His heart a mirror was, of purest kind, Where the bright image of his Maker shined; The irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove.' The writings of Butler which have been thought most worthy of the attention of moralists and divines consist of a series of Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel, and the Analogy of Religion. The sermons may be described as abstruse dissertations on the subject of ethics or morals, addressed to persons of acute and philosophical minds. In speaking of Butler's system of morals, as it has been termed, Sir James Mackintosh, in his 'Dissertation on Ethics,' prefixed to the seventh edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica,' remarks as follows:-"The tie which holds together religion and morality is, in the system of Butler, somewhat different from the common representations, but not less close. Conscience, or the faculty of approving or disapproving, necessarily constitutes the bond of union. Setting out from the belief of theism, and combining it, as he had entitled himself to do, with the reality of conscience, he could not avoid discovering that the being who possessed the highest moral qualities is the object of the highest moral affections. He contemplates the Deity through the moral nature of man. In the case of a being who is to be perfectly loved, "goodness must be the simple actuating principle within him, this being the moral quality which is the immediate object of love." "The highest, the adequate object of this affection, is perfect goodness, which we are therefore to love with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength." "We should refer ourselves implicitly to him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him. The whole attention of life should be to obey his commands." "Moral distinctions are thus presupposed before a step can be made towards religion; virtue leads to piety; God is to be loved, because goodness is the object of love: and it is only after the mind rises through human morality to divine perfection, that all the virtues and duties are seen to hang from the throne of God."" While the sermons of Butler were mainly designed to unfold a system of ethical philosophy, his other work, already adverted to, entitled 'The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature,' was intended as a corresponding system of the philosophy of religion, and has justly been reckoned the most original and profound work on the subject. It is now more than a hundred years since this great work was given to the world, and in the present day it is as highly esteemed as it was at the period of its appearance, if not more so. It is fortunately written in a much more popular style, and with a more practical purpose, than the ethical dissertations; and hence, while these are nearly unknown, except in the closets of the learned, the Analogy has become a genuine book of the people, and will, it is hoped, keep its place in their affections as long as the world endures. The best account which has been given of the nature and tendency of the Analogy, is that written by Dr Samuel Halifax, late Lord Bishop of Gloucester, and prefixed as a preface to an edition of Butler's works in the course of last century. The following are his observations on the subject:-""All things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing imperfect." (Eccles. xlii. 24.) On this single observation of the son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our prelate's defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of indulging in idle speculations how the world might possibly have been better than it is, or, forgetful of the difference between hypothesis and fact, attempting to explain the divine economy with respect to intelligent creatures from preconceived notions of his own, he first inquires what the constitution of nature, as made known to us in the way of experiment, actually is; and from this, now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form a judgment of that larger constitution which religion discovers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with, that farther dispensation which relates to us as designed for another world, in which we have an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour here-if both may be traced up to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on according to the same plan of administration, the fair presumption is, that both proceed from one and the same author. And if the principal parts objected to in this latter dispensation be similar to, and of the same kind with, what we certainly experience under the former, the objections, being clearly inconclusive in one case, because contradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be allowed to be inconclusive also in the other. 'This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to what is disputed, from things known to other things that resemble them, from that part of the divine establishment which is exposed to our view to that more important one which lies beyond it, is on all hands confessed to be just. By this method Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the system of nature; by the same method Bishop Butler has explained the system of grace—and thus, to use the words of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure," has formed and concluded a happy alliance between faith and philosophy." ‘And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all difficulties respecting the government of God, and the designs of his Providence with regard to mankind (a degree of knowledge which we are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at least in the present state), yet surely it is of importance to learn from it, that the natural and moral world are intimately connected, and parts of one stupendous whole or system; and that the chief objections which are brought against religion, may be urged with equal force against the constitution and course of nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And this information we may derive from the work before us; the proper design of which, it may be of use to observe, is not to prove the truth of religion, either natural or revealed, but to confirm that proof, already known, by considerations from analogy. After this account of the method of reasoning employed by our author, let us now advert to his manner of applying it, first, to the subject of Natural Religion, and, secondly, to that of Revealed. 1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future life; and with this the treatise begins. Neither the reason of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to Bishop Butler, give ground for imagining that the unknown event, death, will be our destruction. The states in which we have formerly existed-in the womb and in infancy-are not more different from each other than from that of mature age in which we now exist: therefore that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present as the present is from those through which we have passed already, is a presumption favoured by the analogy of nature. All that we know from reason concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies; and the frequent instances among men of the intellectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point of putting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on the human soul, not even so much as to suspend the exercise of its faculties: though, if it have, the suspension of a power by no means implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us. "The probability of a future state once granted, an important question arises-How best to secure our interest in that state? We find from what passes daily before us, that the constitution of nature admits of misery as well as happiness; that both of these are the consequences of our own actions; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that our happiness or misery in a future world may depend on our own actions also, and that rewards or punishments hereafter may follow our good or ill behaviour here, is but an appointment of the same sort with what we experience under the divine government, according to the regular course of nature. "This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance, that the natural government of God, under which we now live, is also moral; in which rewards and punishments are the consequences of actions considered as virtuous and vicious. Not that every man is rewarded or punished here in exact proportion to his desert-for the essential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce happiness and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect from accidental causes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and beginnings of a righteous administration to be discerned in the constitution of nature; from whence we are led to expect that these accidental hindrances will one day be removed, and the rule of distributive justice obtain completely in a more perfect state. 