effort in support of Mr. Canning's policy in this particular, but it certainly had his hearty approval; for we find him, when out of office-having retired with Mr. Huskisson-bitterly reproaching the Wellington Administration for a neutrality in the contest between Don Miguel and the Portuguese Liberals so rigorous as to savour of sympathy with the former. "It is impossible," says he (June 11, 1829), "for any man, of late, to have set foot beyond the shores of these islands, without observing with deep mortification a great and sudden change in the manner in which England is spoken of abroad; without finding, that instead of being looked up to as the patron, no less than the model, of constitutional freedom, as the refuge from persecution, and the shield against oppression, her name is coupled by every tongue on the Continent with everything that is hostile to improvement, and friendly to despotism, from the banks of the Tagus to the shores of the Bosphorus; and that she is represented as the key-stone of that arch of which Miguel, and Spain, and Austria, and Mahmoud, are the component parts. Time was, and that but lately, when England was regarded by Europe as the friend of liberty and civilisation, and, therefore, of happiness and prosperity, in every land; because it was thought that her rulers had the wisdom to discover, that the selfish interests and political influence of England were best promoted by the extension of liberty and civilisation. Now, on the contrary, the prevailing opinion is, that England thinks her advantage to lie in withholding from other countries that constitutional liberty which she herself enjoys." In this same speech, Lord Palmerston insisted on the special relations of Portugal and England; and enunciated views on the doctrine of non-interference which may serve, in some measure, as a key to his subsequent policy. "The ground upon which my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Peel), has defended the doing of all that has been done, and the not doing of all that has been omitted, is the principle of non-interference; that is to say, the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbours;

and that one nation has no right to control, by force of arms, the will of another nation in the choice of its government or ruler. To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound, it ought to be sacred; and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation. But in all discussions it is of great importance to come to a clear understanding of the precise meaning of terms used in debate; and let us, therefore, strip the word interference' of an ambiguity which tends to perplex and confuse. If by 'interference,' is meant interference by force of arms, such interference, the Government are right in saying, 'general principles and our own practice forbade us to exert.' But if by 'interference,' is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling in every way, and to every extent short of actual military force, then I must affirm, that there is nothing in such interference which the law of nations may not in certain cases permit; and that the whole history of the connection between England and Portugal has been almost one unbroken chain of such interference on our part; nay, more, that the complaint to which the present Government is most justly exposed, is, not that they have not interfered, but that they have interfered only on the wrong side."

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We come next to his own diplomatic interference, as Foreign Secretary of England, in the dispute between Belgium and Holland, and his non-interference between Russia and Poland. The former two nations had been united by the treaty of Vienna into one kingdom of the Netherlands. land had been annexed to Russia, by the same treaty, on the condition of her receiving a constitution. The Belgians rose in arms against a sister nation, made odious by compulsory annexation; the Poles against the severities of a military ruler, and in defence of their constitution. The interests of freedom and good government seemed at least as strongly concerned in the latter case as in the former. What, then, was Lord Palmerston's rule of differential policy? In a speech, delivered in the early part of 1831, while the contest between the Belgians and Dutch was yet doubtful, we find him saying: "Belgium, in the history of modern times,

never was an independent state; it was first Spanish, then Austrian, then French, and, finally, was conquered from France by the united efforts of Europe. Holland is a state whose existence is known to the world; Holland is a state which the powers of England and Europe have united to maintain. Holland is a state whose independence and integrity concerns the welfare of other countries. We have a right to say to Belgium, 'You are a legislature of yesterday; your independence has hardly been established, and you have no right to claim as yours that which of right belongs to another.'" In short, he argues that the European Powers have a right to interfere, both as to the limits of the new kingdom, and the individual elected to be its sovereign. In a speech, delivered nearly a year later, his lordship, as it seems to us, divests himself of-even repudiates-the honour which his admirers usually attribute to him, that of being the liberator of Belgium: "It has been said that, if we are parties to the separation of Belgium from Holland, we are guilty of a crime; but I say that the English Government were not the cause of this separation; and after it had once taken place, it was our duty to make the best of the circumstances in which we were placed. We certainly refused to take those steps which were absolutely necessary to secure the possession of Belgium to the King of Holland; I mean the having recourse to military measures. And, supposing that we had adopted those steps, it would have been impossible to have receded, and the inevitable consequences would have been that a general war would have been kindled throughout Europe. It would have been a war of opinion, and the consequences, whatever they might have been, would inevitably have been lamentable. We should have been obliged to go on when we once had been engaged in it; and, although England might have the glory of restoring the system of 1815, yet I am confident that we never should recover from the consequences of such a line of policy. When, as I said before, the separation was inevitable, we took the safest course that we could." This sounds very much like saying, "We sided with the strongest party when we had ascertained on which side

