nerves of touch, produces a certain effect; but to infer from thence the existence of a rare, light, invisible, and impalpable fluid, is clearly an operation of reasoning, as much as that which enables us to infer the existence of light or heat from their perceptible effects. But furthermore, we are accustomed to speak of seeing motion; and the reasoner whom we are supposing would certainly class the phenomena of mechanics, and possibly of dyna mics generally, including astronomy, under his first head, of things known immediately by the senses. Yet assuredly nothing can be more certain than that the knowledge of motion is a deduction of reasoning, not a perception of sense; it is derived from the comparison of two positions; the idea of a change of place is the result of that comparison attained by a short process of reasoning; and the estimate of velocity is the result of another process of reasoning and of recollection. Thus, then, there is at once excluded from the first class almost the whole range of natural philosophy. But are we quite sure that any thing remains which, when severely examined will stand the test? Let us attend a little more closely to the things which we have passed over hastily, as if admitting that they belonged to the first class.

It is said that we do not see light, and we cer- tween the method of investigation, the nature of the tainly can know its existence directly by no other evidence, in the two departments of speculation? sense but that of sight, but that we see objects va-, Although this Preliminary Discourse, and indeed riously inminated, and therefore that the existence the work itself which it introduces, and all the Las of light is an inference of reason, and the diversity trations of it, are calculated irongnant to furnish of color an object of sense. But the very idea of di- the answer to the question, we shall yet add a few versity implies reasoning, for it is the result of a particulars in this place, in order to show how precomparison, and when we affirm that white light is cisely the same fallacy which we have been expos composed of the seven primary colors in certain ing, in regard to the classification of objects in oras proportions, we state a proposition which is the re-nary scientific research, gives rise to the more gesult of much reasoning-reasoning, it is true, found-, neral classification or separation of all science int ed upon sensations or impressions upon the senses; two distinct branches, Human and Divine, and bow but not less founded upon such sensations is the rea- erroneous it is to suppose that these two branches soning which makes us believe in the existence of a rest upon different foundations. body called light. The same may be said of heat, and the phenomena of heated bodies. The existence of heat is an inference from certain phenomena, that is, certain effects produced on our external senses by certain bodies or certain changes which those senses undergo in the neighborhood of those bodies; but it is not more an inference of reason than the proposition that heat extends or liquefies bodies; for that is merely a conclusion drawn from comparing our sensations occasioned by the external objects placed in varying circumstances.

SECTION IL

COMPARISON OF THE PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL
THEOLOGY WITH PHYSICS.

THE two inquiries-that into the nature and con stitution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design which it displays; in a word, physics and psychology, philosophy, whether natural or mental, and the fundamental branch of Natural Theology But can we say that there is no process of reason- are not only closely allied one to the other, but are wa ing even in the simplest case which we have sup- very considerable extent identical. The two parts of posed our reasoner to put; the existence of the three investigation for a great part of the way completely kingdoms, of nature, of the heavenly bodies, of the coincide. The same induction of facts which leads mind? It is certain that there is in every one of us to a knowledge of the structure of the eye, and these cases a process of reasoning. A certain sen- its functions in the animal economy, leads us to the sation is excited in the mind through the sense of knowledge of its adaptation to the properties of light vision; it is an inference of reason that this must It is a truth of physics, in the strictest sense of the have been excited by something, or must have had word, that vision is performed by the eye refracting a cause. That the cause must have been external, light, and making it converge to a focus upon the may possibly be allowed to be another inference retina; and that the peculiar combination of which reason could make unaided by the evidence lenses, and the different materials they are com of any other sense. But to discover that the cause posed of, correct the indistinctness which would was at any the least distance from the organ of vi- otherwise arise from the different refrangibility of sion, clearly required a new process of reasoning, light; in other words, make the eye an achromat considerable experience, and the indications of other instrument. But if this is not also a truth in Nat senses; for the young man whom Mr. Cheselden ral Theology, it is a position from which, by the couched for a cataract, at first believed that every shortest possible process of reasoning, we arrive a thing he saw touched his eye. Experience and rea- theological truth; namely, that the instrument so soning, therefore, are required to teach us the ex-successfully performing a given service by meats istence of external objects; and all that relates to of this curious structure, must have been formed their relations of size, color, motion, habits, in a with a knowledge of the properties of light. The word, the whole philosophy of them, must of course position from which so easy a step brings us to thes be the result of still longer and more complicated doctrine of Natural Theology was gained by stret processes of reasoning. So of the existence of the induction. Upon the same evidence which all na mind: although undoubtedly the process of reason-tural science rests on, reposes the knowledge tha ing is here the shortest of all, and the least liable to the eye is an optical' instrument: this is a trus deception, yet so connected are all its phenomena common to both physics and theology. Before the with those of the body, that it requires a process of days of Sir Isaac Newton, men knew that they sa abstraction alien from the ordinary habits of most by means of the eye, and that the eye was cuff men, to be persuaded that we have a more undeni-structed upon optical principles; but the reason of able evidence of its separate existence than we even its peculiar conformation they knew not, because have of the separate existence of the body. they were ignorant of the different refrangibility of It thus clearly appears that we have been justified light. When his discoveries taught this truth, it was in calling the classifier whose case we have been found to have been acted upon, and conseque supposing, a careless inquirer, a superficial reason-known by the Being who created the eye. Still ou er, an imperfect logician; that there is no real foun- knowledge was imperfect; and it was reserved f dation for the distinction which we have supposed Mr. Dollond to discover another law of nature-ide him to take between the different objects of scien- different dispersive powers of different substances tific investigation; that the evidence upon which which enabled him to compound an object-glass that our assent to both classes of truths reposes is of the more effectually corrected the various refrangibility this truth for ing from sensations or ideas, originally presented must have been known to the maker of the eye; for by the external senses or by our inward conscious upon its basis is that instrument, far more perfe If, then, the distinction which at first appeared than the achromatic glass of Dollond, framed.solid, is found to be without any warrant in the dif- gy; they are truths taught us by the self-sam samt ferent kinds of Humane Science, has it any better cess of investigation, and resting upon the self-same

