policy as Prof. Fuller elaborates. In any case, why should Bismarck voluntarily undertake the task of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Austria? There is no reason to doubt that if the choice had definitely to be made between Russia and Austria he would, as the German Government did in 1908 and 1914, have chosen for Austria; but his whole policy was directed to removing the need for this choice, which would be followed by all the nightmares he was anxious to avoid.* It would involve the enmity of Russia and a consequent rapprochement between Russia and France, with the probability of an evenly balanced European war fought for no better cause than Austria's possible gain in the Near East.

The real objections to this theory is that there was very little chance of the policy being successful, and that it would not have benefited Austria if it had been successful. In what sense could Bismarck hope to solve the Near Eastern question? Prof. Fuller himself points out that any temporary defeat of Russia would merely postpone the issue, and that Bismarck, if he tackled the problem at this stage, would aim at solving it once and for all; but there is nothing of a permanent character in the defeat of Russia which resulted from the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 and the largely independent development of events in Bulgaria at the same time. This solution was obviously one-sided and even less satisfactory than the 'understanding confined to Bulgaria and Serbia,' which Prof. Fuller considers inadequate as a solution of the question. In the 'nineties a reconciliation was arranged between the Russian and Bulgarian Governments, and the renewed interest of Russia in the Near East in the early years of the new century was followed by open war in 1914. Bismarck's own constructive solution of a division of the peninsula into spheres of influence was, on the other hand, a recognition of the permanent nature of Russia's movement to the south. This movement, as at the Peace of Paris in 1856 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, had been in the past checked by a combination of powers and after Russia had been exhausted by war; but there was no reason to believe that the fresh forward movement,

* Cf. Die Grosse Politik,' IV, 349.

which seemed possible in 1886 and 1887, could receive anything more than another temporary check.

From the reopening of the Eastern crisis in 1885 Bismarck had been striving to maintain good relations with Russia, and discouraging Austria from entering any agreement with England; he recognised that the semi-defensive measures of the Mediterranean group might assume a provocative character which would indeed keep the Russian Government engaged in the Near East, but would do so to an extent which would destroy the European status quo that he was interested in maintaining. Bismarck's promises of support both to Russia and to the opponents of Russia may be due to the fact that one set of promises was genuine, the other mere bluff; a more probable explanation is that Bismarck, relying on the Near Eastern stalemate, was trying to make friends with both sides by giving promises which he would probably not be called upon to fulfil. The policy that he seems in consequence to have followed was not that of strengthening the opposition to Russia but of restraining the Russian Government in its too natural tendency to reply violently to threats. His promise of diplomatic support in return for Russia's promise to maintain the status quo made a peaceful policy apparently profitable for Russia, and, what was even more important at the moment, was flattering to Russia's amour propre. Such a policy, if carried out successfully, would result in a continuance of the Near Eastern stalemate, and, as both Russia and Austria had Balkan ambitions, would be favourable or unfavourable to them in equal degrees. It is only in this sense that Bismarck can be said to have had any intention of solving the Near Eastern question: the solution, such as it was, was temporary, and while it lasted prevented the realisation of Austrian as well as of Russian aims.

The Near Eastern question had baffled many generations of statesmen before Bismarck, and it is but one more example of what may be called the Bismarck Legend which attributes to him the power of permanently modifying one main line of Near Eastern development. That Bismarck was powerful in his day is no justification for a chorus of appreciation which even now assigns to him an influence bordering on omnipotence. German post-war writers may be expected to regard sym

pathetically the work of a statesman who managed, though with increasing difficulty, to preserve intact an impressive creation, and their judgment is in many cases kept in touch with reality by a close acquaintance with the inner working of the diplomatic machine which Bismarck perfected. But, even among British writers the high appreciation of pre-war days has suffered no modification, either through war-time feeling or as a result of the further information furnished by the opened archives of post-war years. Prof. Fuller's view, though governed by sweeping and-unless we can discover a superior morality in the methods of other governments -relatively unjustified denunciations of Bismarckian 'old diplomacy,' does rightly emphasise the many weaknesses in the mighty heritage handed by Bismarck to his successors; only, however, to fall into what is apparently the old exaggeration by the tacit assumption that Bismarck had the power to recreate and modify his structure at will.

