Alloy is not difputed, but how much it goes for; and, in like manner, all Things are at Par. We take Phyfic as we do Geometry; and Tricks of Hocus Pocus, Inchantments, the League and Correfpondence with the Souls of the Dead, Prognoftications, Domifications, and so much as the ridiculous Purfuit of the Philofophers Stone, all pafs current, without Scruple. We need to know no more, but that Mars's House is in the middle of the Triangle of the Hand, that of Venus in the Thumb, and that of Mercury in the little Finger; that, when the Table Line cuts the Tubercle or Ball of the Fore Finger, 'tis a Sign of Cruelty; that when it falls fhort of Sign of Cruelthe Middle Finger, and the natural Median Line makes an Angle with the Line of Life, Side, 'tis a Sign of a miferable Death; that if, in a Woman, the natural Line be open, and does not close the Angle with the Vital, it denotes that she will not be very Chafte. I leave you to judge, whether a Man thus qualified, may not pass, with Reputation and Favour, in all Companies. ty. in the fame Of a miferable Death. Of Unchafity. The Extent of ledge. Theophraftus faid, that human Knowledge, guided by the Senfes, might judge of the Caufes of Things to a certain Degree; but that, when arrived to the firft and extreme Causes, it muft stop short and retire, by reafon either of its own Infirmity, or the Difficulty of Things.' 'Tis a moderate and gentle Opinion, that our own Understandings may conduct us to the Knowledge of fome Things, and that it has certain Measures of Power, beyond which, 'tis Rashness to imploy it. This Opinion is plaufible, and introduced by Men of well-compofed Minds; but 'tis hard to limit our Wit, 'tis curious and greedy, and will no more stop at a thousand, than at fifty Paces: Having myself experimentally found, that the Thing wherein one has failed, the other has hit, and that what was unknown to one Age, the Age following has explained; and that the Arts and Sciences are not caft in a Mould, but are formed and perfected by Degrees, by often handling and polishing, as Bears leifurely lick their Cubs into Shape: What 3 I have I have not Strength to discover, I do not yet defift to found and try it, but by handling and kneading this new Matter over again, and by turning and heating it, I pave the Way for him that fhall fucceed me, to enjoy it more at his Éafe, and render it more manageable and fupple for him. ut Hymettia fole Cera remollefcit, tractatáque pollice multas i. e. As Wax does fofter in the Sun become, The Human As much will the second do to the third, which is the Cause that the Difficulty ought not to make me despair, and my own Imbecillity, as little; for 'tis No-body's but my own. Man is capable of all Things, as well Understanding as of fome: And if he confeffes, as Theoincapable of phraftus fays, the Ignorance of firft Causes attaining to the evident and Principles, let him furrender to me all Knowledge of the rest of his Knowledge: If he is deThings. fective in Foundation, his Reason is on the Ground: Disputation and Inquifition have no other Aim nor Stay but Principles; if this do not stop his Career, he wavers ad infinitum. i Non poteft aliud alio magis minúsve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una eft definitio comprebendendi. One Thing can no more nor lefs be comprehended than another, because the Rule of comprehending all Things is one and the fame. Now, 'tis very likely, that, if the Soul knew any Thing, it would, in the first Place, know itself; and, if it knew any Thing out of itself, it would be its own Body and Cafe, before any Thing else. If we fee the Gods of Phyfic, to this very Day, debating about our Anatomy, -Mulciber in Trojam, pro Troja ftabat Apollo *: h Ovid. Metam. lib. x. Fab. 8. v. 42. i Cic. Acad. Quæft. lib. iv. c. 41. * Ovid. Trift. lib. i. El. 2. v. 5. i. e. i. e. Vulcan against, for Troy Apollo ftood. the Academics when are we to expect, that they will be agreed? We are nearer Neighbours to ourselves, than the Whiteness of Snow, or the Weight of Stone, are to us. If Man does not know himself, how fhould he know his Forces and Functions? No queftion that we have fome true Knowledge in us, but 'tis by Chance; and forafmuch as Errors are received into our Soul the fame Way, after the fame Manner, and by the fame Conduct, it has not wherewithal to distinguish them, nor to chufe the Truth from Falfhood. The Academics admitted a certain Inclination of Judgment, and thought it too crude to fay, that it was not more likely, that Snow was white, than black; and that we were not more affured of the Motion of a Stone, thrown by the Hand, than that of the eighth Sphere. And to avoid this Difficulty and Strangeness, that cannot, in Truth, eafily lodge in our Imagination; though they did conclude, that we were, in no fort, capable of Knowledge, and that Truth is ingulphed in fo profound an Abyfs, as is not to be penetrated by human Sight: Yet did they acknowledge fome Things to be more likely than others, and received into their Judgment this Faculty, that they had a Power to incline to one Appearance more than another: They allow ed it