of law, why should this be more than a greater degree of culpability, not an absolute bar to divine mercy?

If, in deciding as to the significance of the Christian revelation, we are guided by the general principles which appear in the teaching of Christ, so far as they can be confidently traced, rather than by individual sayings, then I think that the above considerations will dissuade us from the popular belief that his religion is committed to the doctrine of everlasting punishment. However, before leaving the question, I ought to notice an objection which may perhaps be brought against this view, from a like general consideration of Scripture language. It. is the argument from silence. It may be said, if the reconciliation of the whole moral universe to God, and its consequent happiness, be what we are to expect in the end, how comes it to pass that this great and cheering prospect is not distinctly spoken of in the New Testament?

Now as regards the question, whether it really is spoken of or not, I confess that I have little to bring forward. I can recall only one passage in the Bible which, in my judgment, may be thought to intimate such a consummation. It is 1 Corinthians, xv. 28. And here I would not be confident. But, on the other hand, I think that we might justly question the soundness of the argument from silence in this It proceeds on the assumption that the

matter.

Christian revelation would, from its very nature, make known the general character, at all events, of God's dealings with us for ever. Now this is an assumption as to God's way of communicating with us which cannot, I hold, be supported. If analogy is to be our guide, we must adopt an opposite idea. God has taught us secular knowledge by parts at a time, in an orderly progress, which is still going on, and may indeed have an indefinite course. Something of the same kind may be traced in that knowledge which comes nearest in character to the matter of revelation-the knowledge of moral truth, and of natural theology. In revelation itself we do see stages. The Old Testament is progressive. The New is a sudden advance, although modern criticism would not allow that its ideas were all novelties, nor yet that they were all ushered into the world at once. Why then should we regard that revelation as complete, final, exhaustive? If the next æon in the history of our race is to be that of Kρíois, of separation in the outward lot of the good and the bad, it might well be within the scope of the Gospel to dwell only upon that.1

I have now completed what I purpose to say on the comparison of the precepts and doctrines of Christianity with the dictates of conscience. I have not alluded to what I may call the metaphysical doc

1 See also Birks' Victory of Divine Goodness,' p. 173.

trines of Christianity, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, because they do not seem to me to come within the proper province of the judgment of our moral faculty. It is not God in his absolute nature, but God in his dealings with us, of which that faculty may venture to judge. The truth of such a doctrine as the Trinity must be obviously a matter of pure revelation. At first sight this may seem a serious defect in my evidential argument, but it must be remembered that I have contended not merely that Christian doctrine was to be received only so far as upheld by our moral instincts, but further that the moral superiority and spiritual insight evident in the authors of Scripture gave to their writings a dogmatic authority.

PART IV.

An argument has been brought forward, and has met with wide acceptance in this country, which puts aside the method of this essay--this trying of Christianity by the moral faculty. It defends any seeming contrariety by instancing the like opposition in the course of this present world considered as the appointment of God. I allude to the celebrated work of Bishop Butler, The Analogy of Religion

Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature.' Of course, if this argument be sound, the conclusions of the present essay will not hold. I purpose accordingly to conclude my essay with a brief examination of the Bishop's reasoning.

His book has had a high reputation. It has been relied upon in England, perhaps more than any other, in the controversy with sceptics. Although I venture to dissent from some of its most important positions, I would still wish to express my own participation in the esteem in which it has been held, and my own obligations to the book. Certainly it does abound in marks of deep and careful thought. For instance, it is an evidence of the Bishop's sagacity,' that he should to a great extent anticipate modern views as to the reign of law and evolution. At the same time certain defects, certain points at least in which the knowledge of the present day has advanced beyond that of the Bishop, are, I believe, generally allowed. His argument 2 for the immortality of the soul from our sense of continued identity when important parts of the body are lost, or when its whole constituents are changed, or, again, from the indiscerptibility of consciousness, would not now be urged. His argument for

3

1 'Analogy,' part i. chap. vii. p. 127; part ii. chap. iv. p. 193, edition by the Bishop of Gloucester,.Dr. Halifax.

2 Analogy,' part i. chap. i. 3 Analogy,' part ii. chap. ii. sect. ii.

miracles from the need of a miracle to plant man upon the globe must be given up if evolution is adopted. It's indisputable that he underrated the à priori objection against miracles, and that he fell into a fallacy when he reasoned as follows:-A chance combination of ideas, as to ordinary events, coming into our minds, would never be thought of as actually matter of fact, but a very little testimony would make it probable as such. So a little testimony removes the incredibility of miracles. Again, with our present knowledge of the development of religious belief, we should not, like Butler, bring forward as evidence a supposed primæval revelation. These are individual blots or weaknesses, which would I think be generally allowed, but which, it might be contended, did not materially impair the value of the work. But what I have now to bring forward is a comprehensive objection. It lies against the general scope of the book. That scope is well expressed in a passage which Butler* quotes from Origen- He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from Him who is the author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitu

3

1 6 Analogy,' part ii. chap. ii. sect. iii.

2 See article on Miracles, Smith's Dictionary of the Bible;' Mill's 'Logic,' book iii. chap. xxv. art. 4.

'Analogy,' part i. chap. vi. p. 120; part ii. chap. ii. p. 169, edition by Dr. Halifax. Analogy,' Introduction.

4 6