which may be expected to follow on the establishment of really cordial relations between the Persian and British Governments, it seems to me that the country is singularly accessible, not only to our influence, but to our material aid, and that we might thus at no great cost succeed, if so minded, in converting Persia into a permanent and impregnable bulwark of defence to India. In the mean time of course, if we did acquiesce in the Persian occupation of Herat, it would be necessary to make special provision for possible local requirements. Our Candahar frontier would require to be strengthened by the Farrah outpost; we must have the right of throwing a British garrison into Herat, to support the Persians if the place should be really threatened from the north; above all, satisfactory arrangements must be made for the control of the Eymack tribes, for the permanent tranquillisation of the Seistan frontier, and especially for the safety of Mymeneh, a point of the utmost strategic value in the future of Afghanistan.

And now, although it hardly falls within the scope of the present paper, which treats especially of the situation in Afghanistan, to scrutinise the general policy of Russia in Central Asia, still a few remarks on her proceedings as connected with the Afghan frontier can hardly be dispensed with. There can be no doubt, then, but that Russia, so far as Central Asia is concerned, is profoundly dissatisfied with England's policy, and not without some reason. She ascribes, in the first place, her Turcoman failure of last year in a great measure to the want of Persian co-operation, the result, as she presumes, of our growing influence at Teheran. To our counsels may be also due, she thinks, the revival of the Persian claim to the allegiance of the Tekkehs of Merv, and though she can hardly take exception, as a question of policy, to the possible transfer of Herat to Persian jurisdiction, inasmuch as she has fostered and stimulated Persian ambition in that direction since the days of Graf Simonitch and Vitkavitch, still the arrangement would be undoubtedly distasteful to her as an evidence of the good understanding existing between Teheran and London. But her main grievance at present centres on the Oxus. Our Afghan successes have disconcerted her policy, diminishedperhaps for a time destroyed-her prestige, and, as she asserts, become a source of danger to her Central Asian dominion. She is deeply irritated, and will infallibly try to right herself. Possibly the Austro-German alliance and its consequences may find her full occupation in Europe. Possibly she may be paralysed by internal troubles; but supposing her to be in any degree at liberty to follow her inclinations, we may expect reprisals on a large scale during the current year. It will be incumbent on her in the first place to strain every nerve in order to retrieve her Turcoman disasters. Should it be really true that she has been driven out of Chikishlar and her magazines destroyed, including the supplies and war material already .stored at Chat, she may find it beyond her power to resume imme

diately offensive operations in the Steppe from the Caspian base; but she has at any rate an alternative line of attack, and, according to all the information which reaches Persia and India from Turkistan, she is thus already making the most strenuous exertions to advance on Merv by the direct line of approach from the Oxus. Doubtless this would be a hazardous operation, as the intervening desert of above 100 miles can only be crossed in detachments, or by flying columns, in consequence of the very limited supply of water at the wells; and the Persian claim to Merv, if persisted in and supported by us, would also raise a further diplomatic difficulty; but, in spite of such drawbacks, in spite of all that England or Persia can do to the contrary, I have the gravest misgivings that the fate of Merv is sealed, and that sooner or later the Russian flag will be planted on the Murghab. In the meantime, it is only natural to expect that Russia will do all she can to impede our Afghan settlement. Abdur-Rahman Khan, the only surviving member of Dost Mahomed's family who has any strong personal influence in the country, has been already launched, well supplied with funds, from his Samarcand seclusion, and may be expected ere long to make his presence felt upon the frontier. The chief Sirdars of Shir Ali's government, such as Gholam Hyder Khan, the late Naib of Turkistan; Nek Mahomed Khan, Shir Ali's brother; and others who now find themselves unemployed, are received with open arms when they cross the Oxus. Unless, indeed, we can come at once to an understanding with Russia as to our common frontier,-whether, as I should greatly prefer, the river line be retained, or whether Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh be detached from Cabul and formed into a neutral zone-we shall be kept no doubt in a state of turmoil and agitation which will be most prejudicial to the restoration of order at Cabul, and which may even necessitate a campaign upon the Oxus. At present the outlook in this quarter is most unsatisfactory, and although it does not portend immediate or actual danger to India, remedial measures of a decided character are loudly called for.

My sketch would be incomplete without a few parting words on the condition of the tribes, the true Afghan tribes of history, who dwell upon the Indian border. It has been observed--and with truth-that the aggregate strength of these tribes is so considerable, amounting to at least 100,000 fighting men, that their due control forms the most important feature in any general scheme of Afghan government. Fortunately, they are without the means, without even the desire, of combination. They are actuated by divergent in many cases by conflicting, interests. They have been for so long a time virtually independent of Cabul, that it can make but little difference to them whether we annex the upper country, or whether it continues to be administered by native chiefs acting under our supervision. In either case we should have to deal with the great VOL. VII.-No. 36.