this Propenfion, but interdicted all Refolution. The Pyrrhonifts Opinion is more folid, and alfo more likely For this Academic Inclination, and this Propension to one Propofition rather than another, what is it but an Acknowledgment of fome more apparent Truth in this, than in that? If our Understanding be capable of the Form, Lineaments, Comportment, and Face of Truth, it might as well fee it entire, as by halves, in its Birth and Imperfection. This Appearance of Likelihood, which makes them rather incline to the Left than to the Right, aug ments it Multiply this Ounce of Verifimilitude, that turns the Scales to a hundred, to a thousand Ounces, it will happen, in the End, that the Balance will, itfelf, end Book II. the Controverfy, and determine one Choice, and one entire Truth. But how do they fuffer themselves to incline to Verifimilitude, if they know not the Truth? How fhould they know the Probability of that, whereof they do not know the Effence: Either we can abfolutely judge, or abfolutely we cannot. If our intellectual and fenfible Faculties are without Footing or Foundation; if they only waver and totter, 'tis to no Purpose that we fuffer our Judgment to be carried away with any Thing of their Operation, what Appearance foever it may feem to prefent us: And the fureft and moft happy Seat of our Understanding would be that, where it kept itself serene, upright, and inflexible, without tottering, and without Agitation. Inter vifa, vera, aut falfa, ad animi affenfum, nihil intereft. Amongst Things that are feen, whether true or falfe, it fignifies nothing to the Affent of the Mind. That Things do not lodge in us in their Form and Effence, and do not there make their Entry by their own Force and Authority, we plainly fee: Because, if it were fo, we should receive them after the fame manner: Wine would have the fame Relifh with the fick, as with the healthful: He who has his Finger chapped or benumbed, would find the fame Hardness in Wood or Iron, which he handles, that another does. Strange Subjects then furrender themselves to our Mercy, and are seated in us as we please: Now if, on our Part, we did receive any Thing without Alteration, if human Grafp were capable and ftrong enough to feize on Truth by our own Means, these Means being common to all Men, this Truth would be conveyed from Hand to Hand, from one to another; and, at least, there would be fome one Thing to be found in the World, amongst so many as there are, that would be believed, by Men, with an universal Consent. But, as there is no one Propofition, that is not debated and controverted amongst us, or that may not be, this makes it very manifeft, that our Natural Judgment does not, very clearly, difcern what it embraces : For my Judgment cannot make my Companion approve of what it approves ; which is a Sign that I feized it by fome other Means, than Cic. Acad. lib. iv. c. 28. by The Uncertain ty which every one may per ceive in his own Judg ment. by a Natural Power that is in me, and in all other Men. Let us lay afide this infinite Confufion of Opinions, which we fee even amongst the Philofophers themselves, and this perpetual and univerfal Difpute about the Knowledge of Things For this is truly prefuppofed, that Men, I mean, the most knowing, the best bred, and of the beft Parts, are not agreed about any one Thing: Not that Heaven is over our Heads; for they who doubt of every Thing, do alfo doubt of that; and they who deny that we are able to comprehend any Thing, fay, that we have not comprehended, that the Heaven is over our Heads; and these two Opinions are, without Comparison, the strongest inNumber. Befides, this infinite Diversity and Divifion, thro' the Trouble which our Judgment gives ourselves, and the Uncertainty that every one finds in himself, 'tis eafy to perceive that its Seat is very unstable. How variously do we judge of Things? How often do we alter our Opinions? What I hold and believe to-day, I hold and believe with my whole Belief: All my Inftruments and Engines take faft hold of this Opinion, and become refponfible to me for it, as much as in them lies; I could not embrace nor preferve any Truth with greater Affurance, than I do this. I am wholly and intirely poffeffed with it: But has it not befallen me not only once, but a hundred, nay, a thousand times, and every Day to have embraced fome other Notion with all the fame Instruments, and in the fame Condition, which I have afterwards judged to be falfe? A Man muft, at least, become wife at his own Expence. If I have often found myself betrayed under this Colour; if my Touch prove ordinarily false, and my Balance unequal and unjuft, what Affurance can I now have more, than at other times? Is it not Stupidity and Madness to fuffer myself to be fo of ten deceived by my Guide? Nevertheless, let Fortune.remove us five hundred times from Place to Place; let her do nothing but inceffantly empty and fill into our Belief, as into a Veffel, various other Opinions, yet ftill the present and the laft is the certain and infallible; for this we must abandon Goods, Honour, Life, Health, and all. VOL. II. Y ・pofte |