auxiliary. It shows how favourably Free Trade among us compares with Protection in France, Austria, Russia, and the United States. One strange plea, indeed, the witch has invented at her last gasp, to save her from the stake she has so well deserved. She yields a liphomage to Free Trade as good for Britain, though elsewhere bad. This country, it seems, had just reached by means of Protection a development, which has enabled her to venture safely on Free Trade. An unreformed drunkard might as well say to a reformed one, that he indeed, drunkard A, had by means of constant drinking so fortified his constitution as to be able to face the perils of temperance, but that to himself, drunkard B, who had not yet emptied so many puncheons, butts, and bottles, such premature amendment would be fatal. What is the term granted to Protection, and with which she will be satisfied, to complete her minority, and sow her wild oats?

Scire velim, pretium chartis quotus arroget annus.3

Alas! the wild oats are never sown, the minority never is exhausted; and the blushing maiden, when all her excuses are exhausted, will fight at last to the death in other lands as she did in this, a withered and hideous, but resolute and formidable, hag. The trades of most continental countries, be it observed, are not younger trades than ours, but older; as civilisation is older in France, Spain, Italy, and perhaps also in Germany, than it is in England. By far the most remarkable industry we possessed before 1842 was the Cotton industry; which supplied in 1841 not far short of a moiety of our total exports (23,500,000l. out of 51,500,000l.), and, but for the import duty, would probably have exceeded that proportion. Was it Protection which had given to the cotton industry this peculiar extension? On the contrary, it was distinguished from the other great trades by this, that far the larger part of its products was sent and sold abroad. So that by far the most powerful of our manufactures was by far the least protected. I might, perhaps without impropriety, even say that it was a persecuted trade. Not only was the raw material, until 1842, struck with an import duty, but there was, until a period not much earlier, a duty of excise on printed calicoes. Into these points I will not now enter. What has been the sequel? That under the system of Free Trade, though our business in cottons has undergone a large absolute extension, its proportion of our export trade has diminished. In the great years 1872-3, it supplied, instead of near a half, less than a third of our export trade, and in the years 1874-8 it has stood at about one-third, or say 33 per cent., of the whole, instead of 45 per cent. What is this but to say, in other words, that we cannot eat our cake and have it? The cotton industry could not have the full benefit of Free Trade, because it had enjoyed part of that benefit already. This pretended benefit of Protection Hor. Ep. II. i. 35.

during the first minority of a trade, was just what it had least of all enjoyed; and, consequently, it had grown beyond every other trade. The other trades of the country were kept in swaddling clothes, while cotton had its right hand free. Is it possible to contend that the swaddling clothes were the secret of strength, in the face of the fact that the child but half swaddled grew the most, and that, when the whole was removed from the rest, and the residue from it, then its brothers and sisters began to catch it up? Protection, if a guardian, is a guardian who carries to his own banking account the proceeds of the minor's estate; and the favour now given to Protection in America and elsewhere is simply endowing such a guardian with an annuity instead of ensconcing him in the prison or the dock.

POSTSCRIPT.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

I have been prevented by circumstances from commenting on a very able and valuable argument by Lord Derby on points akin to the subject of this paper. While expressing my concurrence in his general views, and my hope that his address will be of great utility, I may venture to say that my own estimate of the proportion which the income from Foreign Trade bears to the aggregate annual income of the country is materially larger than that of Lord Derby, who places it at one-seventh only.

January 23, 1880.

THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY.·

No. XXXVII.-MARCH 1880.

ENGLAND AS A NAVAL POWER.

THE subject of England as a Military Power' has been well treated in the pages of this Review by one of the ablest and most successful of our generals. In taking up the consideration of England as a Naval Power,' it is my most anxious desire to write about it in a spirit of fairness and impartiality, and to indicate the facts which relate to it, free alike from optimist exaggeration and pessimist depreciation. However much we may regret the stubborn realities which surround us and compel us to give our time, our wealth, and our energies to the unproductive arts of destruction, yet, in the present state of the world and our own position in it, we are not free agents in the matter. We cannot follow the peaceful paths of civilisation and progress, regardless of the intentions and aspirations of those around us. We see masses of men terribly armed, admirably disciplined, whose destructive energies may, at any moment, be launched against their fellow-men, and overwhelm in a common ruin all that we value, all that we and our forefathers have realised through self-sacrifice and devotion. We cannot suffer this unresistingly, even though the blow should not be, in the first instance, aimed directly at ourselves.

Our own place among the nations of the earth is remarkable and providential. We have a great inheritance of glory and responsibility. With all its faults and with all its shortcomings, the English race has left its mark for good over vast and populous regions of the world. We, and those who come after us, inherit with our name great possessions, immense wealth, large risks, heavy responsibilities. It VOL. VII.-No. 37.

