III.

Viewed by the light of our present knowledge, the great Mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857 seems almost the natural finale of a gradual deterioration, through which the native forces had been passing for years previously. It would, however, be incorrect to assume that military maladministration alone led to the final crisis. Its complex causes were also partly political and partly religious. A policy of annexation, the system of recruiting too exclusively from one class, an over-concentration of authority at head-quarters, and other matters, have been urged as tending to disaffection. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to enter into these points; but it may, at all events, be assumed, that the gradual decline of our native forces in loyalty and efficiency prepared the ground for that final catastrophe which in Bengal led to the destruction of the army, and rendered necessary a reorganisation of our native forces all over India.

At the conclusion of those remarkable campaigns of 1857-58, by which, against enormous odds, we were enabled to recover the shattered elements of our power, the whole subject called for solution, and some portions of it pressed for immediate action. It was not merely that the regimental arrangements required to be recast; there were many appointments, political, semi-military, or civil, hitherto held by officers of the army; and the interests of the present individuals, as well as the machinery of future supply, required prompt treatment. We had, in short, not only a very large body of officers whose regiments had disappeared, and whose future therefore was precarious, but various employments extraneous to the army which had to be provided for. The disorganised condition of our native forces, and the conflicting opinions which almost naturally arose out of such a chaos of revolution, added greatly to the difficulties of the situation. In April 1861, however, a Staff Corps was created in each Presidency. It was not limited in numbers 14 in any of its ranks, and its object was to provide a body of officers for service in India by whom various offices and appointments, hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several corps or regiments in India, shall in future be held.'15 The general provisions of the warrant were, that military rank, rising according to length of service, with commensurate pay and pension, should be given to all who entered, irrespective of their departmental position, or of the duties they might be performing; and as the terms were liberal, the great majority of officers who were then employed away from their regiments were induced to accept them This arrangement pro

14 Lord Hotham's Report, August 1860.

15 Report of the Commission on the Memorials of Indian Officers (Lord Cran. worth's), 1864.

vided as it were for immediate requirements; and it was also laid down that vacancies arising from time to time should be filled by young officers from Queen's regiments, who (after fulfilling certain tests as to languages, &c.), in consideration of the advantages held out to them, would leave their original service, enter the Staff Corps, and adopt an Indian career. The scope of the warrant of 1861 was confined to the object of providing a body of officers for staff duties, extraneous as it were to the army; but in its practical application it at once went far beyond this; and ever since the formation of the three Staff Corps they have in addition included the regimental officers of the whole of the native armies. In short, all officers now seeking what is called an Indian career in any capacity—regimental, staff, or civil-must enter one of the three Staff Corps.

That some such scheme was desirable as a temporary measure, and in order to assure the future of a large body of officers whose prospects were uncertain, and to prevent a paralysis of the public service, may be true; but it does not follow that it is an advantageous permanent arrangement for the public service, or that its provisions are suitable for the promotion of regimental officers. The subject is a very difficult one, and requires careful consideration; but as it has now been in force for about nineteen years, it is possible by a study of the Staff Corps lists to ascertain something of its general working, both as to efficiency and cost.

The following table gives an abstract of the numbers and duties performed by the officers of the three Indian Staff Corps in January 1880, and which will be useful as a reference in the remarks which follow.

Abstract of the Duties performed by the Officers of the Three Indian Staff Corps, January 1880.

It will be observed that the duties divide themselves into three

distinct classes, namely:—

1. Civil duties.

2. Duties of the Supply departments of the army.

3. Military duties.

The first class comprises political residents, commissioners of provinces, magistrates, officers of police and public works, &c. In former days many of these appointments were held by officers, because, as already pointed out, the regimental establishments were looked upon as an unlimited reserve, and partly because, in the then half-subjugated condition of the country, some of the more important of these duties were really semi-military, and it seemed appropriate that they should be held by officers; but the circumstances have been, and are still, rapidly changing, and the duties every day become more of an ordinary and civil character.

It is not, however, to the exceptional employment of officers in positions where their military knowledge may be of real use that objection can be made; but by the present system that object is only accomplished in name. Formerly the officers so employed had, at various periods of their career, joined their regiments on service, and consequently possessed a considerable amount of real military experience. It is hardly the case now, and will not be so in future. The officers who for years past have been joining the three Staff Corps, and have been appointed to the civil duties under consideration, have done so early in life, as subalterns, after two or three years' duty with their corps; so that they join with little or no military knowledge, and never add to it. They have no regiments; and on being posted to magisterial, police, public works, or other civil departments, they naturally become absorbed in their new duties. Nevertheless they rise gradually in military rank, and will ultimately become colonels and generals without ever having performed the duties, or incurred the responsibilities, of the intermediate grades. Their military rank is therefore fast becoming fictitious and nominal, and confers no real distinction on themselves, nor does it enable them to perform their duties any better than if they were in name, as they are in fact, civilians.16

