that those who made it were unwilling, after asserting so emphatically the inherent right of every commoner of England to present petitions, to abridge and even annihilate that right in the next breath, by arrogating to themselves an unlimited right of judgment, how far these petitions were fit or unfit to be received. They claimed only the right to judge how far they were fit to be retained; and to retain, I need not say, ex vi termini, implies reception.

But how is it with the examples which have been cited of a direct refusal to receive in later days, and with the standing rules of the House of Commons under which these examples have occurred?

It is true, Sir, that two rules of this character were adopted by that body more than a century ago. One of them to the effect, "that they would receive no petitions against a bill, actually pending, for imposing taxes or duties." The other, "that they would receive no petitions for grants or appropriations of money relating to public service not recommended by the Crown." Now, these are the only rules of the kind which have ever been known to the parliamentary proceedings of England; and all the cases in which petitions, respectful in their terms, have been refused a reception, are found to be ranged under the authority of these two rules. And how am I to substantiate my position, that these rules are exceptions to the general principles and general practice of Parliament, and furnish no justification of the rule of this House? I shall summon to my aid, for this purpose, the great authority upon all questions of parliamentary proceeding, Mr. Hatsell; from whose well-known work Mr. Jefferson compiled his Manual, and to whom the highest acknowledgments are paid in the preface to that Manual. Let Mr. Hatsell explain these rules, and the reasons of them, in his own words, and then let us hear what he has to say in addition:

"We see from the foregoing instances, particularly from the precedents which are cited, and read on the 10th of April, 1733, that very soon after the Revolution, the House found it necessary to establish a rule, "that they would not receive any petition against a bill, then depending, for imposing a tax or duty." The principle upon which this rule was adopted appears to be this, that a tax generally extending in its effect over every part of the kingdom, and more or less affecting every individual, and in its nature necessarily and intentionally imposing a burden upon the people, it can answer

no end or purpose whatever for any set of petitioners to state these consequences as a grievance to the House. The House of Commons, before they come to a resolution which imposes a tax, cannot but know that it may very sensibly affect the commerce or manufacture upon which the duty is laid; but they cannot permit the inconvenience that may possibly be brought upon a particular branch of trade to weigh with them, when put in the balance with those advantages which are intended to result to the whole, and which the public necessities of the State demand from them. For these reasons it has been thought better, and more candid to the persons petitioning, at once to refuse receiving their petition, rather than by receiving it to give countenance to the application, and to mislead the petitioners into an idea, that in consequence of their petition the House of Commons would desist from the tax proposed, and impose another, which, though it might be less felt by that branch of trade, might be more oppressive to some other branch.

"Upon an accurate examination of the numerous precedents cited on the 10th of April, 1733, (in favor of the doctrine which was then laid down by Mr. Sandys, and those who supported the petition of the city of London) out of seventy-nine cases which were then produced and read, it will be found there are but three which apply to this question. The first of these is the petition against a bill for imposing a duty of ten per cent. ad valorem upon the woolen manufacture in the year 1696-'7. The resolution of the Committee of Ways and Means upon this point brought such a cloud of petitions from all parts of the kingdom- not only from those who were immediately concerned in the woolen trade, but from others who thought they might be ultimately affected by it-that it was thought advisable not even to present the bill. And in the very next session, in April and June, 1698, the House, having felt the inconveniency resulting from admitting these petitions, peremptorily refused to receive the petitions which were then offered against the taxes at that time depending.'

"

In the following note to this passage, the rule is still further explained:

"What Mr. Winnington afterwards said in the debate upon the petition against the bill relating to the trade of the sugar colonies, proved true upon this occasion. 'If we were to receive all petitions against bills that are brought in for the laying on of any new duties, there would be such multitudes of them against every such bill, that the nation might be undone for want of an immediate supply for the public use, whilst we are sitting to hear frivolous petitions against bills brought in for granting that supply.' Commons Debates, vol. vii. p. 310. This reasoning does not apply to the receiving petitions which desire the repeal or alteration of taxes imposed in any former session; no public service is delayed by receiving and considering such petitions; nor can the time of the House be employed more properly than in endeavoring to lighten the burdens which have been necessarily imposed upon the people, by introducing such regulations, in the manner of collecting the taxes, as experience shall point out; or even by repealing taxes, in instances where no regulation can make them fit to be continued."

And now let us hear Mr. Hatsell's account of the second of these rules:

"The great number of petitions that were presented to the House of Commons, at the commencement of the session which began in October, 1705, from persons either

