the time would come when the arms of France would be turned against Germany. He perceived that the restraining power the alliance of England had thus far exercised over the Emperor Napoleon was at an end, and, as was not unnatural or peculiar to himself, he exaggerated the imminence of the danger; for the catastrophe which overtook Austria in 1866 and the still greater catastrophe which overthrew the French Empire in 1870 were long subsequent to his own death.

When the late Lord Derby returned to power in 1858, after having contributed to the rejection of the Conspiracy Bill, which he had previously approved, by a sudden alliance of the Tories with the Radicals, he succeeded to what Count Persigny justly called an héritage de rupture. The relations of the two countries were critical, but the relations of the two Courts were still friendly, though less confiding than they had been. In August, 1858, the Queen and the Prince visited Cherbourg, where they were received by the Emperor and the Empress with all honour. Guns were fired, speeches were made, but the Emperor was grave; there was something in the air. Sir Theodore Martin quotes the significant lines which describe a cooling friendship. They were received

'With courtesy and with respect enough;

But not with such familiar instances,

Nor with such free and friendly conference,
As he hath used of old.'

At that moment, and just before the Cherbourg visit, the
Emperor had concluded at Plombières that secret arrange-
ment with M. de Cavour, which he knew both the Queen and
the Prince must condemn, because it involved war, and could
not fail to plunge Europe into a long course of perils and
difficulties. The secret of the Imperial policy lay heavy on
his tongue, and could not be disclosed, until, on January 1,
1859, it broke forth to the amazement and alarm of France
and of the world. The danger lay, not in the probability of
any attack on England, which the Emperor himself steadily
repudiated, and which Lord Cowley firmly believed never to
have entered into his designs, but in the chances of a war
beginning in Italy, likely to extend to Germany, and avowedly
intended to effect what the Emperor termed a better equi-
librium in Europe.' General Espinasse declared that he
accompanied the Emperor with pleasure to the campaign of
This was
Italy, because it was the first step to the Rhine.
the opinion which excited such universal alarm in Europe, and
powerfully affected the mind and conduct of Prince Albert.

The Emperor himself hesitated, for he soon had reason to perceive that he ran the risk of calling into existence a European coalition against France, and could rely on the support of no other Power; but Count Cavour had entangled him in engagements from which there was no escape, and the war policy with all its risks at length prevailed. Cavour had in fact obtained from the Emperor written engagements, of which the exact tenor has never been disclosed; but the nature of them was such that when Napoleon hesitated to fulfil them, Cavour threatened to go to America, publish the documents there, and blast his fame. Under this compulsion he yielded, and the die was cast.*

It so happened that in the previous month of October the complete failure of the faculties of the King of Prussia had compelled the present Emperor Wilhelm to assume as Prince Regent the reins of government in that kingdom. So that, whilst the course of events had shaken the confidence of Prince Albert in the French alliance, it opened a door to a much closer understanding with the chief State of Northern Germany. It is somewhat amusing to remark that within a few weeks of the accession of the Prince Regent to power, he was favoured with copious admonitions from Windsor Castle from a kinsman who had at least not half his years or his experience. But the laudable intentions of our Prince are the best apology for his zealous interference. What especially pleases me,' he said, 'is the prospect of seeing, for 'the future, among the five Powers, a Continental Power that

6

It is stated by Kossuth in his 'Memoirs of my Exile,' that on December 7, 1858, Prince Napoleon had informed Mieroslaw szky, an exiled Polish general, that war with Austria had become unavoidable, and that his plan was that Piedmont should cede Savoy and Nice to France, and should receive in exchange the province of Milan as far as the Mincio: as soon as the province of Milan is occupied and Austria agrees to its cession, peace would be concluded. Certain it is that these are precisely the terms on which the war was made and terminated by the Emperor Napoleon. On the other hand, Kossuth relates that after the peace of Villafranca, Cavour said to Pietri, in his 'Your Emperor has disgraced me; yes, sir, disgraced me; il m'a déshonoré. My Lord and my God! He gave me his word, he took an oath, that he would not stop until Austria had been finally driven out of Italy; in return, he stipulated that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to him. I persuaded my King to accept the bargain and to submit to this sacrifice for the sake of Italy; and now your Emperor takes his reward and deserts me shamefully half-way.' This scene ended by language of still greater violence. (Kossuth, p. 415.)

presence,

'will take its stand simply and solely upon the domain of justice and equity, and will thus become a corrective element of the highest importance in the great continental policy of 'intrigue.'

It was not given to Prince Albert to look so far beyond his own times into the future as to foresee a Bismarck; otherwise, we venture to say that, although he desired the unity of Germany and even the ascendency of Prussia, there has been much in the subsequent course of events which he could not have reconciled with the domain of justice and equity,' and which he would cordially have disapproved. But in 1859 the prospect of a sincere union with a German Power, capable of holding in check the uncertain and alarming proclivities of the Emperor Napoleon, revived in the strongest manner his German sympathies and hopes. The following letter from the Prince Regent to Prince Albert is one of great interest :

'Events,' the Prince Regent wrote, 'have been only too frequent within the last few weeks, which force upon us the question, What political constellation will the proximate future bring us? and how will England and Prussia be placed in it?

