Errata.

Page 34, line 4 from the top, for I do read I do not

54, note, also pages 57, 58, in the heading, also page 57, line 8 from the

top, and page 58, lines 18, 23, for 'Clark' read 'Clarke'

,, 101, line 14 from the top, for national read natural

,, 158-171, in the heading, also page 158, line 14 from the top, and page 163, line 10, for Assissi read Assisi

,, 316, note, for Archbishop Magee read Archbishop Magee on the Atone.

ment

ESSAY I.

THE BELIEF IN GOD.

PART I.

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from Design has been in past days by far the most popular. Philosophers, it is true, have pointed out flaws in the reasoning and defects in the conclusion, but mankind at large have certainly found it more clear, instructive, and convincing, than any other. But there has been a change. Its popularity has declined, at least with the educated classes. I purpose to begin this essay with a criticism of the argument, and an examination how far the change in its esteem is well founded.

Mr. Mill has described the argument as an induction by the method of agreement; and this, I suppose, would be its logical classification. But in popular language it may be spoken of as an argument by analogy. Our minds, acting under the control of our wills, and employing the physical powers at our com

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mand, produce certain works. We see that these works are adapted to certain ends, and we know that this adaptation arose from contrivance, and that contrivance from design upon our part, or upon that of our fellow men. We conclude that design precedes adaptation. We look upon nature, and we see the same appearance of adaptation. Often, indeed, we see adaptation much more striking, ingenious, and perfect, than any which we can produce. We conclude that nature is the work of some supreme mind and will, in which the design corresponding to this adaptation had its seat.

This argument has been popular, partly from its simplicity, and partly from the number and force of its concrete illustrations. It is not subtle, or refined, or abstruse. It deals with no difficult abstractions or generalisations. It is common sense, rather than metaphysics. And many of the instances in which the reasoning can be applied in the visible world are most striking. When we are contemplating one of the wonderful machines of nature, say the human eye, for example, we feel driven to believe that it had an intelligent maker. Yet the reasoning here gone through, when considered as a proof of the existence of God, has long been felt by thoughtful men to be open to several objections. The principal of these I will state.

We are seeking, it must be remembered, to prove

the existence of an Eternal and Omnipresent Being, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. Now it may easily be shown, in more than one way, that this argument can never prove the infinity of these attributes. It makes God known to us only as the Maker of the Universe; and, since the Universe known to us can never be more than finite, we cannot conclude that its maker is in any respect infinite. We must attribute to him that amount of wisdom and power needed to make the works which we know, and no more. For example, we must believe that he has the power and wisdom needed to make man, but we are not at liberty, without further evidence, to conclude that he has also the power and wisdom needed to raise man from the dead. Further, apart from this necessary limitation in our premisses, it is easily seen that our argument, from the very nature of its principle, could never prove the existence of an Eternal Being. whose principle is the law of that law in a concrete form. we say, intelligent makers. drawn from a series of phenomena appearing in time. One term of such a series requires its predecessor. To apply this principle to the case before us, we have to look upon the whole universe as such a phenomenon appearing bounded in time, and it follows that its Maker, as thus disclosed, would likewise appear

For it is an argument causation, and, further, Works of design have, That is a generalisation

bounded in time. There is no reason why a maker should not be logically required for him. His intelligence, as thus made known, is only a human intelligence, so stupendously magnified as to be thought equal to the task of making the universe; and if so, the mutual adaptation and co-ordination of its faculties is an evidence of design, and, according to our reasoning, a proof of a second intelligent cause. Atheistical writers have actually reasoned thus, and, though their adversaries exclaimed against the proceeding as monstrous, they did not show that it was illogical. The fact is that the law of causation, being essentially a law of succession in time, can never carry us beyond the limits of time. If, indeed, we suppose the universe to have been eternal, and the work of the Deity to have been fashioning and governing, but not creating, this objection would not apply. But, as I have pointed out, this supposition can never be more than a conjecture, and it certainly is not a conjecture generally made by divines.

A more recondite difficulty may be raised as follows, against our argument as a proof of the wisdom of God. When we speak of wisdom and goodness as shown in adapting means to ends, we argue from a proceeding which is common and intelligible enough in the case of finite beings, dealing with outward conditions, to which they must conform