claiming an arrear of pay as officers, or making some other demand upon the public, made it necessary for the House to put some restriction upon these applications; which, their being often promoted by members who were friends to the parties, and carrying with them the appearance of justice or of charity, induced the rest of the House to wish well to, or at most to be indifferent to their success; and by this means large sums were granted to private persons, improvidently, and sometimes without sufficient grounds. Very early, therefore, in the next session, on the 11th of December, 1706, before any petitions of this sort could be again offered, the House came to a resolution 'that they would receive no petition for any sum of money relating to public service, but what is recommended from the Crown.' This resolution not being at that time made a standing order, had no effect beyond the session in which it was passed, so that soon after the same practice returned again; and (the same mischiefs resulting from it) the House, upon the 11th of June, 1713, ordered the resolution of the 11th of December to be read, and declared it to be a standing order of the House. From this time, whenever any petition which desires relief by public money is offered, or any motion is made to this purpose, before the Speaker puts the question for bringing up the petition, it has been the practice, in conformity to this order, that the recommendation of the Crown should be signified by some member authorized so to do; and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or person usually authorized by the Crown, declines to signify this recommendation, the House cannot properly receive the petition. It has sometimes happened that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, from motives of humanity, and in order not to preclude the House from taking a petition under their consideration, given the recommendation of the Crown, in cases of which, even at the time, he acknowledged his disapprobation. This conduct, from whatever motives it may proceed, is not to be approved of. It destroys the meaning and spirit of the order, and reduces it to a mere form. The resolution of the 11th of December has no other intention than to transfer the responsibility of receiving or refusing the petition from the House to the Ministers of the Crown. Unless, therefore, the Ministers will do their duty, by examining into the nature of the claim, and the propriety of granting any relief; and if they find the application unfounded, will have the courage to inform the House of the result of their opinion-it would be better that the standing order should be repealed, and the House should be left to act in these, as in other circumstances, without restraint or control."

It will be perceived, Sir, from these passages, that neither of these rules of the British Parliament go the length of the rule of this House. Neither of them provides that petitions of a certain class shall not be received at any time, or under any circumstances, or be entertained in any way whatever. The first declares only that petitions against a tax bill shall not be received while that bill is actually pending;* and this, on the ground that the nation might be undone for want of an immediate supply for the public service, while Parliament was occupied in hearing petitions against some particular mode of raising

* This rule has been discontinued by the House of Commons within a few years past.

that supply. And it is expressly admitted that petitions for the repeal or alteration of these same taxes may subsequently be received. The second of these rules stops equally short of an entire exclusion of a certain class of petitions. Its whole intention and operation is to throw upon the ministry the responsibility of all appropriations of public money. It substantially refers all the petitions to which it relates to the advisers of the Crown, (themselves members of Parliament,) and makes them a committee to receive and consider them. And it expressly provides that, with their indorsement, these very petitions shall be received and considered by the House. What sort of analogy is there between rules like these and a rule which declares that petitions on certain enumerated topics shall not be received at any time, or under any circumstances, or be entertained in any way whatever?

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But what does Mr. Hatsell say further on the subject of these rules? "The House," he says, in commenting on one of them, ought to be particularly cautious not to be over rigid in extending this rule beyond what the practice of their ancestors in former times can justify them in. To receive, and hear, and consider the petitions of their fellow-subjects, when presented decently, and containing no matter intentionally offensive to the House, is a duty incumbent upon them, antecedent to all rules and orders that may have been instituted for their own convenience. Justice and the laws of their country demand it from them."

Here, Mr. Speaker, is laid down, in the clearest and noblest phraseology, in words which, after the principles that have so often been advanced, and the practice which has so long prevailed here, ought to be emblazoned in letters of gold upon every column in this hall, and to be suspended on a scroll of silver from the very beak of the eagle above your head, -the true parliamentary and constitutional doctrine on the subject of petitions.

But, before enlarging upon this idea, I must say a few words in defence of the fourth proposition which I promised to prove, namely, that there is abundant reason for believing that the framers of our Constitution would have been the last persons to acquiesce in the exceptions to this doctrine which are contained in the two special rules which have just been cited. Why, Sir,

is it forgotten that our fathers had some experience of their own on this subject of the reception of petitions? Is it forgotten that the Declaration of Independence itself, after reciting the various oppressions to which the American Colonies had been subjected, goes on to state, that "in every stage of these oppressions, we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered by repeated injury?" Is it forgotten that Patrick Henry, of Virginia, in that celebrated speech, which is at the tongue's end of every schoolboy in the Union, and in which he comes to the stern and startling conclusion, "we must fight," presents it as the very climax of his description of the unbearable grievances of that day, "we have petitioned, we have remonstrated, we have supplicated: our petitions have been slighted, our remonstrances disregarded, and we have been spurned with contempt from the foot of the throne?” It is an historical fact that the petitions of our fathers were refused a reception in the British Parliament. And on what ground were they refused? Upon what principle were they denied a hearing, or any entertainment whatever? Sir, it was in conformity with these very precedents which have been cited here so triumphantly! It was under these very rules which are appealed to so confidently in justification of our rule! Here is the record of the fact:

"On the 15th of February, 1765, a petition of Mr. Montague, agent for Virginia, and a petition from Connecticut, and another from the inhabitants of Carolina, against the bill then depending, for imposing a stamp duty in America, being offered, upon the question for bringing them up, it passed in the negative."

And now will any gentleman undertake to maintain that the framers of the Constitution intended to give their assent to principles, under which their own petitions against the Stamp Act were refused a reception? Will any gentleman rely on these precedents, while the words of Patrick Henry and the language of the Declaration are still fresh in his memory? No, Sir, I am sure I need not urge this point further.

Let me recur, then, for a moment, to the admirable exposition of Mr. Hatsell: "To receive, and hear, and consider the petitions of their fellow-subjects, when presented decently, and containing no matter intentionally offensive to the House, is a