bulls and goats was just as sensible and forcible as if we were gravely to assure you that a glass of water could not suffice to cleanse the Augean stables. Some blood could take away sin, or else there is no remission, no forgiveness, and so all men are hopelessly lost. But whose blood could take it away? Could not David's-the man after God's own heart? He was a sinner, and to pardon sin by accepting the sacrifice of a sinner, could have no effect to show forth the holiness and justice of God and God's law;-or had David been entirely spotless, his sacrifice could only be an equivalent for one man, like himself -his blood could not expiate the guilt of millions dead, of millions yet unborn. But could not the angel Gabriel, who never sinned, have taken our nature, and suffered and died, "the just for the unjust ?" No. Gabriel is a mere creature, the insect of a day. And though the whole glorious host of angels had offered themselves as one grand holocaust, (and doubtless those who now rejoice over one sinner that repenteth, would willingly have died for the millions that needed repentance,) had they all come and suffered, it would have been unavailing-for no number of finites can equal an infinite, and nothing less than an infinite was worth a world. The blood of Jesus Christ alone cleanseth from all sin. Not a mere man, not an angel, not ten thousands of angels, but a God.

Yet by his illustration, the philosopher would convince me that this sacrifice would be no compensation to God for my violations of his law. Matthew's obedience, he says, could be no compensation for James's disobedience. He would have me believe that my repentance is of more value in God's sight than the obedience unto death of God's own Son!

For the class of readers whom I now address, it is unnecessary here to go into the commonly urged and never answered. arguments from Scripture, in proof of a vicarious atonement, but I desire to use one arrow from the quiver of the enemy. In war, men often find the captured guns of the enemy more serviceable than their own. The lawyer rightly esteems it a great advantage when he can turn the testimony of an opposing witness in his own favor, for such testimony weighs more in his behalf, than a cloud of witnesses brought to the stand by himself.

We proceed to show the course which has been sometimes taken to be rid of the doctrine of vicarious atonement. The book of Hebrews is so full and clear on this subject, that the

writer of an article in the Christian Examiner (Review of Stuart on Hebrews) endeavors to do away its force by maintaining that neither Paul nor any other apostle was its author, and that it is not canonical. He handles the writer to the Hebrews" without gloves." If he could make out that the writer was what he calls him," a man whose imaginary conceptions are blended with his opinions,"-a man," the conceptions of whose fancy are presented with so much vividness and with such an air of reality that they are likely to be mistaken for his distinct apprehensions of what he believes to be the truth"-if he could make out all this, we say,with a few other things equally feasible, then indeed he had turned the hard and high-walled field of the " Hebrews" into an open common, and thus cleared his way into the other epistles and the gospels, where he might throw out the troublesome rocks of sound doctrine at his leisure, and raise a rank crop of cockle and tares amidst the wheat and barley of God's truth.

"There seems to have been," he says, "in the mind of the writer (to the Hebrews) an obscure and mysterious grandeur thrown around the conception of Jesus Christ as a high priest, which he was unwilling to dispel. His imaginations appear to have become in some measure blended with his belief. He seems to have gazed on the glorious image before him, till his eyes were dazzled and his sight unsteady, and he could not distinguish clearly between realities and figures."*

He proceeds "The writer to the Hebrews taking advantage of the obvious metaphor of a sacrifice, institutes an elaborate comparison between the death of our Lord and the Levitical sacrifices. He insists on this mode of representation as something essential to his purpose. In representing the death of Christ as a sacrifice, the writer to the Hebrews, for the most part, though not always, conceives of it as a sin-offering. In following out this conception, he represents it, to the imagination at least, as having in consequence an intrinsic efficacy to remove the sins of the people. His representation is, likewise,

Verily, the contrast is striking between the weak, visionary, and rhapsodical author of Hebrews, and the solid craniological formation of the author of this article in the Christian Examiner. "How stupid that lion looks, and how short he wears his ears!" said the ass to the bear. "He wears his teeth middling long though," replied Bruin.

that by this great and only necessary sacrifice, the use of all other sacrifices was taken away."

He says, moreover, that " the writer's representations are those into which he was led by his earnestness to discover analogies between the old and new dispensations, and to represent Christianity as the sublime antitype of Judaism."

We have no occasion to attempt any improvement upon the very decisive language of this Socinian writer, as to the bearing which the epistle to the Hebrews has on the priesthood of Christ, the literalness of the sacrifice, its immense importance, and the analogy between the vicarious sacrifices of the old dispensation and "the great and only necessary" sacrifice of the

new.