The Times, in a leading article, July 28, 1873, sums up the objections to the Staff Corps very clearly. It says that the whole system is condemned by many excellent authorities, not only on account of the anomalous terms of the service, but also on account of the alleged impolicy of giving military rank and titles to a miscellaneous assemblage of civil administrators, magistrates, collectors,

16 Major-General Sir Henry Norman-who is much in favour of the Staff Corps system-writing in 1869 of the employment of officers in civil duties, said: "They are practically civilians for life, if found suited for civil employment, and henceforth really fit officers will rarely return to military employ if once confirmed in civil employments.'-East India Staff Corps,' Parliamentary Papers, April 1869.

postmasters, police superintendents, and what not, who are never called upon for any military duty, and who are soldiers only in name.'

The arrangement is a very costly one, because these officers all receive promotion and pay (in addition to that of their special appointments) after stated periods of service, whatever their employment may be. This remark indeed applies to the three Staff Corps generally, in all their various grades and duties. No officer waits for vacancies by the death or retirement of his superiors, as in all other armies, but receives his graduated promotion as a matter of course, and a handsome retirement on colonel's allowances,' without any limit as to numbers. The late Colonel Broome, Controller-General of Military Expenditure in 1869, after describing the extravagant cost of the Staff Corps system, said that military history presents no instance of an army so constituted, or of one so costly;' and he added, but unsatisfactory as is the present financial condition of the Indian army, the future prospect is far worse!' 17

6

With regard to the police, it is sometimes argued that in a country such as India their employment is virtually military, and that this is a reason for giving the command of them to officers; but there is a danger under such circumstances that we may be creating a second native army of undefined dimensions; and my view is that a clear distinction should be drawn between military and police duties, and that the latter should be divorced entirely from the armed power of the State.18 The commissioners appointed in 1859 to inquire into the organisation of the Indian army spoke very clearly on the point, as follows:

Your commissioners observe that military police corps have been formed, or are in course of formation, throughout India. They see in this force, in its numerical strength and military organisation, differing, as it does, in no essential respect from the regular Sepoy army, the elements of future danger. They would therefore recommend that great caution be used in not giving to this force a stricter military training than may be required for the maintenance of discipline, lest a new native force be formed which may hereafter become a source of embarrassment to the Government.

It would not be necessary to interdict officers from obtaining permanent civil employment in India in any department should they elect to do sc, but they should leave the army, as there is no advantage in their retaining the fictitious privilege of rising military rank. Any diplomatic appointments of an exceptional or a temporary nature to which it might be desirable that officers should be appointed in future, could be met in the usual way by treating them as supernumeraries of the army, as is done at home.

The second class of the Staff Corps is composed of officers

17 Parliamentary Papers, 1869.

18 The late Lord Sandhurst was of opinion that officers should not be appointed to the police (Ibid.).

who are employed in the civil non-combatant duties of army supply, such as commissariat, pay, and other auxiliary services. It is not necessary to enlarge on the important functions of these departments, because they are well understood and recognised; but the occupations are not military in the usual acceptation of the term; they require special training of their own, and it would seem more appropriate to organise them as separate branches, with departmental titles and promotion as in other armies, and with relative rank, so as to give the officers adequate status. This is all the more important, because, under the present system, these officers, on rising to high military rank, may consider they have a claim to army commands, for which their departmental experience does not qualify them; or if, on the other hand, they relinquish the hope of commanding troops, then the military rank becomes a fiction. It may be concluded, that the Staff Corps arrangements are neither necessary nor suitable to the officers of the two classes above noted, that is, to officers performing civil duties, and to those employed in noncombatant military administration.

The last and most important class of the Indian Staff Corps is composed of about 1134 officers who are really employed in military duties, the great majority being with native regiments of infantry and cavalry. In the arrangements of 1861 it was laid down that six 19 English officers should be appointed for the higher and most responsible posts in each regiment, the subordinate duties connected with troops and companies being assigned to the native officers. To a certain extent this system, which is still in force, is an improvement on that previously maintained. Instead of a nominal aggregate of twenty-six English officers, who were always struggling to escape from their legitimate functions, we have now, at all events, seven, who are present with their corps, and who in point of pay and army rank have every reason to be satisfied with their condition. But there are palpable defects and anomalies in the Staff Corps arrangements as regards the posting of the regimental officers, which were pointed out at the outset, and which certainly do not improve as time One great drawback is that, as the English officers obtain goes on. their promotion from one rank to another by fixed periods of service, and are not permanently posted to regiments, it follows that their attachment to their corps is comparatively of a temporary nature. All regimental appointments are by selection of the Commander-inChief, so that when officers gain advancement in regimental status, in many cases they have to leave the particular corps and nationality with which they have been serving. This is not only injurious to the officers, but very much so to the men, who find themselves constantly under the command of strangers. Thus officers might serve

VOL. VII.-No. 38.

19 A seventh has since been added.

3 A