either on purpose to fhew the Wavering of Man's Understanding upon every Subject, or elfe ignorantly compelled to it by the Volubility and Incomprehenfibility of all Matter: Which is the very Signification of that Maxim, fo often repeated by Plutarch, Seneca, and many other Writers of their Clafs, viz. In a flippery Track let us fufpend our Belief: For, as Euripides fays, The Works of God in fundry wife like that which Empedocles often makes ufe of in his Books, Truth a very agreeable Occupation. Democritus, * To prove that this was exactly what Montaigne intended by thofe Words, Zue fignifie ce refrein, &c. which Mr. Cotton has moft abfurdly turned into an Interrogation by this Jargon. What means this Chink in the Clofe? I need only point you to thofe that immediately preceded them in the Quarto Edition of 1588; where, after having spoke of thofe ancient Philo fophers who had a Form of writing dubious, both in Subftance and Defign, in quiring rather than inftructing, though they intermix fome dogmatical Periods in their Stile, Montaigne fays, in the fame Breath, Where is this more visible. than in our Plutarch? How differently does he reafon upon the fame Topic? How of ten does he give us two or three contrary Caufes for the fame Effect, and how many various Arguments without preferring either to our Choice? Plutarch's Treatife of the Oracles that ceafed, c. 24. m Cic. Quæft. Acad. lib. iv. c. 5. » Wisdom ix. 14. Democritus's Paffion for Inquiries into Natural Philofo phy. Democritus, having eaten Figs at his Table which tafted of Honey, fell immediately to confidering within himself from whence they derived that uncommon Sweetnefs, and, to be fatisfied in it, was about to rife from the Table, to fee the Place where the Figs were gathered: This Maid, being informed what was the Caufe of this Bustle, said to him, with a Smile, that he need give himself no Trouble about it, for fhe had put them into a Veffel in which there had been Honey. He was vexed at the Discovery, because it had deprived him of the Opportunity of finding out the Caufe himself, and robbed his Curiofity of Matter to work upon. Go thy way, faid he to her, Thou hast done me an Injury; but, however, I will feek out the Cause of it as if it was natural; and he would fain have found out fome true Caufe of an Effect that was false and imaginary. This Story of a famous and great Philofopher does very clearly reprefent to us the ftudious Paffion that amufes us in the Purfuit of the Things which we despair of acquiring. Plutarch gives a like Example of one who would not be fet right in a Matter of Doubt, because he would not lofe the Pleasure of feeking it; and of another Perfon who would not suffer his Phyfician to allay the Thirft of his Fever, because he would not lofe the Pleasure of quenching it by drinking, Satius eft fupervacua difcere quam nihil. i. e. 'Tis better to learn more than is neceffary than nothing at all. As, in all forts of Feeding, the Pleasure of Eating is very often fingle and alone, and as many The ConfideraThings which we take, that are pleafant to tion of Nature the Palate, are neither nourishing nor whole- is Food for the some; in like manner, what our Understand- Mind of Man. ing extracts from Science, is nevertheless pleasant, though R 2 'tis • Plutarch's Table-talk, Qu. 1o. lib. i. This Quotation, which I found as foon as I had dipped into the last Edition of Bayle's Critical Dictionary, at the Article Democritus, Note 1, is very juft, as I was fully convinced by confulting Plutarch himfelf; but I have learnt from M. de la Monnoye, that, according to Plutarch, Democritus eat Toivo, a Cucumber, and not ro x, a Fig, as Montaigne has tranflated it, copying after Amyot and Xylander, P Senec. Epift. 88. 'tis neither nutritive nor falutary. What they say is this: The Confideration of Nature is Food proper for our • Minds; it elevates and puffs us up, makes us difdain low and terrestrial Things, in Comparison with Things that are Sublime and Celestial. The Inquifition into great and occult Things is very pleasant, even to him who acquires nothing by it but the Reverence and Awe of judging it.' Thofe are the Terms of their Profeffion. The vain Image of this fickly Curiofity is yet more manifeft by this other Example, which they are often fond of urging: Eudoxus wifhed, and prayed to the Gods, that he might once fee the Sun near at hand, to comprehend the Form, Magnitude, and Beauty of it, though he fhould be fuddenly burnt by it. He was defirous, at the Peril of his Life, to acquire a Knowledge, of which the Use and Poffeffion fhould be taken from him at the fame Inftant; and, for the fake of this fudden and transitory Knowledge, lofe all the other Knowledge he had then, or might have acquired hereafter. the Numbers of Pythagoras, to what End they were advanced., I cannot easily perfuade myself, that Epicurus, Plato, The Atoms of and Pythagoras, have given us their Atoms, Epicurus, the Ideas, and Numbers, for Articles of our Faith. Ideas of Plato, They were too wife to establish Things fo