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the public Rule: Happy People, who do what they are commanded better than they who command, without tormenting themselves with the Causes; who fuffer themselves gently to roll with the celestial Revolution; Obedience is never pure nor calm in him who argues and difputes.

In fine, to return to myself, the only Thing by which I esteem myself to be fomething, is, that Upon what wherein never any Man thought himself to Montaigne's be defective; my Recommendation is vulgar Efteem of himand common, for who ever fuppofed he wantfelf is founded. ed Senfe? It would be a Propofition that would imply a Contradiction in itself; 'tis a Disease that never is where it is difcerned, 'tis tenacious and strong, but a Disease which the first Ray of the Patient's Sight does, nevertheless, pierce through, and difperfe, as the Beams of the Sun do thick Mifts. To accufe one's Self would be to excuse, in this Cafe; and to condemn, to abfolve. There never was a Porter, or the filliest Wench, that did not think they had Senfe enough to do their Bufinefs. We eafily enough confess an Advantage of Courage, Strength, Experience, Good-nature, and Beauty in others; but an Advantage in Judgment we yield to none, and the Reasons that fimply proceed from the natural Sense of others, we think, if we had but turned our Thoughts that Way, we fhould ourfelves have found them out. As for Knowledge, Stile, and fuch Parts as we fee in others Works, we are foon fenfible if they excel our own; but, for the mere Products of the Understanding, every one thinks he could have found out the like, and is hardly fenfible of the Weight and Difficulty, if not (and then with much ado) in an extreme and incomparable Distance: And whoever should be able clearly to difcern the Height of another's Judgment, would be alfo able to raise his own to the fame Pitch: So that it is a fort of Exercise, from Whether a which a Man is to expect very little Praife, Perfon is to and a kind of Compofition of fmall Repute: value himself And, befides, for whom do you write? The for his WritLearned, to whom the Authority appertains ings.

of judging Books, know nothing valuable but Learning, and allow of no other Progrefs in our Minds but that of

Erudition

Book II. Erudition and Art. If you have mistaken one of the Scipio's for another, what is all the reft you have to say worth? Whoever is ignorant of Ariftotle, according to their Rule, is, in the fame meafure, ignorant of himself: Heavy and vulgar Souls cannot difcern the Grace of refined Reasoning: Now, these two Sorts of Men take up the World: The third Sort, into whofe Hands you fall, of Souls that are regular and strong of themselves, is fo rare, that it justly has neither Name nor Place amongst us; and 'tis fo much Time loft to afpire to it, or to endeavour to please it.

What Grounds Montaigne bad for thinking his Opinions right.

'Tis commonly faid, that the justest Dividend Nature has given us of her Favours, is that of Senfe, for there is no one that is not contented with his Share Is it not this Reafon? Whoever should discern beyond that, would fee beyond his Sight. I think my Opinions are Good and Sound; but who does not think the fame of his? One of the best Proofs I have that mine are so, is the small Efteem I have of myself; for, had they not been very well fettled, they would eafily have fuffered themselves to have been deceived by the peculiar Affection I bear to myself, as one that reduces it almost wholly to myself, and does not let fcarce any run by. All that others diftribute of it amongst an infinite Number of Friends and Acquaintance, to their Glory and Grandeur, I dedicate wholly to the Repose of my own Mind, and to myself. That which escapes of it from me, is not properly by the Rule of my Reason.

Mihi nempe valere, et vivere doctus ".

i. e.

To love myself I very well can tell,
So as to live content, and to be well.

Now I find my Opinions very bold and conftant, in condemning my own Imperfection; and, to fay the Truth, 'tis a Subject upon which I exercife my Judgment, as much as upon any other. The World looks always oppofite; I turn my Sight inwards, there fix and imploy

z Lucret. lib. v. v. 959.

it :

449 it: Every one looks before him, I look into myself; I have no other Bufinefs but myself; I am eternally meditating upon myself, controul and taste myself: Other Men's Thoughts are ever wandering abroad; if they fet themselves to serious Thinking, they are always looking before them.

Nemo in fefe tentat defcendere *.

i. e.

No Man attempts to dive into himself.