Q

tribes separately, and probably on dissimilar terms. In some cases we must apply the strong hand of coercion, and punish raids by retaliation or blockade. In others we may, like our predecessors for centuries back, purchase immunity from attack by blackmail and subsidies. I have seen no reason, indeed, in the events which have transpired since we resumed hostilities with Cabul, to modify the opinions I expressed in August last regarding the tribal clauses of the Treaty of Gandamak. It is, I think, surprising, and bears grateful evidence of the care and skill with which our political officers have conducted relations with the great Afghan tribes, that, notwithstanding the stirring events that have occurred at Cabul, and the incentives thereby offered to insurrection in the passes and around our advanced posts in the mountains, so very little annoyance has been hitherto encountered by us at their hands. It is true that the Shinwaris, the Mangals, the Zaimushts, and others have been severely punished for attacks upon our outposts, and that more recently it has been necessary to chastise the Eastern Ghilzyes for their attempt to interrupt our communications at Jagdallak, as well as to attack the Mohmands at Dakka, who have resented the deportation of Yahya Khan to India; but up to the present time the Khyber and Kohat passes have been open; and, strange to say, the Viziri frontier has been undisturbed. Much will depend in the future on the firmness, tempered with moderation, that may be displayed by the officers who control and execute our frontier policy. I am entirely averse, on principle, to burning villages and shooting men merely because they resist invasion, but I have seen too much of war in barbarous countries not to know that military exigencies in the field override all other considerations, and that what often looks like needless severity is, after all, mercy in disguise. Whatever may happen at Cabul and Ghazni, we shall never, I trust, abandon our positions at Jellalabad and Kuram, and it becomes, therefore, of the more importance so to regulate our dealings with the tribes of the Suliman and Sufid Koh ranges as not only to provide for present emergencies, but to pay due regard to the future pacification of the mountains, and the condition of the inhabitants as permanent and, it is to be hoped, contented British subjects.

P.S.-I take this opportunity of correcting an error which I committed in my last Afghan paper (The Nineteenth Century, No. XXX. p. 385), and which, I understand, has given pain to the friends of so distinguished an officer as the late Sir Herbert Edwardes. Misled by a confused quotation in Macgregor's Afghan Gazetteer, I attributed to Sir H. Edwardes the famous Report on Kuram which advocated the occupation of that valley as early as 1857, a Report which was in reality drawn up by Sir Peter Lumsden, the wellknown Quartermaster-General of the Bengal army. To Sir H.

Edwardes, as a loyal disciple of Sir John Lawrence, such a scheme would have no doubt appeared heretical; but even the united condemnation of all the statesmen of that school will now hardly persuade us that the advance to Piwer was premature or indiscreet. To my mind, at any rate, the wisdom of Lord Lytton in taking so bold a step in advance has been amply vindicated by the ease and celerity with which Sir F. Roberts was able to advance from Ali Kheil to Cabul to avenge the murder of our Envoy; and although, of course, with railways to Candahar and Jellalabad, the Kuram route from India to Ghazni will be of only secondary value, I still look upon a military post in the valley-commanding as it does the districts of Dawer, Khost, and Furmúl-as of very great importance in preserving order and tranquillity through the central mountain region of Afghanistan.

H. C. RAWLINSON.

LORD CHELMSFORD AND THE

ZULU WAR.

No

LORD CHELMSFORD is an incomprehensible person. His conduct of the Zulu war offered the keenest temptation to adverse comment, and criticism of that description was freely brought to bear upon it while as yet his Lordship remained at the head of affairs. But this criticism was in its nature perfunctory, and the appropriate complement of it was obviously a comprehensive résumé of the errors of the campaign up to the period when he resigned his functions of command. It was apparent that such résumé would be in itself a useful contribution to our critical military annals. Nor did there lack other stimulants to the production of a paper of this sort. At Cape Town, after his resignation, Lord Chelmsford cast the imputation upon the commentators who had accompanied the fortunes of his invasion, that their adverse remarks had been dictated by political bias. more overwhelming refutation of this unworthy aspersion could well be conceived, than the categorical proof that hostile criticism had emanated in a unanimous chorus from the representatives of journals of every political colour alike. But just resentment against an aspersion so defamatory prompted naturally, human nature being what it is, to the production of a comprehensive criticism, the warrantable severity of which should punish a wanton calumny on an honourable profession. For myself I may say that I had numerous solicitations to undertake this task. The natural impulse of one whose idiosyncrasy has a family resemblance to that of the sturdy borderer who would 'tak dunts frae naebody,' of one, too, who delights in writing on military topics, was to consent. But other considerations interposed. The heart warms towards a man whom one has seen carrying his head high and displaying worthy demeanour when the air throbs with the roar of the foe, and when the angry bullets are flying thick. Nor was there wanting another incentive to silence on the part of one who knows that what he may write is noticed by and has weight with foreign critics, who are not slow to rejoice over the home-demonstration of a British general's incompetency. Accordingly, I, for one, held my peace; or rather indeed held it not, having portrayed to many audiences Lord Chelmsford's gallant bearing on