uncertain, and fo difputable, for their Credenda. But, in the then obfcure and ignorant State of the World, each of thofe great Men endeavoured to ftrike out fome Image of Light, whatever it was, and racked their Brains for Inventions, that had, at least, a pleasant and subtle Appearance, provided that, however falfe they were, they might be able to ftand their Ground against Oppofition, Unicuique ifta pro ingenio finguntur, non ex fcientiæ vi1. i. c. Thofe are Things which every one fancies, according to his Genius, not by the Virtue of Knowledge. One 9 In Plutarch's Tract, That 'tis impoffible to live merrily, according to the Doctrine of Epicurus, ch. 3, you will find, in Diogenes Laertius, lib. viii. fect. 86,-91, the Life of Eudoxus, that celebrated Pythagorean Philofopher, who was cotemporary with Plato. M. Senec. Suaforiarum, lib. i. Suaf. 4. Philofophy. Conduct of the Philofophers, with Regard to Religion and the Laws. One of the Ancients, being reproached that he profeffed Philofophy, but nevertheless, in his What is true own Opinion, made no great Account of it, made Anfwer, That this was the true Way of pholofophizing. They would confider all, and weigh every Thing, and have found this an Employment fuited to our natural Curiofity. Something they have written for the Use of public Society, as their Religions; and for that Confideration, as it was but reasonable, they were not willing to fift the common Notions too finely, that they might not obftruct the common Obedience to the Laws and Customs of their Country. Plato treats this Mystery with barefaced Raillery; for, where he writes according to his own Method, he gives no certain Rule. When he perfonates the Legislator, he affumes a Stile that is magisterial and dogmatical, and yet, therewith, boldly mixes the most fantastical of his Inventions, as fit to perfuade the Vulgar, as they are too ridiculous to be believed by himself, knowing very well how fit we are to receive all Manner of Impreffions, efpecially the most cruel and immoderate. And, yet in his Laws, he takes great Care, that nothing be fung in Public but Poetry, of which the fabulous Fictions tend to fome ufeful Purpose: It being fo eafy to imprint all Phantafms in the human Mind, that it were Injuftice not to feed it with profitable Lyes, rather than with thofe that are unprofitable and prejudicial. He fays, without any fcruple, in his Republic, that it is very often neceffary for Men's Good to deceive them. 'Tis eafy to distinguish the Sects that have most adhered to Truth, and those that have most View to Profit, by which the latter have, gained Credit. 'Tis the Mifery of our Condition, that it often happens, that the Thing which appears to our Imagination to be the most true, does not appear to be the most profitable in Life. The boldeft Sects, as the Epicurean, Pyrrhonian, and the new Academic, are con-. ftrained, after all is faid and done, to fubmit to the Civil Law. There are other Subjects, which they have difcuffed, fome on the Right, others on the Left; and Book II. each Sect endeavours to give them fome Countenance, be it right or wrong. For, finding nothing fo abftrufe, which they would not venture to treat of, they were very often forced to forge weak and ridiculous Conjectures; not that they themselves looked upon them, as any Foundation for establishing any certain Truth, but merely for the Exercife of their Study. Non tam id fenfiffe, quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materia difficultates videntur voluiffe. i. e. Not that they feem to have been perfuaded of the Truth of what they faid, but rather, that they were willing to exercise their Talents, by the Difficulty of the Subject. And, if it be not taken in this Light, how fhall we palliate fo great Inconftancy, Variety, and Vanity of Opinions, as we fee have been produced by thofe excellent and admirable Souls? As, for Inftance, what can be more vain, than to offer to define God by our Analogies and Conjectures? To regulate Him and the World by our Capacities and our Laws? To make Ufe of that little Scantling of Knowledge, which he has been pleased to allow to our State of Nature, to his Detriment? And, because we cannot extend our Sight to his glorious Throne, to bring him down to a Level with our Corruption and our Miseries ? Of all human and ancient Opinions concerning Religion, that feems to me the most probable, and the most excufable, which acknowledged God to be an incomprehenfible Power, the Original and Preferver of all Things, all Goodnefs, all Perfection, receiving and taking in good Part the Honour and Reverence which Man paid unto him, under what Appearance, Name, or Ceremonies foever: The most probable of all buman Opinions touching Religion. S. Jupiter omnipotens rerum, Regumque Deumque, i. e. The Almighty Jupiter, the Author of all Things, and the Parent of Kings and Gods. This Those which were the Verfes of Valerius Saranus, were preferved by Varro, from whom St. Auguftine has inferted them in his Book de Civitate Dei, lib. vii. c. 9, 11. |