A study of the Balkan question in the years following the Congress suggests a state of affairs that even the genius of Bismarck could not disentangle. His diplomacy after 1878 does not perhaps reveal many of his happier touches, but his anxiety to base his alliance system on an understanding between Russia and Austria, and failing that, to avoid the devastating Near Eastern question altogether, meant that his influence was powerfully exerted to maintain the position established by the Berlin Treaty. The fact was that neither Austria nor Russia was willing to concede to the other a decisive influence on Balkan affairs, and the steady growth of Serbian and Bulgarian opposition made the prospect of exclusive influence by either power increasingly remote. In time a new generation came into office, less impressed by the difficulties of the problem, or perhaps less inclined to avoid its risks, and the ambitions of 1878 appear in new or modified forms. But the Berlin settlement remains as a statement of certain permanent realities which neither Balkan nor world wars have succeeded in shaking very materially, and the fact that such wars were long in coming suggests that Beaconsfield's modest announcement, 'Peace with Honour,' was a rather better summary of results than some subsequent opinion was disposed to admit. W. N. MEDLICOTT.

Art. 2.-SIR HENRY WILSON.

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Bart, G.C.B., D.S.O. His Life and Diaries. By Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B., with Preface by Marshal Foch. 2 vols. Cassell, 1927.

THE Irish have always had a sure instinct in murder. Sir Henry Wilson was an Irishman. He was murdered by two other Irishmen. But this murder was something more than an affair between themselves. The victim

a Field-Marshal of the British Empire; he had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the last months of the War, and was at the time of his death a member of the House of Commons. He was a shining mark. The book under review contains the diaries of this distinguished soldier. It is edited by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, also an Irishman; and he has brought to the task the industry of an experienced writer and the devotion of an Irish friend. The diary, as displayed, demands, with the explanatory comment, 753 pages; it begins with the year 1893-the volumes prior to that, and extending eight years further, having been lost. The editor found it expedient to omit some passages, and desirable to exclude certain expressions about individuals; but enough remains.

Sir Henry Wilson did achieve a high place. The evidence is in the public records and upon every page of the diary. He entered the War as a brevet-colonel; he emerged as Field-Marshal, Knight of the Bath, Baronet with a Parliamentary grant of ten thousand pounds. And it was not alone in his own country, and among his own kin, and in his own house that he had honour. His praise comes from emperor, kings, statesmen, soldiers. A legend has grown up that the War brought forth no great soldier, no great statesman. This diary disproves the first part of the allegation, and equally proves the other. It will be convenient in the outset to assemble by categories the positive evidence in the very words of Sir Henry Wilson himself.

The Emperor of Russia, who was not personally acquainted with him, is reported by a trustworthy witness to have inquired, Wilson? that is the very tall man? I hear he is of the first order' (1, 315). The King

of the Belgians, in his own capital, 'said he knew the part I had played, and thanked me.' Again he repeated the assurance, and was 'charming and flattering' (II, 151). The King of Italy in his own bedroom 'begged me to accelerate assistance, and gave me both his hands in saying good-bye' (11, 28). The King of Spain, after luncheon in his palace, 'credits me with more power than I have, perhaps not more than I may have' (II, 278). General Nostitch, in Russia, said that, if it had not been for me, the Germans would have been in Petrograd (1, 313). General de Castelnau, at dinner in the house of Baron de Neuflise, at Chantilly, said 'in front of every one, that only for me England would never, could never, have gone to war, and therefore it was the literal truth that I had saved France.' The diarist may well add, 'a proud moment' (1, 294). General Nivelle 'appealed to me "in the name of God," as I was the only man in England who could save a most difficult situation' (1, 326). General Smuts described him as the Hindenburg and Ludendorf of this country' (II, 8). To Signor Orlando he was le Rothschild des bons espoirs (II, 56). On the way to Rapallo, as the train was passing Marengo, Lloyd George remarked to him, 'You are our Kellermann, and you must save us in our desperate situation. If you cannot, then no one can' (II, 20). When the Supreme Council of War was being set up in Versailles, M. Clemenceau asked who Versailles was, and answered it himself by saying "Monsieur Wilson "Monsieur Wilson "' (II, 45). Dining with his own King, the Prince of Wales also being present, Lord Stamfordham said that I was more responsible for England joining the war than any other man. I think this is true' (1, 189). General de Castelnau kissed him at Mirecourt (1, 362); and at Doullens Foch kissed me twice in front of the whole crowd' (1, 181). Finally, he came within a little of commanding the Canadian Corps (1, 279). The only voice lacking in this chorus of praise is the voice of an English soldier.

.

The justness of this high eulogy will be clear to any one who reads the diary of his activities on the field of battle in the first six weeks of war. The evidence is on every page, that it was he who turned the tide of battle on the Marne, although at the time he held the inconspicuous post of sub-chief of the General-staff, and the