In quoting from this writer, let it not be inferred that we would charge Coleridge with holding such views as to the authorship of the epistle, or the meaning of the contents. We adduce it merely as showing the belief of one Socinian, at least, as to the real consequences of receiving this epistle as inspired.

In conclusion, we would say that our objection to Coleridge's view of atonement is not so much on account of any bad influence which it had on his own mind, as on account of the effect it may have on others. The philosopher was, no doubt, a Christian. Indeed, passages in his writings on other subjects, would seem to contradict some of his positions and illustrations upon this subject of atonement. But if he really held that Christ's death had any connexion with the justice of God, it is certainly not brought out in the chapter which seems intended to be a full exposition of his views upon the subject of atonement-on the contrary, he explicitly denies it. We have studied the views in this chapter, and have endeavored to give our opinions upon them plainly and with perfect fairness. To learn his views of the Atonement, one must, of course, take the views presented in the portion of his writings where that subject is treated of specifically and fully. It is no part of a reader's business to search elsewhere, to strive to discover passages which might possibly modify or even contradict his plain statements and arguments as they stand in the place where he intends to bring them out fully. One might take a Socinian book and select detached passages which would prove the writer orthodox on all the Bible doctrines; and we deny not that many a sound orthodox work may be proved to be Socinian in the same way. We must consider the writer's main object.

Coleridge, we understand to maintain, that God could be just and the justifier of the believer in Jesus, without any propitiatory sacrifice to the demands of God's law, simply on the repentance of the sinner. When he says redemption is a mystery, he does not mean simply that it is a mystery how God could be just, and still justify the believer in consequence of the sacrifice of Christ; but he means that God could be just and do this without any such sacrifice. He does not mean to say that it is a mystery how this combination of justice and mercy in the Atonement works our redemption, but he denies that there is any such combination in the mystery of redemption-herein joining issue with the apostle, as we think. To our mind, the word mystery, as he uses it, has no signification whatever. We can see very clearly what he does not mean by the word;-but what he does mean is a mystery.

After thus animadverting upon Coleridge's view of atonement, we take the liberty to express our gratitude for the benefit we have received from his writings. The prejudice we imbibed against him from hearsay evidence, we have found melting away as our personal acquaintance with him has increased. We have entirely recovered from the alarm we experienced on first beholding an outlandish and barbarous jargon of " words, words, words,"-and we do believe that if many who are now strongly prejudiced against him, would seriously study, and try to comprehend him, they would acknowledge him to be an original thinker, and a "myriad minded" man; and would sometimes, amidst a mass of strange speculations, and under what seems a hard and useless crust of words, find a diamond of exquisite purity and value.

1844.] An Essay on the Moral Susceptibilities, etc. 189

ARTICLE VIII.

AN ESSAY ON THE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES, MORAL ACTION, AND MORAL CHARACTER.*

THE word moral is used in its broadest sense, to signify that which is influenced to activity by motives. Thus the physical and moral world are contrasted, the one being moved to activity by physical causes, and the other by motives. In a more limited sense, the word moral has reference to mental action as either right or wrong. It is in this restricted sense, that we speak of the moral susceptibilities or moral sense; and in this article it is proposed to discuss the question as to what right and wrong is, and what are the constitutional susceptibilities which influence or move intelligent minds to do right and avoid wrong.

It is needful, first, to settle the question as to the meaning of the terms right and wrong.

The term right in its most generic sense signifies that which is fitted to accomplish the object of a design. Thus a watch is right when it shows the time of the day, a medicine is the right one when it tends to cure; and thus whatever tends to secure the object of a design, either in matter or mind, is called right, and the opposite is called wrong.

In an inquiry, then, respecting the right moral action of mind, it is manifest that it cannot be settled until we first ascertain the object which mind is created to secure; for when we have gained this, any volition is right which tends to secure it, and wrong when it tends to contravene it.

In seeking the answer to this inquiry, we appeal first to reason, and then to revelation. The principle from which we reason is, that the nature of a contrivance shows what is the design of its author. It will, therefore, be first shown, that the object of the Creator, in the formation of mind, is the production of the greatest amount of happiness.

In attempting this, it is needful to show, not merely that mind is designed for the production of happiness in certain degrees, more or less, so that if any degree is attained the end is accomplished, but that it was designed to secure the greatest amount of happiness.

* The author's name is withheld for special reasons.