For my Part, I wheel myself in my own Sphere: And this Capacity of trying the Truth, whatever it be, in me, and this free Humour of not eafily fubjecting my Belief, I owe principally to myfelf; for the strongest and most general Imaginations I have, are thofe, that, as a Man may fay, were born with me; they are natural, and intirely my own I produced them crude and fimple, in a ftrong and bold manner, but a little confused and imperfect; I have fince established and fortified them with the Authority of others, and by the found Examples of the Ancients, whom I have found of the fame Judgment: They have given me fafter Hold, and a clearer Enjoyment and Poffeffion of it; the Reputation that every one courts of Vivacity and Readiness of Wit, I aim at from Regularity; the Glory they pretend to from a brave and fignal Action, or fome particular Ability, I claim from Order, Correfpondence, and Tranquillity of Opinions and Manners. Omnino fi quidquam eft decorum, nihil eft profecto magis quàm æquabilitas univerfæ Vita, tum fingularum actionum; quam confervare non poffis, fi aliorum naturam imitans, omittas tuam: If any Thing be intirely decent, nothing certainly can be more, than a Uniformity of the whole Life, and in every particular Action of it; which thou 'canft not poffibly preferve, if, in imitating other Men's, thou neglectest to cultivate thy own Genius' Here then you fee to what Degree I find myself guilty of this, which I faid was the first Part of the Vice of Prefumption. VOL. II.

b

G g

As

a Perf. Sat. iv. v. 23.

Cic. Offic. lib. i. c. 31.

Montaigne not much prepoffeffed in Favour of his own Times.

Book II. As to the fecond, which confifts in not having a fufficient Efteem for others; I know not whether I can fo well excufe myself; but, whatever comes on't, I am refolved to speak the Truth: And whether, peradventure, it be, that the continual Acquaintance I have had with the Humours of the Ancients, and the Idea of those great Souls of paft Ages, difgufted me, both with others and myself; or that, in Truth, the Age we live in produces but very indifferent Things; yet fo it is, that I see nothing worthy of any great Admiration; neither, indeed, have I fuch an Intimacy with many Men, as is requifite to form a Judgment of them; and those with whom my Condition makes me the moft frequent, are, for the most part, Men that take little Care of the Culture of the Mind, but look upon Honour as the Sum of all Bleffings, and Valour as the Height of all Perfection. What I fee that is handsome in others, I very readily

He loved to

commend Merit, whether in his

Friends or Enenies.

1

commend and efteem; nay, I often fay more in their Commendation, than, I think, they really deferve, and give myself so far leave to lye; for I cannot invent a false Subject. My Teftimony is never wanting to my Friends, in what I conceive deferves Praife; and where a Foot is due to them, in Point of Merit, I am willing to give them a Foot and a half; but to attribute to them Qualities that they have not, I cannot do it, nor openly defend their Imperfections: Nay, I frankly give my very Enemies their due Teftimony of Honour: My Affection alters, my Judgment does not; I never confound my Controverfy with other Circumftances that are foreign to it; and am fo-jealous of the Liberty of my Judgment, that I can very hardly part with it for any Paffion whatever: I do myself a greater Injury in Lying, than I do him of whom I tell a Lye. This commendable and generous Cuftom is obferved of the Perfian Nation, That they fpoke of their • mortal Enemies, and with whom they were at deadly Wars, as honourably and juftly

Enemies bonoured by the Perfians for their Virtue.

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as

• as their Virtues did deferve.' I know Men enough that' have several fine Parts; one Wit, another Courage, another Addrefs, another Confcience, another Language, one one Science, another another; but a Man generally great, and that has all these brave Parts together, or any one of them, to fuch a Degree of Excellence, that we should admire him, or compare him with those we honour of Times paft, my Fortune never brought me acquainted with one; the greatest I ever knew, I mean, for the natural Parts of the Soul, and the beft-natured Man living, was Stephen Boetius; his was a capa- Praife of Stecious Soul indeed, and that had every Way phen Boetius. a beautiful Afpect; a Soul of the old Stamp,

and that would have produced great Deeds, had Fortune been so pleased, as he had added much to thofe great natural Parts by Learning and Study.

it comes to pass that Men of Letters are vain, and of

From whence

weak Underftandings.

But how it comes to pass I know not, and yet it is certainly fo, there is as much Vanity and Weaknefs of Judgment in those who profefs the greatest Abilities, who take upon them learned Callings, and bookish Employments, as in any other fort of Men whatever; either because more is required and expected from them, and that common Defects are inexcufable in them; or, truly, because the Opinion they have of their own Learning makes them more bold to expofe and lay themfelves too open, by which they lofe and betray themselves. As an Artificer more betrays his Want of Skill in a rich Work that he has in his Hand, if he difgrace it by ill Handling, and contrary to the Rules required, than in a mean Subject; and Men are more difpleased at a Fault in a Statue of Gold, than in one of Alabafter; fo do these, when they exhibit Things that, in themselves, and in their Place, would be good: For they make Ufe of them without Difcretion, honouring their Memories at the Expence of their Understanding, and making themselves ridiculous, to honour Cicero, Galen, Ulpian, and St. Jerome.

I willingly fall again into the Difcourfe of the Folly, of our Education; the End of which has been not to render

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