Introduction to Industrial Organization, second edition

Portada
MIT Press, 2017 M03 3 - 440 páginas
An issue-driven introduction to industrial organization, thoroughly updated and revised.

The study of industrial organization (IO)—the analysis of the way firms compete with one another—has become a key component of economics and of such related disciplines as finance, strategy, and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. Although formal in its approach, it is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. This second edition has been thoroughly updated and revised.

In addition to updated examples, this edition presents a more systematic treatment of public policy implications. It features added advanced sections, with analytical treatment of ideas previously presented verbally; and exercises, which allow for a deeper and more formal understanding of each topic. The new edition also includes an introduction to such empirical methods as demand estimation and equilibrium identification. Supplemental material is available online.

Dentro del libro

Contenido

What is industrial organization?
1
11 An Example
2
12 Central Questions
3
13 Coming Next
9
Microeconomics Foundations
13
Consumers
15
22 Demand Elasticity
19
23 Estimating the Demand Curve
26
92 Price Wars
222
93 Factors that Facilitate Collusion
227
94 Empirical Analysis of Cartels and Collusion
232
95 Public Policy
234
Entry and Market Structure
249
Market Structure
251
101 Entry Costs and Market Structure
253
102 Endogenous vs Exogenous Entry Costs
260

24 Are Consumers Really Rational?
29
Firms
35
31 The Firms Production Cost and Supply Functions
36
32 Pricing
43
33 Do Firms Maximize Profits?
52
34 What Determines a Firms Boundaries?
54
35 Why are Firms Different?
56
Competition Equilibrium andEfficiency
67
42 Competitive Selection
74
43 Monopolistic Competition
79
44 Efficiency
81
Market Failure and Public Policy
93
52 Imperfect Information
99
53 Monopoly
102
54 Regulation
107
55 competition Policy and Antitrust
109
56 Firm Regulation
110
Price Discrimination
121
61 Selection by Indicators
125
62 Self Selection
130
63 NonLinear Pricing
135
64 Auctions and Negotiations
140
65 Is Price Discrimination Legal? Should it be?
144
Oligopoly
157
Games and Strategies
159
71 Nash Equilibrium
161
72 Sequential Games
167
73 Repeated Games
172
74 Information
174
Oligopoly
185
81 the Bertrand Model
186
82 The Cournot Model
194
83 Bertrand vs Cournot
200
Comparative Statics
202
Collusion and Price Wars
217
91 Stability of Collusive Agreements
218
103 Intensity of Competition Market Structure and Market Power
264
104 Entry and Welfare
269
105 Entry Regulation
273
Horizontal mergers
281
111 Economic Effects of Horizontal Mergers
282
112 Horizontal Merger Dynamics
288
113 Horizontal Merger Policy
292
Market Foreclosure
303
121 Entry Deterrence
304
122 Exclusive contracts bundling and Foreclosure
312
123 Predatory Pricing
317
124 Public Policy towards foreclosure
320
NonPrice Strategies
331
Vertical Relations
333
131 Vertical Integration
334
132 Vertical Restraints
340
133 Public Policy
342
Product Differentiation
349
141 Demand for Differentiated Products
350
142 Competition with Differentiated Products
354
143 Advertising and Branding
362
144 Consumer Behavior and Firm Strategy
368
145 Public Policy
371
Innovation
377
151 Market Structure and innovation Incentives
381
152 Diffusion of Knowledge and innovations
383
153 Innovation strategy
385
154 Public Policy
391
Networks
399
161 Chicken and Egg
401
162 Innvation Adoption with Network Effects
405
163 Firm Strategy
414
164 Public Policy
419
Networks
420
Index
427
Derechos de autor

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Luís M. B. Cabral is Paganelli-Bull Professor of Economics and International Business and Chair of the Department of Economics at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University.

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