France has constructed ships specially designed for that purpose, not omitting the power of beating off a defending force. Two ships of war have recently been built expressly designed to surpass in swiftness and power our first-class iron frigates, in which aim they appear to have been successful. The fastest of our iron frigates obtained a speed of 16.5, and the two others somewhat less. Our rivals obtained, in both ships, a speed of 16.9 knots. Moreover, the design of their first-class corvette contemplates a speed of 16 knots, which there is every reason to believe has been obtained. Ten corvettes styled of the second class, eight of which were under construction in 1878, had a speed of 15.5 knots, and two of the third class are credited with a speed of 15 knots. These ships are in addition to older ships called first-class cruisers, whose speed is probably of the same style as that of our old wooden frigates. Thus the attacking power of the unarmoured ships of war rather seems to have the superiority over the defence. Another mode of attack, the distance at which it can operate being limited, is by means of detached ironclads whose speed is fourteen knots and upwards, who would drive off or destroy the unarmoured protecting force, and capture the merchant ships that were slower than themselves. This apprehension led to the construction of armoured ships which on our side might be detached to counteract such a proceeding; three have been specially so designed. Unfortunately the speed of these ships is but thirteen knots. Three ironclads of the earliest design-which, notwithstanding some very good qualities as single ships, I have been obliged to declare totally unfit for fleet service owing to thin armour and great unhandiness-might, with but slight alterations, do far better service in cruising for the protection of trade than in any other way; and there are three others which, with more serious alterations, might usefully be so employed. All of them have a speed exceeding fourteen knots, and, as single ship to single ship, they would not be altogether incapable of defeating in a stand-up fight those ironclads of the second class before mentioned.

Another side of the problem, which has been much discussed, has recently come to the front. No ship of war, up to a very recent date, had been constructed with a speed and coal-carrying capacity combined nearly equal to the fastest merchant ships navigating the ocean. We have built, and so have our neighbours, faster ships armed than any of the great lines of packet and other steamers, but neither of us have built armed ships which could carry a coal supply of ten or twelve days at a speed of fifteen knots. The commercial ships of England (the best of them) have done that; and their French competitors have nearly, if they have not quite, equalled them. Of course, in the event of hostilities between ourselves and other powers, it would be possible for the Government to purchase a whole fleet of the fastest and largest coal-carriers amongst the

splendid merchant ships belonging to these companies; and as very unimportant alterations and additions would suffice to convert such ships into cruisers for the protection of commerce, only against such armed merchant ships as could be purchased and fitted out by foreign powers for the destruction of commerce, we may find, by a sacrifice of a part of our merchant shipping, protection for the remainder. The example given us by Russia in 1878 may show us how to deal a counterstroke to the well-defined task which others have set themselves 'the destruction of our commerce.' It has been much debated whether the whole, or at any rate a large part, of our most valuable unarmed steamships might not be made self-protecting, and the Whitehead torpedo certainly offers to a swift steamship extraordinary facilities for defence. What has been done in this direction has met with much opposition. A strong opinion has been pronounced against incurring the losses and accepting the commercial impediments of such a system, and protection by the Royal Navy-and adequate protection--instead, has been warmly advocated. Both systems or methods must be seriously and vigorously employed; and when all is done, slow steamers and sailing ships, in which is still found a large, though decreasing, percentage of our trade, will even then be in a most hazardous and insecure position.

It cannot be too clearly stated that, powerful as the armed steamer I have described may be for attack or defence against a merchant ship, she will fall an easy prey if, from inferior velocity, she has to fight even a third-class corvette or sloop. Against such ships of war as a neighbouring nation possesses, the only defence for a mercantile navy which can be relied on is to place on the water superior ships in greater number. We have failed to do this. The reason for our failure has been the dread of cost. We took the lead in 1866, we lost it in 1874, and since then there has been no attempt to regain the position we have lost. We had the swiftest and most powerful unarmoured ships in the world. Errors notwithstanding, we maintained that distinction till 1874. Our neighbours, who had thoroughly studied, under all circumstances of prosperity and adversity, how best to make a war, should one occur, fatal to us, understood what a weak point was presented by our gigantic trade, and, finding that we ignored for eight long years the value of the weapon we had forged for its defence, boldly reversed the position-designed and have launched two ships surpassing our great achievement of eight years ago, while we have gone back to second-rate speeds and inferior ships! Perhaps an attempt may be made to deny this assertion, and to cite, as a distinct contradiction of the statement, the case of the two despatch corvettes, which have realised a speed of seventeen and a half knots; but we are so placed in comparison with our rival, that our fastest ships are

The Hecla is an excellent example of what may be done in that way.