ness.

grounds when we apply it to draw the line between that branch of philosophy itself, and the other which

kind of evidence.

and th

When we extend our inquiries, and observe the has been termed Divine, or Theology? In other varieties of this perfect instrunient, we mark the words, is there any real, any specific difference be- adaptation of changes to the diversity of circum

stances; and the truths thus learnt are in like man- | uppermost, roll the egg how you will; consequently,

ner common to Physical and Theological science; that is, to Natural History, or Comparative Anatomy, and Natural Theology.

That beautiful instrument, so artistly contrived that the most ingenious workman could not ima-sition for the little speck or sac in question, in order gine an improvement of it, becomes still more interesting and more wonderful, when we find that its conformation is varied with the different necessities of each animal. If the animal prowls by night, we see the opening of the pupil, and the power of concentration in the eye increased. If an amphibious animal has occasionally to dive into the water, with the change of the medium through which the rays pass, there is an accommodation in the condition of the humors, and the eye partakes of the eye both of the quadruped and the fish.

the chick is always kept nearest to the breast or belly of the mother while she is sitting. Suppose, then, that any one acquainted with the laws of motion had to contrive things so as to secure this poto its receiving the necessary heat from the hencould he proceed otherwise than by placing it in the lighter liquid, and suspending that liquid in the heavier, so that its centre of gravity should be above the line or plane of suspension? Assuredly not; for in no other way could this purpose be accomplished. This position is attained by a strict induction; it is supported by the same kind of evidence on which all physical truths rest. But it leads, by a single step, to another truth in Natural Theology; that the egg must have been formed by some hand So, having contemplated the apparatus for pro- skilful in mechanism, and acting under the knowtection in the human eye, we find that in the lower ledge of dynamics. The forms of the bones and animals, who want both the accessory means of joints, and the tendons or cords which play over cleaning the eye and the ingenuity to accomplish it them, afford a variety of instances of the most perby other modes than the eyelids, an additional eye- fect mechanical adjustment. Sometimes the power lid, a new apparatus, is provided for this purpose. is sacrificed for rapidity of motion, and sometimes Again, in fishes, whose eye is washed by the ele- rapidity is sacrificed for power. Our knee-pan, or ment in which they move, all the exterior apparatus patella, throws off the tendon which is attached to it is unnecessary, and is dismissed; but in the crab, from the centre of motion, and therefore adds to the and especially in that species which lies in mud, power of the muscles of the thigh, which enable us the very peculiar and horny prominent eye, which to rise or to leap. We have a mechanism of preevery body must have observed, would be quite ob- cisely the same kind in the lesser joints, where the scured were it not for a particular provision. There bones, answering the purposes of the patella, are is a little brush of hair above the eye, against which formed of a diminutive size. In the toes of the osthe eye is occasionally raised to wipe off what may trich, the material is different, but the mechanism adhere to it. The form of the eye, the particular is the same. An elastic cushion is placed between mode in which it is moved, and, we may say, the the tendon and the joint, which, whilst it throws off coarseness of the instrument compared with the the tendon from the centre of motion, and therefore parts of the same organ in the higher class of ani- adds to the power of the flexor muscle, gives elastimals, make the mechanism of eyelids and of lach-city to the bottom of the foot. And we recognise rymal glands unsuitable. The mechanism used for this purpose is discovered by observation and reasoning; that it is contrived for this purpose is equally a discovery of observation and reasoning. Both propositions are strictly propositions of physical

science.