'The moral government of God, thus established, implies in the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of acting wrong as well as right, in those who are the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, that the present life is in fact a state of probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from its being analogous throughout to the general conduct of providence towards us with respect to this world; in which prudence is necessary to secure our temporal interest, just as we are taught that virtue is necessary to secure our eternal interest-and both are trusted to ourselves. 'But the present life is not merely a state of probation, implying in it difficulties and danger, it is also a state of discipline and improvement— and that both in our temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is a state of discipline for youth, youth for manhood, and that for old age. Strength of body and maturity of understanding are acquired by degrees; and neither of them without continual exercise and attention on our part, not only in the beginning of life, but through the whole course of it. So again, with respect to our religious concerns, the present world is fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a state of discipline and improvement for a future one. The several passions and propensions implanted in our hearts incline us, in a multitude of instances, to forbidden pleasures: this inward infirmity is increased by various snares and temptations perpetually occurring from without: hence arises the necessity of recollection and self-government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, and forming our minds to habits of piety and virtue-habits of which we are capable, and which, to creatures in a state of moral imperfection, and fallen from their original integrity, must be of the greatest use, as an additional security, over and above the principle of conscience, from the dangers to which we are exposed. 'Nor is the credibility here given by the analogy of nature to the general doctrine of religion destroyed or weakened by any notions concerning necessity. Of itself it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea; and as much requires an agent—that is, a necessary agent-in order to effect anything, as freedom requires a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same as false; for it is matter of experience, that with regard to our present interest, and as inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we were free; and therefore the analogy of nature leads us to conclude that, with regard to our future interest, and as designed for another world, we shall be treated as free also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at all affect either the general proof of religion or its external evidence. 'Still objections may be made against the wisdom and goodness of the divine government, to which analogy, which can only show the truth or credibility of facts, affords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, if it suggest that the divine government is a scheme or system, and not a number of unconnected acts, and that this system is also above our comprehension. Now, the government of the natural world appears to be a system of this kind; with parts, related to each other, and together composing a whole; in which system ends are brought about by the use of means, many of which means, before experience, would have been suspected to have had a quite contrary tendency; which is carried on by general laws, similar causes uniformly producing similar effects; the utility of which general laws, and the inconveniences which would probably arise from the occasional or even secret suspension of them, we are in some sort enabled to discern; but of the whole we are incompetent judges, because of the small part which comes within our view. Reasoning, then, from what we know, it is highly credible that the government of the moral world is a system also, carried on by general laws, and in which ends are accomplished by the intervention of means; and that both constitutions-the natural and the moral-are so connected, as to form together but one scheme. But of this scheme, as that of the natural world taken alone, we are not qualified to judge, on account of the mutual respect of the several parts to each other and to the whole, and our own incapacity to survey the whole, or, with accuracy, any single part. All objections, therefore, to the wisdom and goodness of the divine government, may be founded merely on our ignorance; and to such objections our ignorance is the proper and a satisfactory answer. 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Religion being now removed, our author proceeds in the next place to that which is Revealed; and as an introduction to an inquiry into the credibility of Christianity, begins with the consideration of its importance. "The importance of Christianity appears in two respects-first, in its being a republication of Natural Religion, in its native simplicity, with authority, and with circumstances of advantage, ascertaining in many instances of moment, what before was only probable, and particularly confirming the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; secondly, as revealing a new dispensation of Providence, originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and conducted by the mediation of his Son, and the guidance of his Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, represented in a state of apostacy and ruin. This account of Christianity being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices of these three Divine Persons being once discovered to us, we are as much obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relation we stand in to God the Father-although the two former of these relations be learnt from revelation only; and in the last we are instructed by the light of Nature—the obligation in either case arising from the offices themselves, and not at all depending on the manner in which they are made known to us. "The presumptions against revelation in general are, that it is not discoverable by reason-that it is unlike to what is so discovered-and that it was introduced and supported by miracles. But in a scheme so large as that of the universe, unbounded in extent, and everlasting in duration, there must of necessity be numberless circumstances which are beyond the reach of our faculties to discern, and which can only be known by divine illumination. And both in the natural and moral government of the world under which we live, we find many things unlike one to another, and therefore ought not to wonder if the same unlikeness obtain between things visible and invisible; although it be far from true that revealed religion is entirely unlike the constitution of nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there anything incredible in revelation, considered as miraculous; whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at |