immeasurably inferior in armament, and, when the armament approaches to an equality, our speed is seriously less. It is surely childish to say that England, with all she has at stake upon the ocean, with no defeat to avenge, no hundreds of millions recently torn from her to the impoverishment of the nation, no wounds occasioned by foreign and domestic war to heal, cannot afford the cost of building such ships as she requires which shall be superior to all others. Would it indeed have cost more to have kept a lead that we had obtained in 1866, to have made the requisite improvements in that design which time would have pointed out, to have multiplied the numbers of such ships year by year, till all rivalry should have become unavailing, than it will cost to accept a contest, with weapons to a certain extent inferior as to quality, and by no means numerous enough to make up for less efficiency? Is not this courting defeat? We have not acted thus with our first-class war ships which are to fight the Trafalgars and Aboukirs of modern days, though even in this direction there is much to regret, but with the unarmoured fleet that regret approaches to dismay.10

Unwise counsels and false economy have prevailed, and England as a naval power, though a Colossus, is yet found to have feet of clay. It is painful to avow such conclusions, but, such as they are, there is abundant evidence that they have been arrived at, perhaps in exaggerated proportions, by every maritime power in the world. I have been obliged to take many of my illustrations and comparisons from France. I hasten to say that I do not for a moment attribute to that great and gallant nation any concealed or meditated hostility against this country. I believe, on the contrary, that she would forego the good understanding which happily exists between us with great reluctance and only upon great provocation. What she has done and what she will do in this matter, is to secure herself the means of striking hard, and perhaps with fatal effect, a blow against England, should the chapter of accidents convert us into enemies. I regret the chances of striking successfully which we have left open to her and to other navies. I believe that if the statements and conclusions which I have advanced, and which I consider unassailable, were thoroughly known to the British public, they would insist upon

10 I know that to some persons reflections like these have been some what tempered by the declaration following the Treaty of Paris in 1856. They entertain a confident expectation that under it the property of a belligerent will be respected in a neutral ship, and that a belligerent may and will have recourse to this expedient for protecting his trade. I do not concur in this opinion, and the many efforts made by ourselves to set aside the protection so given to neutral flags ought, I think, to convince us that the declaration in question will not be respected by others. The really important advantage we possess over other maritime powers is unfortunately much neglected. It would be easy for us to establish in our numerous and scattered possessions large supplies of that coal which in many ways is the key of the efficiency of our naval power, but in the majority of instances the coal is not where it ought to be, or, if there, is at the mercy of a resolute enemy's gunboat.

measures being taken which should bar out those chances and strengthen our weak points. I have often stated, and I still hold the opinion, that the defective organisation of our naval administration is responsible for the shortcomings of our naval efficiency, and that our present system never can produce a really adequate and efficient navy; but it is not now possible to discuss this subject. My object in this paper has been to bring home to ourselves an exact knowledge of our strength and of our weakness as a naval power. Unfortunately that cannot be done without a reference to the other navies of the world; and the second naval power in Europe-if indeed it be the second-naturally comes into greater prominence than any other. Should a conflict arise between us-which I deprecate as a calamity to the human race-as in its earlier stages we might possibly meet with the fate of Entellus :

Ipse gravis, graviterque ad terram pondere vasto
Concidit-

let us hope that the poet's lines might prove prophetic, and the conclusion be:

At non tardatus casu neque territus heros

Acrior ad pugnam redit.

Præcipitemque Daren ardens agit æquore toto.

VOL. VII.-No. 37.

EE

ROBERT SPENCER ROBINSON.

THE COMMON-SENSE OF HOME RULE.

WHO first applied the phrase 'dismemberment of the Empire' to the Home Rule scheme? Whoever he was, he may consider himself a fortunate man, if his ambition was only to do injury to the proposed measure, or even to do mischief in a general way. For a practical people the English are strangely governed by words and phrases. In political affairs this influence of phrases is specially remarkable. With certain minds a phrase settles a whole question. A few years ago any possible suggestion of electoral reform was made odious to a vast number of respectable persons by the terrible words, 'Americanising our institutions.' The three words were enough; the question was settled once and for ever. None of those over whom a phrase has this magical influence would think of stopping to consider whether, first, the proposed reform would really tend to Americanise our institutions, and next, whether it might not have some good points in it even though it had such a tendency. Then again, who can have forgotten the cabalistic power exercised at one time by the words setting class against class'? The lightning conductor does not draw down the lightning more surely than the recitation of these words could call forth a burst of cheers from the Conservative benches of the House of Commons. In the minds of thousands, Mr. Bright was for a long time only a man engaged in the reprehensible task of setting class against class. Any proposal coming from him was settled by the words, I am opposed, Mr. Speaker, as an Englishman, to an agitation which would set class against class.' 'Dismemberment of the Empire' is the phrase which stands in the place of argument against Home Rule. It appears in every leading article, it is repeated in every speech. In drawing-room, in debating society, club-room, bar-room, on every platform, on every hustings, the words are to be heard, and they constitute for thousands, probably millions, of people, a sufficient and unanswerable argument.

Let us see what is this proposal which is to dismember the Empire. Perhaps it will be well to find out in the first instance what is meant by dismemberment of the Empire. What is the Empire? Is it only England, Ireland, and Scotland? Surely not; we must admit the right of the colonies to be considered part of the Empire.