the intention of this when we remember that this bird does not fly, but runs with great swiftness, and that the whole weight rests upon the foot, which has but little relative breadth; these elastic cushions serving, in some degree, the same office as the elastic frog of the horse's hoof, or the cushion in the bottom of the camel's foot.

The web-foot of the water-fowl is an inimitable paddle; and all the ingenuity of the present day exerted to improve our steam-boats makes nothing to approach it. The flexor tendon of the toes of the duck is so directed over the heads of the bones of the thigh and leg, that it is made tight when the creature bends its leg, and is relaxed when the leg is stretched out. When the bird draws its foot up, the toes are drawn together, in consequence of the bent position of the bones of the leg pressing on the tendon. When, on the contrary, it pushes the leg out straight, in making the stroke, the tendons are relieved from the pressure of the heel-bone, and the toes are permitted to be fully extended, and at the same time expanded, so that the web between them meets the resistance of a large volume of water.

The same remarks apply to every part of the animal body. The use to which each member is subservient, and the manner in which it is enabled so to perform its functions as to serve that appointed use, is learnt by an induction of the strictest kind. But it is impossible to deny, that what induction thus teaches forms the great bulk of all Natural Theology. The question which the theologian always puts upon each discovery of a purpose manifestly accomplished, is this: "Suppose I had this operation to perform by mechanical means, and were acquainted with the laws regulating the action of matter, should I attempt it in any other way than I here see practised?" If the answer is in the negative, the consequence is irresistible that some power, capable of acting with design, and possessing the supposed knowledge, employed the means which we see used. But this negative answer is the result of reasoning founded upon induction, and rests upon the same evidence whereon the doctrines of all physical science are discovered and believed. And the inference to which that negative answer so inevitably leads is a truth in Natural Theology ; for it is only another way of asserting that design and knowledge are evinced in the works and functions of nature. It may further illustrate the argument to take one or two other examples. When a bird's egg is examined, it is found to consist of three parts; the chick, the yelk in which the chick is placed, and the white in which the yelk swims. The yelk is lighter than the white; and it is attached to it at two points, joined by a line or rather plane, below the centre of gravity of the yelk. From this arrangement, it must follow that the chick is always grain.

In another class of birds, those which roost upon the branch of a tree, the same mechanism answers another purpose. The great length of the toes of these birds enables them to grasp the branch; yet were they supported by voluntary effort alone, and were there no other provision made, their grasp would relax in sleep. But, on the contrary, we know that they roost on one foot, and maintain a firm attitude. Borelli has taken pains to explain how this is. The muscle which bends the toes lies on the fore part of the thigh, and runs over the joint which corresponds with our knee-joint: from the fore part its tendon passes to the back part of the leg, and over the joint equivalent to our heel-bone: it * Hence called Sesamoid from Sesamum, a kind of

