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putes fear no Revenge. When they fay that Weight preffes downwards, they would be forry to be believed, and want to be contradicted, for the Sake of creating Doubt and Sufpence of Judgment, which is their ultimate End. They only advance their Propofitions to oppofe fuch as they imagine have gained our Belief. If you admit theirs, they are altogether as ready to maintain the contrary. 'Tis all one to them. They have no Choice. If you maintain that Snow is black, they will argue on the contrary, that 'tis white. If you fay, that 'tis neither the one nor the other, their Bufinefs is to maintain, that 'tis both. If you adhere to the Opinion that you know nothing of the Matter, they will maintain that you do: Yea, and, if by an affirmative Axiom you affure them that you doubt of a Thing, they will argue that you do not doubt of it, or that you cannot be sure that you do doubt of it. And by this Extremity of Doubt, which fhocks itself, they separate and divide themselves from many Opinions, even of those who have, in many Forms, maintained Doubt and Ignorance. Why fhall it not be allowed to them, fay they, as it is to the Dogmatists, one to fay Green, another Yellow, and even to doubt of thefe? Can any Thing be propofed to us to acknowledge or deny, which is not allowable for us to confider as ambiguous? And where others are induced, either by the Custom of their Country, or by the Inftitution of Parents, or by Accident, as by a Tempeft, without Judgment, and without Choice, nay, most commonly before the Age of Difcretion, to fuch or fuch an Opinion, to the Sect of the Stoics or Epicureans, and are thereto fo inflaved and faft bound, as to a Thing that they cannot recede from, ad quamcumque difciplinam, velut tempeftate, delati, ad eam, tanquam ad faxum, adhærefcunt, i. e. to whatsoever Difcipline they happen to be introduced, to that Sect they cleave, as they would to a Rock, if drove to it by a Storm; why fhould not thefe be permitted, in like manner, to maintain their Liberty, and confider Things without Obligation and Servility? Hoc liberiores et folutiores, quòd integra illis eft judicandi poteftas, i. e. Being,

Cic. Acad. Quæft. lib. ii. c. 3.

Idem, ibid.

t

Being, in this refpect, the more free and unconstrained, because they have the full Power of judging. Is it not of fome Advantage to be difengaged from the Neceffity which curbs others? Is it not better for a Man to continue in Sufpence, than to intangle himself in fo many Errors as human Fancy has produced? Is it not better for him to fufpend his Opinion, than to meddle with those feditious and wrangling Divifions. What fhall I chufe? What you please, provided you do but chufe. As filly as this Answer is, yet it seems to be the Language of all the Dogmatifts, by whom we are not permitted to be ignorant of what we are ignorant. Take the most eminent Side, it will never be fo fecure, but you will be under a Neceffity of attacking a hundred and a hundred contrary Opinions for the Defence of it. Is it not better to keep out of this Confusion? You are permitted to embrace Ariftotle's Opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, with as much Zeal as if your Honour and Life were at Stake, and to contradict and give the Lye to Plato on that Head; and fhall they be forbid to doubt of it? If it be lawful for " Panatius to fufpend his Judgment concerning Augury, Dreams, Oracles, Vaticinations, of which Things the Stoics make no manner of Doubt, why may not a Wife Man prefume to do the fame, in all Things, that this Man dared to do in those Things which he learnt from his Master, established by the School of which he is a Disciple? If it be a Child that judges, he knows nothing of the Matter; if a Wise Man, he is prepoffeffed. They have referved to themfelves a wonderful Advantage in Battle, having eafed themselves of the Care of providing a Fence. They are not concerned at being ftruck, provided they alfo strike; and they make every Thing ferve their Purpose. If they overcome, your Argument is lame, as theirs is, if you overcome: If they fall fhort, they verify Ignorance, as you do, if you mifs: If they prove that nothing is known, it goes well; if they cannot prove it, 'tis altogether as well. "Ut quum in eadem re paria in contrariis partibus momenta inveniuntur, facilius ab utraque parte affertio fufti neatur, i. e. To the End that, as the Reasons are equal pra

Cic, Acad, Quæft, lib, i, c, ult. w Idem, ibid.

and

Book II. and con upon the fame Subject, the Determination may cafily be fufpended on both Sides: And they make Ac count to find out, with much greater Eafe, why a Thing is falfe, than why 'tis true; and what is not, than that which is; and what they do not believe, than what they do believe.

Their Forms of Speech are, I eftablish nothing: 'Tis

The common
Stile of the
Pyrrhonians.

no more fo than fo; or no more one than the other: I do not comprehend it: The Appearances are, in all respects, equal: The Rule of fpeaking, both pro and con, is alike: Nothing feems true, that may not as well • feem falfe.' Their Sacramental Word is inexw, that is to fay, I demur to it, I fufpend my Judgment. This is their conftant Note, with other Terms of the like Significancy, the Effect of which is a pure, intire, and abfolute Pause and Suspension of the judgment. They make Ufe of their Reafon to inquire and difpute, but not to fix and determine. Whoever will imagine a perpetual Confession of Ignorance, a Judgment without Biafs, and without Inclination, upon any Occafion whatsoever, conceives a true Idea of Pyrrhonifm. I exprefs this Whimsicalness as well as I can, by reason that many People can hardly conceive what it is, and Authors themselves reprefent it a little differently and obfcurely.