I

strength lay." As to Russia and Poland, the noble lord distinctly stated his opinion (July, 1833), that the constitution given by the Emperor Alexander to the kingdom of Poland, in pursuance of the treaty of Vienna, must be considered as resting on the sanction of that treaty; that Russia was bound, in good faith, to preserve that constitution; that the revolt of the Poles did not absolve the Russian Government from the obligations of that treaty; and that England was entitled, if she thought fit, to interfere in enforcing that treaty. Why, then, did England, represented by Lord Palmerston, not think fit to interfere? Because "it would not have been judicious for the British Government to have taken a step which must have led to a general war, in the hope and expectation of rescuing Poland from destruction. repeat, that a general war must have taken place if England had interfered by arms; because, on one side there were Russia, Austria, and Prussia entertaining one opinion; and, on the other, England and France were united in a different interpretation. Austria and Prussia were both in possession of Polish provinces, and both were interested, or believed themselves interested (which is much the same thing), in establishing the interpretation put by Russia on the treaty. And what was the state of the disposable army of these powers? Russia had an army in Poland, against which the Poles were scarcely able to make head; Austria had an army on the Austrian frontier of Poland; while Prussia had concentrated her forces on the Russian frontier; and if the British Government had wished to make the fate of the Poles certain, and to involve them in a contest with forces so superior as to render resistance on their part for a week impossible, they had nothing to do but to declare that they would, by force of arms, compel Russia to maintain the Constitution of Poland. I, therefore, think that the British Government has acted wisely and properly in reference to the interest of the Poles themselves, in contenting itself with the expression of its sentiments on the subject." Again we say, this sounds very like the language of one who hesitates, from political considerations, to do a morally righteous action.

In Lord Palmerston's speech on the

Quadruple Treaty, we find no reasons for interference alleged, beyond the right and interest of England to do so if she pleased. "In the case of a civil war," says he, "proceeding either from a disputed succession, or from a long revolt, no writer on national law denies that other countries have a right, if they choose, to take part with either of the two belligerents." Why did England interfere in this case? Because the cause of the Queen was the cause of "liberty and civilisation," and of the majority of the people? It is not said so; but, "it is an English interest that the cause of the Queen of Spain shall be successful; it is of great importance to this country, that that alliance which has been intimately cemented between the four Powers of the West, England, France, Constitutional Spain, and Constitutional Portugal-it is, I repeat, of great interest and importance, in the most enlarged views of national policy, that the alliance should continue; and it can only continue by the success of the Queen of Spain." In another part of this speech, the phrase, "most enlarged views of national policy," is expanded into "the preservation of the peace of Europe." In another speech, we are told that England has an interest in the success of the Queen of Spain, because "it is the interest of England that Spain should be free, and that she should be prosperous; because it is for the interest of England that Spain should be independent, in order that she may be an element of the balance of power in Europe. Or even if we look at the matter in the narrow view of our relationship with Spain as a trading and commercial country, it is our interest that her resources and her wealth should be developed; and that, for this purpose, she should receive the benefits of that constitution which Martinez de la Rosa has laboured to procure for her."