He

'I used to compare the political position of Napoleon with regard to Italy with that of a player at "Zweckmühle," who moves the winning stone to and fro till the time comes to strike the decisive blow. Every day shows more and more the aptness of the simile. The necessity for this decisive blow (viz. his going to war) I always expected would arise when he should see no other means of keeping himself on his throne. I cannot see that this is the case at the present moment. Something else must therefore be the motive power, and I believe it may be shortly expressed by the words, "La guerre ou le poignard," not the French but the Italian poignard. But is this a sufficient motive for a war? Unfortunately the Italian dagger seems to have become an idée fixe with Napoleon. It made him stretch out his feelers, and try where to find allies upon whom he could count. appears to have drawn them quickly back when he found there were no sympathies anywhere with a proceeding, for which none of the Cabinets, calm, prudent, and unmoved by passion as they are, could see a reason. What seems to have surprised him most is, that in England there should not-at least for the present-be any sympathies for this kind of support to be given to the Italians. I believe that the saying will again prove true of him: "Il recule bien pour le moment, And this shows us the position we mais il n'abandonne jamais!" ought to take" to be vigilant and to come to an understanding with one another." This understanding must first and foremost be directed towards removing any cause for war, and therefore to exhort to peace. We are, moreover, moved to take this course by the decision of the last Treaty of Paris.

"The pretext for a war in Italy is to be the form of government of the different States. But the true cause is Sardinia's desire for

aggrandisement. And Governments, which are not concerned with the matter, are asked to take part in it. Where is the statute of international law to be found, that teaches us to wage war against a State, because we do not like its form of government? Or are we compelled to aid the unjustifiable desire for aggrandisement of one State at the cost of another?

'There is also another reason which will drive Napoleon into war, viz. his opinion that a Napoléonide must break through the Treaties of 1815, whenever an opportunity for doing so arises. To this there is a simple answer, that all the other Governments are called upon to ensure the maintenance of thesc treaties. If France be perfectly convinced of this, she will think twice before going to war.

'But, on the other hand, Austria must also be exhorted to desist from taking any provoking steps in Italy. "Whoever provokes wantonly will not easily find allies!" This is a standing phrase of mine with foreign diplomatists here; it expresses my firm conviction. 'Now the question arises for Prussia: What is she to do if France assists Italy in a conflict with Austria? Public opinion has for the last four weeks expressed itself throughout Germany in such a decided manner against France in case of such an emergency, that one cannot shut one's eyes to the fact. And herewith Prussia's line of action would seem to be clearly marked out; for the wars of the Revolution have shown us that, should the French arms be victorious, they would soon be turned against Germany and Prussia, if they had remained neutral and had quietly looked on at all the disasters of Austria.

'But what would be our position if England should declare in favour of France and thereby of Italy in such a war? And further, what are we to do, if Russia should threaten to join such an AngloFrench alliance? Would not such an alliance force a neutrality (though an armed one) upon Germany and Prussia?

'On the other hand, suppose that England and Russia should remain neutral, and Austria be victorious against the Franco-Italian alliance, while Germany and therefore Prussia remained idle spectators-what would be the position of Prussia? How are we to escape the dangers of such alternatives? This question I put to you. I most anxiously await your answer, for it will be decisive for us.' (Vol. iv. p. 380.)

These last words are remarkable. They show how great was at that time the influence of England, even over the policy of Germany, and that in these royal or semi-royal communications between sovereigns, the Prince was exercising a very powerful control over the foreign policy of the country. But it would be unjust to assume that this power was used for any other purpose than to support the policy of the responsible Ministers of the Crown. This important communication from the Prince Regent of Prussia was shown by the Prince to Lord Malmesbury and Lord Derby, then in office, and with their assent he returned to it an elaborate answer, in which he advised the Prussian Regent

to rely mainly on public opinion enlightened by free discussion, to negotiate little, to hold stoutly to the maintenance of existing treaties, and to promote in Germany the organisation of the Federal forces. Prussia and Germany would then always have time to take part in the war with advantage, before France could have so cleared her hands of the Austrians that she could launch all her force against Germany.

This advice was followed, and matters turned out, at the time, better than had been anticipated. The Emperor Napoleon, in spite of his success at Magenta and Solferino, found out that he had none of the qualities of a great commander. He was in no condition to undertake the siege of the great fortresses of the Quadrilateral. It was by no means certain that a prolongation of hostilities would not bring Prussia and the forces of the Germanic Confederation into the field. A great service-greater than he intended or desired had been rendered to Italy. And with equal promptitude and good sense he terminated the campaign and the war at Villafranca.*

* It does not appear in any part of Sir Theodore Martin's volumes that the Prince was aware of the conspiracy (for such it must be called) then going on between the Emperor Napoleon and Kossuth, as the head of the Hungarian exiles; but the disclosures recently made by Kossuth himself powerfully corroborate the case as against the Emperor, and they certainly are of the most extraordinary description. According to his statement, Kossuth was introduced by Prince Napoleon to a secret audience of the Emperor on May 5, 1859, the result of which was that the Emperor undertook to extend the seat of war from the banks of the Po to those of the Danube and the Theiss, and to land a French army in Hungary, Kossuth pledging himself to secure the neutrality of England (which was an indispensable condition) by the overthrow of Lord Derby's Government on the question of its foreign policy, with the assistance of his friends the politicians of the Manchester school: he was then to raise an Hungarian army from prisoners and deserters from the Austrian ranks; and finally, with the open support of France, to raise the whole Hungarian nation into insurrection, with the assistance of Roumania and Servia. Kossuth boasts that he executed the whole of his share in the plot. He came to England to agitate. The speeches he delivered at the London Tavern, at Manchester, and at Bradford, were really the speeches of an agent of the French Emperor, sent to dupe the people of England into a tacit connivance with his designs. The general election followed, in which Kossuth conceives himself to have achieved the defeat of Lord Derby, and to have brought into the Liberal Cabinet at least two members who were pledged in writing to abet the policy of France. The Manchester politicians were the mere tools of Kossuth, who used them, not for the preservation of peace, but for the extension of the war, by paralysing, as far as possible, the action of the Queen's Government. In the