What is the Behaviour of the Pyrrhonians in common Life.

X

At to the Actions of Life, they follow the common Forms. They yield and give themselves up to the Natural Inclinations, to the Impulse and Power of the Paffions, to the Conftitutions of the Laws and Cuftoms, and to the Tradition of the Arts, Non enim nos Deus ifta fcire, fed tantummodo uti voluit. i. e. For God would not have us know, but only use these Things. They fuffer their common Actions to be guided by thofe Things without any Deliberation or Judgment. For this Reafon I cannot well reconcile what is faid of Pyrrho with this Argument. They represent him stupid and immoveable, leading a favage and unfociable Courfe of Life, putting himfelf

* Sextus Empiricus fays this verbatim, Pyrrh. Hypot. lib. i. c. 11. p. 6. Cic. de Div. lib. i. c. 18,

himself in the Way of being joftled by Carts, going upon Precipices, and refufing to conform to the Laws. This is to exaggerate his Difcipline. He would not be thought a Stock or a Stone. He would be represented as a Man living, reafoning, and arguing, enjoying all natural Conveniencies and Pleafures, employing and making Use of all his corporeal and spiritual Faculties in Rule and Reafon. As for the fantaftic, imaginary, and falfe Privileges that Man has ufurped, of lording it, ordaining and establishing, he has, in good earnest, renounced and quitted them.

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Yet there is no Sect but is obliged to permit its Wife Man to follow feveral Things not compre- The Wife Man hended, nor perceived, nor confented to, nor confented to, if is determined he means to live: And if he goes to Sea, he in Life by Appursues that Design, not knowing whether it pearances. will be fuccefsful to him or no; and is influenced only by the Goodness of the Ship, the Experience of the Pilot, the Convenience of the Season, and Circumstances that are only probable. According to thefe, he is bound to go, and fuffer himself to be governed by Appearances, provided there be no exprefs Contrariety in them. He has a Body, he has a Soul, the Senfes push him, the Mind fpurs him on. Altho' he do not find in himself this proper and peculiar Token of judging, and tho' he perceives, he ought not to engage his Confent, confidering that there may be a falfe equal to the true Appearance, neverthelefs he carries on the Offices of his Life with great Liberty and Convenience. How many Arts are there, the Profeffion of which confifts in Conjecture more than in Knowledge? That decide not Truth or Falfhood, and only follow what they appear? There is, they fay, the Right as well as the Wrong, and we have, in us, wherewith to feek it, but not to ftop it when we touch it. We are much the better for it, when we fuffer ourselves to be governed by the World without Inquiry.. A Soul free from Prejudice is in a prodigious fair Way towards Tranquillity; Men that judge and controul their Judges, never duly fubmit to them.

How

Montaigne only copies Cicerò here. Acad. Quæft. lib, ii. c. 32.

What Minds

are beft difpofed to fubmit to Re ligion, and the ·Rules of Go

vernment.

How much more docile and easy to be reconciled to Religion, and the Laws of Civil Policy, are fimple and incurious Minds, than thofe overcurious Wits and Pædagogues, that will ftill be prating of Divine and Human Causes? There is nothing in Human Invention that carries fo much Probability and Profit. This Man is represented Naked and Empty, acknowledging his natural Weakness, fit for receiving foreign Strength from Above, unfurnished with Human Science, and the more adapted for receiving Divine Knowledge, undervaluing his own Judgment to make the more room for Faith, neither difbelieving nor establishing any Doctrine contrary to the Laws and common Obfervances; humble, obedient, teachable, ftudious, a fworn Enemy to Heresy, and confequently freeing himself from the vain and ungodly Opinions introduced by the Falfe Sects. He is as a Charte blanche, prepared to receive fuch Forms from the Finger of God, as he shall please to engrave on it. The more we refign and commit ourselves to God, and the more we renounce ourselves, of the greater Value we are. Take in good Part, fays the Preacher, the Things that • present themselves to thee, as they feem and tafte to thee from one Day to another: The reft is out of thy Knowledge. Dominus novit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vana funt. i. e. The Lord knoweth the Thoughts ⚫ of Man, that they are Vanity

tifts.

a

Thus we fee, that, of the three general Sects of PhiThe Refult of lofophy, two make open Profeffion of Doubtthe Profeffion ing and Ignorance; and, in that of the Dogof the Dogma- matists, which is the third, 'tis obvious, that the greatest Part of them have only affumed the Face of Affurance, to give them the better Air. They have not been fo follicitous to establish any Certainty for us, as to fhew us how far they proceeded in this Pursuit of the Truth, Quam dotti fingunt magis quam norunt, i. e. How the Learned rather feign than know. Timaus, being to inform Socrates of what he knew of the Gods, the World, and Men, proposes to speak of them to him, as

b

▸ Pfal, xciv. 11, b Plato in Timæo, p. 526,

one

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