Passing over the Syrian war, because it illustrates only Lord Palmerston's sense of the importance of maintaining the Ottoman Empire intact, we come to the events of 1848 and '49. The intervention of the French in Italy is thus briefly alluded to :-" The answer we gave (to the French Government) was this: that it was not for us to judge for the French Government, but that in our opinion the differences

which had arisen between the Pope and his subjects might be arranged by diplomatic intervention; and that, in our opinion, that diplomatic intervention ought to have for its object an understanding between the Pope and his subjects, by which the Pope, returning to Rome, would secure to the Roman people those constitutional institutions which were granted last year, and especially a practical and real separation between the temporal and spiritual authorities of Rome." No more decided expression of opinion than this could be obtained from the statesman who had repeatedly declared the right of England to interfere, at least by negotiation and remonstrance, whenever constitutional liberty is attacked, and who had been officially informed of the fact, that the Republican Government at Rome was as thoroughly constitutional in its origin, and as orderly in its administration, as that of England. To the war between Hungary and Austria his lordship devoted at least one long and able speech, and a State paper remarkably luminous and high-spirited. In that speech he admits that the entire Hungarian nation is engaged, not in a revolt, but in defence of its ancient constitutional rights; and represents it as devoutly to be desired, "not simply on the principle of general humanity, but on the principle of sound European policy, and from the most friendly regard to the Austrian Empire itself," that the contest may be brought to an amicable termination. It was in this speech that his lordship used an expression which has been much applauded and is frequently quoted: "Opinions are stronger than armies. Opinions, if they are founded in truth and justice, will in the end prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the fire of artillery, and the charge of cavalry." Why, then, it may be asked, did not the representative of England afford to the Hungarian nation this cheap but omnipotent aid of "opinion?" Why not strengthen them with the encouraging assurance, " England holds that you are right, and desires that you may be successful?" We meet, in his lordship's speeches, with no better reason for this anomalous abstinence than in these sentences:"But there are higher and larger considerations which ought to render the maintenance of the Austrian empire

an object of solicitude to every English statesman. Austria is a most important element in the balance of European power. Austria stands in the centre of Europe, a barrier against encroachments on the one side, and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European power; and, therefore, anything which tends by direct, or even remote, contingency, to weaken and to cripple Austria,-but still more to reduce her from her position of a first-rate power to that of a secondary Statemust be a great calamity to Europe, and one which every Englishman ought to deprecate, and to try to prevent." It is true, that, to the entrance of a Russian_army into the Hungarian territory, Lord Palmerston did object ; but a reply was furnished by his own words and the whole tenor of his policy: "In the case of civil war, other countries have a right, if they choose, to take part with either belligerents."

There are several distinct principles of international relation. There is that which was embodied in the Holy Alliance, and seems perpetuated by Russia-the right of absolute Governments to interfere arbitrarily for the repression of popular power; or, as the advocates of that principle would say, in defence of law and order. The opposite principle is that temporarily decreed by the National Convention of France in 1791-the right of democratic propagandism, or of assisting subjects in revolt against their rulers, -a principle which has now, to our knowledge, no representatives.

A modification of the latter is the assurance given by Lamartine to the Foreign Powers in 1848: "Respect for existing arrangements, but brotherhood with oppressed nationalities." Similar to this is the doctrine of Kossuth: "Intervention to enforce non-intervention," -the doctrine that, if one power interfere in the internal affairs of another, the neighbouring powers should unite to repress that interference. None of these principles, however, have we found embodied in Lord Palmerston's policy, or expressed in his speeches. Of the rights of "oppressed nationalities" we see nothing. Three conditions are necessary to constitute a nation-a

territory marked out by distinct physical features; oneness of race or language; and the capacity of self-protection and self-government. Belgium is such a nation; Spain and Portugal are such; Italy is unquestionably such a nation; and, as decidedly, Hungary. But of these circumstances Lord Pal