DD

would be a dastard's spirit that would shrink from accepting that noble inheritance because of the difficulties it would bring and the sacrifices it would entail. The least thoughtful amongst us, when comparing the small extent of the British Islands thrust out to the North-west of Europe, enjoying no very hospitable climate, and possessing no exuberant fertility of soil, with the marvellous and unparalleled development of the race which has sprung from them, must reflect that we are not here for nothing, and will readily admit that the law, the order, the civilisation, and even the language which that race has diffused over the world, are worth defending at their fountainhead. The duty of doing so, and the sacrifices required, lie plainly before us, and from the necessity of maintaining an armed force there is clearly no escape. That such a force should be essentially conservative and defensive, rather than aggressive and destructive, will, I think, be readily conceded to me; but I may be allowed to say in explanation that no force can be effectively defensive that is not prepared to act offensively on occasion.

Whether or no the navy may still with propriety be called the right arm of England, its efficiency is vital and paramount to the preservation of the Empire. I propose, therefore, to describe its present condition, and to consider its adequacy to perform the duties required of it.

An inadequate navy is an inefficient navy, in the sense of its being incapable of performing the work required of it. It is as well to state this clearly, as the tendency of all administrators of naval affairs and of many writers on the subject is to forget that the efficiency of single ships is not the only element in the efficiency of a

navy.

It was well remarked, in a recent number of the Pall Mall Gazette, that both Conservatives and Liberals declare, and in the abstract believe, that the efficiency of the navy is outside of the domain of party politics, but that in reality the naval administrators of both parties are so afraid of being charged by their opponents with reckless expenditure, that they are very apt, consciously or unconsciously, to deceive themselves and give to the public words instead of facts on the subject.' It is no doubt owing to this frame of mind that we are continually hearing from responsible authorities of the great efficiency of the navy, and of its ability to deal, if not, as has been

As an illustration I cannot but notice the extreme care taken in the Navy Estimates year after year to record the differences in the yearly expenditure of each particular vote. There is always a triumphant reference to any item on which a diminution can be shown. In matters of management and business all capable and experienced administrators know perfectly well the vast, nay, the often antagonistic, difference between true economy and the mere non-spending of money. The former is the key to that efficiency which we all desire, and about which it is more important to hear than whether more or less money has been expended on this or that item than was the case last year. The House of Commons neglects its duty when it accepts this sham instead of the substance of true economy.

sometimes said, with all the navies of the world, at least with a combination of a great number of them. Facts suggestive of a very opposite conclusion pretty frequently present themselves, and we are not favoured with any attempts to explain such discrepancies. A careful analysis of the amount and condition of the naval force, as given by its administrators, will at all events place these matters before us in a clear and intelligible light.

These

It is, of course, well known that the chief naval administrator is the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is necessarily a Cabinet Minister; the politics of the Cabinet with respect to foreign affairs determining chiefly the disposition and amount of the available naval force, as well as the maintenance and preparation of a suitable reserve. two taken together cause the principal items of naval expenditure, and constitute the naval force of the country. In order to secure parliamentary control, the First Lord or the Secretary of the Admiralty makes an annual statement to the House of Commons of the state of the navy, and of the amount of money which will be required for the naval service. Estimates of the proposed expenditure, in more or less detail and more or less explained, are submitted to Parliament. It is proposed to take the statement and estimates for the year ending March 31, 1880, because it is a favourable epoch for the review of our naval position, the vote of credit for about two millions granted in 1878 having enabled the naval administrator to supply admitted deficiencies, and strengthen his position in view of future contingencies.

In round numbers we find that ten millions and a half are wanted for the navy, and that it is proposed to spend this amount in about equal proportions between the two great branches of the naval service, the personnel and the matériel-that is, about five and a quarter millions upon each. My object is to show in general terms what amount of force is produced by this expenditure, beginning with the personnel.

For the year just referred to, 1,938 officers and 20,562 petty officers and seamen, in all 22,500, were voted for the service of the active fleet, which, for convenience, may be called Class A. 2,604 officers with 15,225 petty officers and seamen, in all 17,029, were voted for a first reserve and other duties essential to the maintenance of the active fleet, which may be called Class B. The two classes make a total of 40,329; adding to this number 166 for flag-officers and their retinues, 5,305 boys, 2,400 of whom are under training, and 13,000 marines, about half of whom are serving on shore, we get a grand total of 58,800 officers and men, forming the more or less effective personnel provided by Parliament for the wants of the navy. The so-called non-effective list, for which a separate vote is taken, comprises the names (including those on half-pay) of 3,069 officers.

Class A mans the active fleet, which, on the 1st of January, 1879,