u heated in the Lungs, moiftened in the Heart, and diffufed throughout the whole Body. Zeno, the Quin• teffence of the four Elements: Heraclitus Ponticus, that it was the Light: Xenocrates and the Egyptians, a Moveable Number: The Chaldeans, a Vertue without any • determinate Form. Habitum quendam vitalem corporis effe, i. e. A vital Habit in Man's Frame to be, Let us not forget Ariftotle, who held the Soul to be that which naturally caufes the Body to move, which he called Entelechia, with a colder Invention than any of the rest: For he neither speaks of the Effence, nor of the Origin, nor of the Nature of the Soul, and only takes Notice of the Effect. Lactantius, Seneca, and moft of the Dogmatifts, have confeffed, that it was a Thing they did not understand. After all this Enumeration of Opinions : Harum fententiarum quæ vera fit, Deus aliquis viderit, fays Cicero: Of these Opinions, which is the true, let some • God determine. I know by myself, fays St. Bernard, • how incomprehenfible God is, feeing I cannot compre'hend the Parts of my own Being.' Heraclitus', who was of Opinion, that every Place was full of Souls and Demons, x I know not where Montaigne had this; for Cicero exprefsly fays, that this Quinteffence, or Fifth Nature, is a Thought of Aristotle, who makes the Soul to be compofed of it; and that Zeno thought the Soul to be Fire, Cic. Tufc. Quaft. lib. i. C. 9 and 10. After this, Cicero adds, that Ariftotle calls the Mind, which he derives from that Fifth Nature, Entelechia, a newcoined Word, fignifying a perpetual Motion. Tho' Montaigne has copied these last Words, in what he proceeds to tell us of Ariftotle, he cenfures him for not having spoken of the Origin and Nature of the Soul. But had he only caft his Eye upon what Cicero had faid, a little before, he would have been convinced, that Ariftotle had taken Care to explain himself concerning the Origin of the Soul, before he remarked the Effect of it. If he has not thereby fully demonftrated what the Nature of it is, Zeno has not given us much better Light into it, when he fays, The Soul or Mind feems to be Fire: And it would not be difficult to fhew, that, in this Article, the other Philqfophers have not fucceeded better than Zeno and Ariftotle. w Lucret. lib. iii. v. 100. x Cic. in Tufc. Quaft. lib. i. c. :l Y Diog, Laert. in the Life of Heraclitus, lib, ix. fect. 7. . ، Demons, did nevertheless maintain, that no one could advance fo far towards the Knowledge of his Soul, as ever to arrive at it; fo profound was the Effence of it.' Neither is there lefs Controverfy and Debate about the Seat of it. Hippocrates and Hierophilus place it in the Ventricle of the Brain: Democritus and Ariftotle, throughout the * whole Body. Ut bona fæpe valetudo cum dicitur esse In what Part of Man the Soul refides. Corporis, et non eft tamen hæc pars ulla valentis, i. e. So Health and Strength are both faid to belong To Man, but are no Parts of him that's ftrong. Epicurus in the Stomach, or middle Region of the Breast. Hic exultat enim pavor, ac metus, bæc loca circùm Lætitiæ mulcent. i. e. For this the Seat of Horror is and Fear, c The Stoics, about, and within, the Heart: Erafiftratus, close to the Membrane of the Epicranion: Empedocles, in the Blood, as alfo Mofes, which was the Reason why he interdicted eating the Blood of Beafts, in which their Soul is feated. Galen thought, that every Part of the Body had its Soul: Strato has placed it betwixt the Eyebrows: Quâ facie quidem fit animus, aut ubi habitet, ne quærendum quidem eft: What Figure the Soul is of, or what Part it inhabits, is not to be enquired into', fays Cicero. I very willingly deliver this Author to you in his own Words: For fhould I go about to alter the Speech of Eloquence itfelf? Befides it were no great Prize to steal the Matter of his Inventions. They are neither very frequent, nor very difficult, and they are pretty well known. But the Reafon why Chryfippus argues it to be about U 3 z Plutarch. de Placitis Philofophorum, lib. iv. c. 5. adv. Mathem. p. 201. b Lucret. lib. iii. v. 103. Plutarch. de Placitis Philofoph, lib. iv. c. 5. • Cię. a Sextus Empiricus c Id. ib. v. 141. Tufc. lib. i. c, 28. . Book II. about the Heart, as the rest of that Sect do, is not to be admitted. It is, fays he, because, f when we would affirm any Thing, we lay our Hand upon our Breasts: And when we are to pronounce yw, which fignifies I, • we let the lower Mandible fink towards the Stomach." This Place ought not to be overflipped, without a Remark upon the Vanity of fo great a Man: For, befides that thefe Confiderations are infinitely trivial in themselves, the laft is only a Proof to the Greeks, that they have their Souls lodged in that Part. No human Judgment is fo vigilant, that it does not sometimes fleep. Why should we be afraid to speak? We see the Stoics, who are the Fathers of human Prudence, have found out, that the Soul of a Man, crushed under a Ruin, does long labour and strive to get out, before it can difengage itself from the Burden, like a Moufe caught in a Trap. Some hold, that the World was made to give Bodies, by way of Punishment, to the Angels that fell, by their own Fault, from the Purity wherein they had been created: The firft Creation having been no other than incorporeal And, that according, as they are more or lefs depraved from their Spirituality, fo are