merston seems to take no account. Nor does he appear to have faith in what is called by Anglo-Saxons, "the brotherhood of nations,"-by Frenchmen, "the solidarity of peoples." He speaks of their mutual interests as political or commercial communities; but that they may have a moral relation analogous to that of individuals— obligations to succour each other in distress, and protect each other from wrong-there is no evidence that he believes. The following passage of a speech delivered in 1848 applies to communities a doctrine that is deemed misanthropical when applied to individuals: "As to the romantic notion that nations or Governments are much or permanently influenced by friendships, and God knows what,-why, I say that those who maintain those romantic notions, and apply the intercourse of individuals to the intercourse of nations, are indulging in a vain dream. The only thing which makes one Government follow the advice and yield to the counsel of another, is the hope of benefit to accrue from adopting it, or the fear of the consequences of opposing it." Disdainfully negligent of the rights, and sceptical of the morality of nations, his lordship appears equally destitute of that magnanimous spirit which deems the help of the wronged more obligatory when it involves resistance to the strong. Poland, Cracow, Rome, and Hungary, though each confessedly a good cause, are left to succumb, because remonstrance would be vain, and war would be inconvenient to English interests. Liberty and civilisation may have the benefit of English aid in Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, because the Belgians have the sympathies of insurgent Europe; and the despots, Miguel and Carlos, are feeble. In short, the only "principles " that can be gleaned from a careful review of Palmerstonian utterances and doings, are, an irregular, indefinite sympathy with constitutional government, anxiety to maintain the "balance of power" in Europe, and a determination to make both

subservient to the "glory" and interests of England.

It is with almost painful reluctance that the writer has brought himself to this conclusion. Having finished his task, he may confess that he commenced it with a prepossession in favour of Lord Palmerston's political career, as well as the admiration so commonly felt for his talents and energy. A careful collation of the materials for this review has considerably modified the former feeling. On many, a similar effect has been produced by the avowal of his lordship's approval of Louis Napoleon's usurpation. He now stands, as he told Sir Robert Peel two-andtwenty years ago, one of the representatives of the people of England, and the representative of my own opinions." He may, peradventure, occupy once more the proud position of helmsman of the British barque through the troublous waters of foreign politics. Would he in that, or in his more private capacity, expiate his late offence against his own fame and the cause of political morality, in condoning with Napoleon's treason, he may do so by resuscitating within his heart the spirit of his illustrious friend and master, George Canning-by calling in once more the New World to redress the balance of the Old-and by uniting England and America in an array of their "power of opinion" against the power of despotic swords-at once preserve the peace and establish the liberties of Europe; crowning his own grey hairs with a wreath of imperishable

renown.

THOMAS CHATTERTON. THE subject of this sketch is not one around whose name is enshrined the halo of loving or joyous reminiscences; but rather telling of the shadows of a dark and stormy time, of one whom we have, perhaps, only even remembered as associated with a clouded pathway, and an untimely grave! but some extenuation may be urged for the failings of one who died so young, and yet performed so much; and if we can awaken the interest of any in exploring the mysteries of the human heart, and in tracing the corruscations of genius, draw a moral from its career, and a lesson from its errors, some good purpose may be answered.

Thomas Chatterton was born at Bristol, the 20th November, 1752. His father, who was master of the Freeschool, in Pyle-street, died three months before the poet was born; his mother was a plain, worthy woman; gentle, but melancholy. At five years of age he went to school, exhibiting no symptoms of genius; on the contrary, he was remarkably dull and stupid, appearing an incorrigible dunce; in fact, he was sent back on the score of incapacity, until six and a-half years old; even his mother thought him to be an absolute fool, and, when correcting him, frequently told him so.

This inaptitude, for early learning, has been no unfrequent occurrence in the annals of literary men.

But the mental energy was not dead, but sleeping, and a change soon came over the spirit of his dream. There chanced to be, in his mother's possession, an old, musical manuscript, adorned with illuminated capitals; it arrested the child's attention; and to use his mother's words, "he fell in love with it." He quickly began to read; an ancient black letter Bible which she brought him completed the charm, and Chatterton was no longer a dunce.

This, doubtless, gave the first early bent to his antiquarian taste; and the ancient monuments and antique inscriptions, in the church of St. Mary, Redcliffe, amongst which he thus early wandered, strengthened it. At eight years of age he would read from early morning to late at night, and even thus early, were his dawning dreams of ambition commenced. A manufac turer promised to make for the children a present of some earthenware mug or cup that would gratify a child; and he asked the boy what device should be inscribed on his? "Paint me," replied the future creator of Rowley, " an angel with wings, and a trumpet, to trumpet my name over the world!"

He became silent and thoughtful, often weeping, apparently, without a cause, and would frequently absent himself from home for a long period; and, after being severely corrected, he said, "it was hard to be whipped for reading."

At the age of eight years he went to Colston's school; his pocket money all went to a circulating library. His