then splits, and extends in the bottom of the foot to them forward, and is accompanied with a similar the toes. The consequence of this singular course and probably a coeval rotatory motion in some of of the tendon is, that when the mere weight of the them round their axis, and the attraction of each bird causes these two joints to bend under it, the towards every other body, which attraction produtendon is stretched, or would be stretched, were it ces three several effects-consolidating the mass of not that its divided extremities, inserted into the each, and, in conjunction with the rotatory motion, last bones of the toes, draw these toes so that they moulding their forms-retaining each planet in its contract, and grasp the branch on which the bird orbit round the sun, and each satellite in its orbit roosts, without any effort whatever on its part. round the planet-altering or disturbing what would These are facts learnt by induction; the induc- be the motion of each round the sun, if there were tive science of dynamics shows us that such me- no other bodies in the system to attract and disturb. chanism is calculated to answer the end which, in Now it is demonstrated by the strictest process of point of fact, is attained. To conclude from thence mathematical reasoning, that the result of the whole that the mechanist contrived the means with the in- of these mutual actions, proceeding from the unitention of producing this end, and with the know-versal influence of gravitation, must necessarily, in ledge of the science, is also strictly an inference of consequence of the peculiar arrangement which has induction. been described of the orbits and masses, and in consequence of the law by which gravitation acts, produce a constant alteration in the orbit of each body, which alteration goes on for thousands of years, very slowly making that orbit bulge, as it were, until it reaches a certain shape, when the alteration begins to take the opposite direction, and for an equal number of years goes on constantly, as it were, flattening the orbit, till it reaches a certain shape, when it stops, and then the bulging again begins; and that this alternate change of bulging and fiattening must go on for ever by the same law, without ever exceeding on either side a certain point. All changes in the system are thus periodical, and its perpetual stability is completely secured. It is manifest that such an arrangement, so conducive to such a purpose, and so certainly accomplishing that purpose, could only have been made with the express design of attaining such an end-that some power exists capable of thus producing such wonderful order, so marvellous and wholly admirable a harmony, out of such numberless disturbances-and that this power was actuated by the intention of producing this effect.* The reasoning upon this subject, I have observed, is purely mathematical; but the facts respecting the system on which all the reasoning rests are known to us by induction alone: consequently, the grand truth respecting the secular disturbance, or the periodicity of the changes in the system-that discovery which makes the glory of Lagrange and Laplace, and constitutes the triumph of the Integral Calculus, whereof it is the fruit, and of the most patient course of astronomical observation whereon the analysis is grounded—may most justly be classed as a truth both of the Mixed Mathematics and of Natural Theology-for the theologian only adds a single short link to the chain of the physical astronomer's demonstration in order to reach the great Artificer from the phenomena of his system.

Examine now, in land animals, the structure of the larynx, the upper part of which is so contrived as to keep the windpipe closely shut by the valve thrown over its orifice, while the food is passing into the stomach, as it were, over a drawbridge, and, but for that valve, would fall into the lungs. No one can hesitate in ascribing this curious mechanism to the intention that the same opening of the throat and mouth should serve for conveying food to the stomach and air to the lungs, without any interference of the two operations. But that structure would not be sufficient for animals which live in the water, and must therefore, while they breathe at the surface, carry down their food to devour it below. In them accordingly, as in the whale and the porpoise, we find the valve is not flat, but prominent and somewhat conical, rising towards the back of the nose, and the continuation of the nostril by means of a ring (or sphincter) muscle embraces the top of the windpipe so as to complete the communication between the lungs and the blow-hole, while it cuts off all communication between those lungs and the mouth.

Again, if we examine the structure of a porpoise's head, we find its cavities capable of great distention, and such that he can fill them at pleasure with air or with water, according as he would mount, float, or sink. By closing the blow-hole, he shuts out the water; by letting in the water, he can sink; by blowing from the lungs against the cavities, he can force out the water, and fill the hollows with air, in order to rise. No one can doubt that such facts afford direct evidence of an apt contrivance directed towards a specific object, and adopted by some power thoroughly acquainted with the laws of hydrostatics, as well as perfectly skilful in workmanship.

To draw an example from a very different source, let us observe the structure of the Planetary System. There is one particular arrangement which produces a certain effect-namely, the stability of the system,-produces it in a manner peculiarly adapted for perpetual duration, and produces it through the agency of an influence quite universal, pervading all space, and equally regulating the motions of the smallest particles of matter and of its most prodigious masses. This arrangement consists in making the planets move in orbits more or less elliptical, but none differing materially from circles, with the sun near the centre, revolving almost in one plane of motion, and moving in the same direction those whose eccentricity is the most considerable having the smallest masses, and the larger ones deviating hardly at all from the circular path. The influence of gravitation, which is inseparably connected with all matter as far as we know, extends over the whole of this system; so that all those bodies which move round the sun-twenty-three planets including their satellites, and six or seven comets are continually acting upon each by two kinds of force,—the original projection which sends

But let us examine further this matter. The position which we reach by a strict process of induction, is common to Natural Philosophy and Natural Theology-namely, that a given organ performs a given function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain stability, by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said that the process of reasoning is short and easy, by which we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural Theology-namely, that some power acquainted with and acting upon the knowledge of those laws, fashioned the organ with the intention of having the function performed, or constructed the system so that it might endure. Is not this last process as much one of strict induction as the other? It is plainly only a gene

* Earum autem perenes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredibilique constantia, declarant in his vim et mentem esse divinam, ut hæc ipsa qui non sentia deorum vim habere, is nihil omninc sensurus esse videatur. Cicero De Nat. Deo. II. 21.

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