they more or less jocundly or dully incorporated. From thence proceeds all the Variety of fo much created Matter. But the Spirit that, for his Punishment, was invefted with the Body of the Sun, muft certainly have a very rare and particular Measure of Thirst. The Extremities of our Perquifition all terminate in a Mist, as PluThe Vanity of tarch" fays on the Head of Hiftories, where, philofophical Inquiries. as it is in Charts, all that is beyond the Coafts of known Countries is reprefented to. be taken up with Marfhes, impenetrable Forefts, Defarts, and Places uninhabitable'. And this is the Reafon why the most stupid and childish Reveries were mostly found in thofe Authors, who treat of the fublimest Subjects, and proceed the furtheft in them: Lofing themfelves in their own Curiofity and Prefumption. The Beginning f Apud Galenum, lib. ii. de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. 8 Senec. Ep. 57. This Reflection of Plutarch is in the Preamble 3 to his Life of Thefeus. The Atoms of the Epicu reans, what? ginning and End of Knowledge are equally reputed foolish. Obferve to what a Height Plato foars in his poetic Clouds: Do but take Notice of his Gibberish of the Gods. But what did he dream of when Plato's ridicu he defined Man to be a two-legged Animal, lous Definition without Feathers: Giving thofe who had a of Man. Mind to deride him, a pleasant Occasion; for, having plucked a Capon alive, they called it the Man of Plato. And, as for the Epicureans, how fimple were they to imagine, that their Atoms, which they faid were Bodies, having fome Weight, and a natural Motion downwards, had formed the World, 'till they were put in mind by their Adverfaries, that, according to this Defcription, it was impoffible they fhould unite and join to one another, their Fall being fo direct and perpendicular, and producing fo many parallel Lines throughout? Wherefore, there was a Neceffity, that they should afterwards add a fortuitous and fide-ways Motion, and that they should, moreover, accoutre their Atoms with Hooks and Crooks, to adapt them for a Union and Attachment to one another. And, even then, do not thofe that attack them upon this fecond Confideration, put them hardly to it? If the Atoms have, by Chance, formed fo many Sorts of Figures, why did it never fall out that they made a House or a Shoe? Why, at the fame Rate, should we not as well believe, that an infinite Number of Greek Letters, ftrewed all over a certain Place, might poffibly fall into the Contexture of the Iliad? Whatever is 'capable of Reason, fays Zeno, is better than Zeno's weak that which is not capable of it: There is Argument. nothing better than the World; the World is therefore capable of Reason.' Cotta, by this Way of Argument, makes the World a Mathematician; and 'tis alfo made a Musician, and an Organist, by this other Argument of Zeno: The Whole is more than a Part; we are capable " of Wisdom, and are Parts of the World; therefore the • World is wife '.' It would be endless to inftance, not U 4 only Diog. Laert. in the Life of Diogenes the Cynic, lib. v. fect. 40. Idem, ib. lib. ii. ç, 12. * Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. iii. c. 9. ancient Philojophers treated of Knowledge feriously, Book II. only in the Arguments, which are falfe in themselves, but filly ones, that do not hold together in themselves, and that accuse their Authors, not fo much of Ignorance, as Imprudence, in the Reproaches the Philofophers hit one another in the Teeth withal, upon their Diffenfions in their Sects and Opinions. Whoever fhould bundle up a lufty Faggot of the Fooleries of human Wisdom, would produce Wonders: I willingly mufter up these few for a Pattern, by a certain Biafs, not lefs profitable than the moft moderate Inftructions. Let us judge, by these, what Opinion we are to have of Man, of his Senfe and Reason, when, in these great Perfons, and fuch as have raised human Knowledge fo high, there are so many grofs and palpable Errors. For my Part, I am rather apt to believe, that they have treated of Knowledge cafualWhether the ly, played with it, dallied with Reafon, as a vain and frivolous Inftrument, like a Shittlecock, and fet on foot all forts of Fancies and Inventions, fometimes more nervous, and fometimes weaker. This fame Plato, who defines Man, as if he were a Fowl, fays elsewhere, after Socrates, "That ⚫ he does not, in Truth, know what Man is, and that he is one of the Members of the World the hardest to understand.' By this Variety and Instability of Opinions, they tacitly lead us, as it were, by the Hand, to this Certainty of their Uncertainty: They profefs not always to deliver their Opinions bare-faced and apparent to us; they have, one while, difguifed them in the fabulous Shadows of Poefy, and, another while, in fome other Vizor: For our Imperfection carries this alfo along with it, that crude Meats are not always proper for our Stomachs; they must be dried, altered, and mixed: The Philofophers do the fame: They, now and then, conceal their real Opinions and Judgments, and falfify them to accommodate themfelves to the Public: They will not make an open Profeffion of Ignorance, and of the Imbecillity of human Reafon, that they may not frighten Children; but they fufficiently difcover it to us by the Appearance of Knowledge that is confufed and uncertain. I advised a Perfon 3 in |